*1 23328. In Bank. Apr. No. 1976.] [S.F. HARLOW, Plaintiff and
HARLOW Respondent, CARLESON, Director, etc., as Defendant
ROBERT B. Appellant.
Counsel Palmer, General, J. Elizabeth Assistant Evelle Younger, Attorney General, Brown Eleanor Sheridan H. and Attorney Nísperos, Deputy General, and for Defendant Attorneys Appellant. Plaintiff and M. III for
Armando Menocal N. May Christopher Respondent.
Opinion RICHARDSON, J.This and its Le Blanc case Swoap, companion, 304,548 P.2d 744 129 raise the issue of 704], post, page Cal.Rptr. proper [ standard of review to in an be used administrative judicial mandamus action to annul a decision welfare brought assistance. terminating
We conclude within reasoning Strumsky Retirement Assn. (1974) Cal.3d 28 Diego County Employees 805, Pierno benefits, continued welfare for right decisions, review welfare is both judicial “fundamental” purposes “vested,” standard of thereby invoking review.
Harlow Harlow welfare benefits under (respondent) began receiving the aid to the disabled (A.T.D.) permanently totally program 1970 after been medical review state January having diagnosed by *4 reaction, board as from suffering “schizophrenic hebephrenic type.” has or true her name and Respondent forgotten ignored history personal 17. before She has received assistance under the A.T.D. age continuously since for a six-month from program January except period April 1972. Benefits were withheld from her through September during that on the of a basis decision issued period by appellant Department 17, 1972, Social Welfare on that January (Department) holding respon- dent’s no were sufficient to her for A.T.D. impairments longer qualify aid, benefits. for A.T.D. and her Subsequently, respondent reapplied benefits were restored. filed an administrative mandamus action in San the
Respondent Court, Francisco the decision Superior challenging January court, terminate her A.T.D. benefits. The the rejecting independent review, test, standard of the substantial evidence judgment applied found that the administrative decision not was challenged supported by substantial evidence. The that any Department appeals, contending substantial evidence did exist to its determination. support Respondent exist, if asserts in that even substantial evidence did the reply proper standard, standard review was the judicial independent judgment standard, that the under this the trial court would have reversed clearly We decision. with agree respondent. Department’s 1094.5, Code of Civil Procedure section review judicial authorizing decisions, administrative or orders establishes two different standards review. Subdivision of the (c) section that “... in cases in which provides the court is authorized law to exercise its on by judgment independent evidence, abuse of discretion is if the court determines established evidence; are not findings supported by weight if the court determines of discretion is established all other cases abuse in the evidence are not substantial that the light findings supported the whole record.” test, administrative of the evidence
Under
substantial
findings
record, the trial
if,
the entire
after
must
reviewing
upheld
agency
exists
that substantial evidence
agency’s
determines
supporting
court
test, on
the evidence
or
The
weight
independent
judgment
findings.
the evidence
hand,
to reconsider
the trial court
other
requires
Pierno,
of fact. (See
supra,
make its own
Bixby
findings
independent
130, 143-144.)
that,
not
held
with
This court has
exceptions
pertinent
repeatedly
here,
must be
review standard
applied
affects “fundamental
decision
whenever an administrative
substantially
Retirement
vested
(Strumsky
Diego County Employees
rights.”
Assn.,
28, 34;
4 Cal.3d
11 Cal.3d
supra,
71 Cal.2d
914-915
Merrill v.
Motor Vehicles
Department of
89,
Given the above, rationale of the authorities cited would it appear irrelevant that the had retained the Legislature to amend general power or revoke benefits under its (Welf. welfare & granted Inst. programs Code, 13502, 1973, 1216, § Stats. ch. or had 55) § repealed granted counties to or cancel welfare & (Welf. awards Inst. authority modify Code, 13750, 1973, 1216, § Stats. ch. 55). In § context in repealed every which the of the standard of review of administrative question judicial arises, decisions the administrative has the to withdraw the agency power from benefit the individual if certain conditions But exist. we have held that the relevant factor is whether a certain benefit uniformly or whether, or was not right “already possessed” “legitimately acquired,” received, once was it to remain the fact that the permanently. Similarly, lost, to terminated, future benefits is not when no has right irretrievably on the a whether is “vested.” bearing question right continued benefits concluded that to welfare right
Having “vested,” we be consider whether is also considered right may determination, a we have indicated that “fundamental.” In such making should not economic but also its courts only aspect right, weigh “effect... in human and the of it to the individual in terms importance Pierno, 144.) the life situation.” v. at (Bixby supra, p. Applying not to we have held to so fundamental necessitate as principle test, of the various interests application rights interest an in a variance including applicant zoning (Topanga a Assn. Scenic Los Community County Angeles for fn. 1 12]), corporation’s right obtain aof at approval recapitalization (Bixby plan *6 130), the of the bondholders to construction of a p. right bridge prevent (Faulkner v. Cal. Toll 40 (1953) neighboring bridge Bridge Authority 317 Cal.2d P.2d the in and of a water 659]), right [253 company diverting water from a river Water Co. v. Public (Temescal Works particular Dept. 44 Cal.2d In 1]). 90 P.2d those cases we concluded that (1955) the [280 deferential be substantial evidence standard should used in the reviewing administrative decisions. hand,
On the other we have held other of various to be sufficient rights to the individual to review. importance justify independent judgment These have included a widow’s to receive a death allowance right Assn., Retirement the (Strumsky Diego County Employees supra), to continued insurance benefits right unemployment compensation
737
v.
