187 N.J. Super. 65 | N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | 1982
This is an appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants dismissing plaintiffs’ action for inverse condemnation of property. In his letter opinion the trial judge concluded that the action was barred by the six-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. The judge held that the declaration of blight on December 14, 1970 was the act that allegedly harmed plaintiffs, that plaintiffs’ complaint was filed on October 16, 1980, almost ten years after the declaration of blight, and that the statute of limitations began to run on the declaration of blight, namely, December 14, 1970. We disagree with this holding as to the statute of limitations, and reverse. This disposition is not intended to imply any opinion on the merits of plaintiffs’ cause of action.
Washington Market Enterprises, Inc. v. Trenton, supra, was a case in which a property owner asserted a cause of action similar to that asserted in the case before us. In Washington Market the declaration of blight occurred in 1967. Thereafter, the City of Trenton acquired approximately half of the properties in the project area. However, in May 1973 Trenton notified the remaining property owners, including Washington Market Enter
Our Supreme Court held that it would be inappropriate to order the municipality to acquire property which it did not want. 68 N.J. at 123. However, it held that plaintiff would be entitled to damages if it is successful in its proofs. Id. The court said:
Upon remand the plaintiff will be required to show that there has been substantial destruction of the value of its property and that defendant’s activities have been a substantial factor in bringing this about. It will be part of its burden of proof to identify the approximate time that this occurred; this will become the date of taking. Plaintiff will then be called upon to establish what the property would have been then worth had there been no declaration of blight and had the ensuing and related activities of the defendant not occurred. Finally, the value of the property as of the date the project was abandoned must be ascertained. This value should actually be determined as of a date somewhat subsequent to the date abandonment was announced so that the market’s response to the lifting of the threat of condemnation can be better evaluated. Plaintiff will be entitled to the difference between these sums, with interest from the date of abandonment. It will also be entitled to interest on the value of its property determined as aforesaid as of the date of the hypothesized taking, calculated from that date to the date of the abandonment of the project, less the excess, if any, of rental receipts over actual disbursements made in maintaining the property for this period. [68 N.J. at 123—124; footnote omitted]
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 provides that an action “for trespass to real property, for any tortious injury to real or personal property, for taking ... personal property, ... for any tortious injury to the rights of another not stated in sections 2A:14-2 [personal injury] and 2A:14r-3 [libel or slander] ...” must be commenced within six years “after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.” An initial problem in this case is determining when plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued. See Fernandi v.
Until the municipal action causing the injury is withdrawn or the project abandoned, the undue infringement upon the use of property continues. See Morey v. Jersey City, 94 N.J.L. 427, 430 (E. & A. 1920); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle,
We reverse the judgment below and vacate the dismissal of this action.