The appellee, George Foster, an employee of the appellant, Harlan-Wallins Coal Company, suffered an injury when he fell on an icy road while en route from the coal mine to the mine office to return a lamp he had used on his shift in the mine. The company concedes that the accident occurred on its property and that it had furnished Foster a mining lamp before he entered the mine which he was required to return when he had completеd his shift in the mine. The Workmen’s Compensation Board and the circuit court both held the injury compen-sable.
The question raisеd on this appeal is whether or not the accident sustained by the appellee arose out of and in the course of his employment, within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. KRS, Chapter 342.
To be compensable under Kentucky Law, an injury must be sustained or result from an accident “arising out of and in the course of employment.” KRS 342.005(1). The words "arising out of” the employment as used in the statute refer to the cause of the accident, and the term “in the course оf” the employment to the time, place and circumstances under which it occurred. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co. v. Barnhill,
The appellant urges that appel-lee’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, beсause “appellee fell as a result of snow and ice, which was a risk to which the public generally was subjected.” The fallacy of this broad assertion is revealed by the rule governing cases of this character which was stated in Palmer v. Main,
“ ‘ * * The fact that the risk may be common to all mankind does not disentitle a workman to compensation, if in the рarticular case it arise out of the employment.” * * *. Where the risk is one shared by all men, whether in or out of emplоyment, in order to show that the accident arose out of the employment it must be established that special exрosure to it is involved. But when a workman is sent into the street on his master’s business, whether it be occasionally or habitually, his employment necessarily involves exposure to the risks of the streets and injury from such a cause arises out of his emplоyment. * * *.’ ”
Also, see: Harlan Collieries Co. v. Johnson,
The difficulty usually encountered is in determining whether the facts of a particular case bring it within the adopted rule. However, in the instant case this problem is easy of solution, because the evidence shows that appelleе was at the
Although the amount in controversy does not require a written opinion, in this case we think one is necessary to distinguish it from Harlаn-Wallins Coal Corporation v. Stewart, Ky.,
In the Stewart case the compensation claimant fell on an ice-covered road as he was leaving his employer’s premises after he had completed his day’s work. In the Isbell case compensation was sought by Is-bell for an injury he sustained, before he had reported to work, when he attemptеd to jump over an icy creek on his employer’s premises. In both cases the claim for compensation benefits was asserted under the “going to or coming from work” rule, and we rejected these claims for compensation because it was not shown that the injuries suffered by the claimants had a causative connection with something peсuliar to their employment.
The decisions in the Stewart and Isbell cases conform to our rule that injuries sustained from aсcidents occurring while the workman is en route to or from work are not compensable. W. T. Congleton Co. v. Bradley,
We have attempted to make clear that in the Stewart and Isbell cases we refused to allow сompensation benefits because the claimants relied solely upon the “going and coming” rule as a basis for thеir claim, while in the instant case the compensation claimant does not rely upon that rule. Appellee established that his injury “arose out of and in the course of his employment” by proving that his injury resulted from exposure to the perils of the work he was required to perform, and was performing for his employer at the time of his accident.
Judgment affirmed.