Under
set forth
we
guidelines
foregoing
is a
to
welfare benefits
of a welfare
continued
right
recipient
terms, and in
It is fundamental both in economic
fundamental one.
to
in
.
.
...
of its “effect...
human terms and .
terms
importance
[its]
144.) Like
at
the fife situation.”
v.
individual
in
{Bixby
supra,
p.
which
deemed both vested
benefits
we
the widow’s retirement
benefits
to continued welfare
in
fundamental
right
Strumsky, supra,
Thomas
involves,
course,
also
(See
the individual’s means of
support.
501,
Com.,
Stab.
holding
Emp.
the denial of
are a
insurance benefits
right,”
“property
unemployment
Indeed,
court.)
de novo
a limited trial
which warrants
reviewing
from
to an individual
disabled
employ-
welfare benefits
totally
gaining
retirement
than
to be even more
ment are
important
necessary
likely
a
to earn
still
able
to an individual who
benefits
physically
may
Appellant argues judgment independent welfare in actions held administrative mandamus challenging applicable with the terminations, lack California’s will welfare conformity program 738 42
federal U.S.C. (see 1352(a)(3)) § regulations rendering program for federal we are not with faced Fortunately, ineligible funding. choice afforded under law on one rights preserving hand, other, on continued federal welfare we find assistance for no between the federal and a rule inconsistency requirements requiring standard review in welfare terminations independent judgment cases.
Section 1352(a)(3) of title 42 United States Code a state requires federal welfare assistance to establish a state seeking to single agency administer the to aid disabled. program permanently totally This was made of all of the welfare titles in requirement the Social part Act and still remains of the aid to families with Security part dependent children Thus, (A.F.D.C.). (42 U.S.C. 602(a)(3).) notwith- program § federal administrative of the standing adult aid assumption programs, A.T.D., us, involved in the including case now before program interest, herein remains of considerable question because its presented continued relevance to the A.F.D.C. program.
Neither the state nor the federal “single agency” requirement regula- tions it would interfere with a rule that a adopted implement requiring court use the standard in welfare reviewing termination decisions. Section Code of Federal 205.100(b), Regula- tions, cited is silent on the standard review to be by appellant, applied courts. Its which are concerned with by reviewing provisions, primarily that no other state interfere in the assuring agency may making decisions, rules, and the authorized state in regulations by single agency, no review courts of the way preclude independent by fact-finding process. herein,
The trial court in benefits to erred awarding respondent, in Nevertheless, substantial evidence it test. is clear from applying the record that had the court properly applied independent judgment test, result, it would have reached the same for this latter test more favorable to than that utilized the trial court in respondent ruling affirm, her favor. Our “. . . to or direct the power modify entry a final . . to be end construed to the that a cause judgment. liberally [is] of on a (American Inc. v. may disposed single appeal.” Enterprise, Const., Van Winkle 39 Cal.2d 935]; see Cal. art. VI, Proc., 43, 909; Code Civ. § see also §§ Mantón (1943) Gudger Witkin, Cal. 217]; (2d 1971) Procedure ed.
739 remand, result, were we to 315, Where 4293.) § p. Appeal, record, exercise this we should from the power dispose foreordained further of the case without proceedings. exercised its
Thus,
if the trial court had
we treat this
as
appeal
limited
the record is
our review of
Accordingly,
judgment.
in
substantial evidence
to a determination whether
there exists any
v.
Medical
the trial court’s
Board
of
judgment.
support
{Moran
of
301,
32
308
P.2d
20];
Examiners
(1948)
Bixby
[196
evidence
10.)
The is affirmed. J., J., J., McComb, J., Tobriner, Mosk, J., Sullivan, C. and
Wright, concurred. CLARK, J., Dissenting. Chief the reasons us perceptively given by For in
Justice Gibson
his
in Laisne v. Cal. St. Bd.
dissenting opinion
of