91 So. 423 | Miss. | 1922
delivered the opinion of the court.
The bill of complaint of the appellee, West Louisiana .Bank, in short, alleged: That it was a banking corporation of Louisiana. -That in due course of business it had
The bill alleges that the defendant Harleston has breached the contract by failing to pay the complainant the amounts agreed to be paid for the gravel at the appointed time. It then goes into detail to explain about two checks the defendant gave it upon, which he stopped payment. Second, it alleges that the defendant has refused to allow the complainant through its agent to examine his books. Third, that he had failed to account to complainant for the sales of sañd and gravel over and above the amount of fifty cents a ton, as he was obligated by the contract (which part of the contract we have not set out). It then alleges on information and belief that Harleston solicited Walker to enter into a contract with him for the .operation of the pit independent and in defiance of the complainant’s rights, thereby intending and attempting to abandon his contract with the complainant. The bill alleges that the defendant is indebted to the complainant in a sum approximating twelve thousand dollars, and asks for discovery. An itemized list of the property turned over by complainant to the
The answer of the defendant challenges the right of the bank to maintain the suit upon the ground that the bank is doing business in Mississippi contrary to its charter and against the laws of the state of Mississippi. The answer further alleges that the reason these checks were not paid was because Walker,' the owner of the gravel pit, notified th.e defendant, Harleston, that the bank had breached its contract with him, and that he would look to Harleston to pay him. There are other allegations contained in the answer unnecessary to be here stated. A motion was made to dissolve the temporary injunction, which was heard upon bill, answer, and oral testimony. The chancellor declined to dissolve the temporary injunction, and from his decree this appeal is here prosecuted to settle the principles of the case.
The contention of counsel for the appellant in brief is that, if Harleston unjustly refused to pay the royalty to the bank, the bank had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, and that it is confined to this remedy, citing 27 Cyc. 716. The text therein is as follows:
“Actions for the recovery of rents and royalties under mining leases are in general subject to the rules governing actions for the recovery of rent under ordinary leases.*119 Where the rent or royalty reserved in the leasing of mineral property is dependent on the amount of mineral taken, a bill in equity will lie to compel an accounting by the operator or lessees of the mines” — citing Swearingen v. Steers, 49 W. Va. 312, 38 S. E. 510.
According' to the contract in this case the royalty reserved is dependent upon the amount of mineral taken, and therefore a bill in equity to compel an accounting is maintainable. In fact in this case the bill alleges the agreement allowing the complainant to inspect the books of the company and a refusal on his part to allow complainant to do so. It shows an amount due the complainant, and also asks that the complainant be compelled to discover, which is, of course, an equitable right.
Without going into the merits of the testimony, we think the chancellor was justified in believing that the defendant was attempting to operate the pit in violation of his contract with the complainant, thereby damaging the equipment owned by the complainant and depleting the pit; of the sand and gravel. These facts were sufficient to justify the continuance of the temporary injunction.
It is next contended by the appellant that the complainant bank in making these contracts and agreements relating to the gravel pit, and in purchasing the personal property under the foreclosure sale, was doing business in this state in violation of section 935, Code of 1906 (section 4111, Hemingway’s Code). That the case of Quartette Music Co. v. Haygood, 108 Miss. 755, 67 So. 211, is decisive of this question.
In the Haygood case it will be noted that the music com-pan.v, a foreign corporation, had a branch house in the city of Tupelo, and was conducting its regular business there, Avithout having complied Avith section 935, Code of 3906, by filing a copy of its charter AAdth the secretary of state.
The question sharply presented here is whether of not the complainant bank by the series of transactions, namely, purchasing the Mississippi mortgages, foreclosing
Affirmed and remanded.