Appellant Bruce Wayne Hargrove was convicted of malice murder in connection with the shooting death of Antonio J amel Jordan on
1. Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was authorized to find that the victim, a confidential informant for the Putnam County Sheriff’s Department, made a controlled buy of cocaine frоm appellant. As a result of the buy, appellant was arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He was later charged with, and pled guilty to, a cocaine charge in federal court.
Following his arrest, appellant told several witnesses that he knew the victim had “snitched” on him, that he “had something” for the snitch, and that he believed the only way he wоuld not be convicted of the cocaine charge was if the victim did not show up for court. Appellant traveled to Milledgeville, Georgia, with his nephew and two others looking for the victim and told a witness that “the police ain’t done nothing but kill that boy.” Upon locating the victim, appellant purchased marijuana from him and drove off. Later that evening, appеllant and two others picked up the victim, drove him to a remote location near some dumpsters, and fatally shot him multiple times in the head and abdomen. Early the next morning, the victim’s body was discovered lying next to the dumpsters in Baldwin County, Georgia. Appellant, having made numerous incriminating comments regarding the victim, was arrested later that morning.
Construing the evidence most strongly in supрort of the verdict, we conclude it was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia,
In evaluating a counselor’s performance, courts must consider both whether counsel failed to meet the minimum standards of objective professional reasonableness, and whether such deficiencies on the part of counsel actually had a prejudicial effect on the defendant. [Cit.]
Simpson v. State,
(a) Appellant claims his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to move to have seven potential jurors struck for cause. “ ‘When a dеfendant in a felony trial has to exhaust his peremptory strikes to excuse a juror who should have been excused for cause the error is harmful.’ [Cit.]” Kirkland v. State,
Whether a prospective juror is subject to a challenge for cause is a matter which lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Higginbotham v. State,
“before a рotential juror is so excused, it must be shown that the individual holds an opinion of the defendant’s guilt or innocence that is so fixed and definite that the individual will not be able to set the opinion aside and decide the case based upon the evidence and the court’s instructions.”
Id.; Stokes v. State,
(b) Appellant contends his trial counsel wеre ineffective for failing to object to testimony and exhibits regarding appellant’s purchase and use of marijuana, as well as to comments by the prosecutor referring to appellant as a “kingpin” and “king of the strip,” which improperly placed his character in issue. However, the record reflects that testimony about appellant’s sale or usе of marijuana was used as part of trial counsels’ overall strategy to gain credibility for appellant by admitting his involvement with drugs and the drug culture while denying his involvement in the murder. Further, appellant’s interaction with the victim just hours prior to the murder was relevant to show opportunity and motive, and any evidence surrounding appellant’s purchase or use of drugs on that day was also relevant. See Grant v. State,
Nor were counsel ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s remarks in closing that appellant was a “kingpin” and “king of the strip,” as there was an аbundance of evidence presented that appellant was a drug dealer who conducted his business in a neighborhood known as “the strip.” See Fann v. State,
(c) Appellant further asserts that trial counsel failed to adequately cross-examine crucial witnesses and that this failure equated to a substantial denial of his constitutional right to cross-examine the witnesses. Vogleson v. State,
(d) Finally, appellant argues that counsel should have attempted to prevent the admission of his in-custody statements regarding his wherеabouts on the night in question as there is no evidence of a Miranda waiver signed by him. However, the record reflects that trial counsel made a strategic decision not to challenge the admissibility of appellant’s statement. During opening statement, counsel informed the jury that evidence would show that appellant did not “clam up” when arrested; that appellant’s statement would explain his whereabouts on the night in question and show he could not have killed the victim; and that the statement served as corroboration of appellant’s alibi defense. Further, there is no evidence showing appellant’s statement was involuntarily made or would have been suppressed if a Jackson-Denno hearing had been conducted. See Morris v. State,
3. Appellant claims the prosecutor made an inflammatory and improper speaking objection when he stated in the presence of the jury, “[w]e’ve already had one snitch killed.” He asserts error in the
4. Nor did appellant’s counsel make a contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor’s references to appellant during closing argument as being a “kingpin” and the “king of the strip.” As a result, appellant’s claim that the prosecution improperly placed his character in issue via these statements has been waived and is not properly before this Court for appellate review. See Mullins v. State,
5. Appellant also сontends the State made an impermissible “golden rule” argument during closing. A “golden rule” argument is one which “regardless of the nomenclature used, asks the jurors to place themselves in the victim’s position.” Humphrey v. Lewis,
6. Appellant claims the Stаte failed to prove venue because the only testimony offered to establish that the murder occurred in Baldwin County was that of a police officer testifying that the body of the victim was found at a location in Baldwin County near some dumpsters. However, additional witness testimony introduced by the State provided evidence that the victim was driven to the dumpster location where he was shot and left for dead. Further, OCGA § 17-2-2 (c) specifically provides that “[i]f a dead body is discovered in this state and it cannot be readily determined in what county the cause of death was inflicted, it shall be considered that the cause of death was inflicted in the county in which the dead body was discovered.” This claim lacks merit.
7. Appellant next enumerates as error certain evidentiary rulings made by the trial court. First, appellant contends the trial court erred in refusing to allow his counsel to ask witnesses whether they were confidential informants. Appellant argues that the fact that a person is a confidential informant is relevant to show bias or motive to testify favorably for the State; thus, the trial court’s ruling denied him the right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination. See Snelling v. State,
“Although . . . appellant is entitled to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of a witness, the scope of such cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” White v. State,
Appellant’s second contention, that the trial court erred in allowing the indictment, plea and sentence from appellant’s federal
Finally, appellant cannot show harmful error arising from the alleged admission of his “mug shot” into evidence as it does not appear from the record that the photograph complained of was actually admitted into evidence, was ever shown to the jury, was actually a “mug shot,” or was even referred to as a “mug shot.”
8. In his last enumeration of error appellant claims his due process rights were violated by the 12-yеar delay caused by his appointed appellate counsel’s failure to pursue his post-conviction appeals. See Threatt v. State,
In determining whether an appellate delay violated a defendant’s due process rights, this Court applies the same four factors identified by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crime occurred on January 7, 1999. A Baldwin County grand jury returned an indictment charging appellant with malice murder for killing the victim by shooting him with a handgun in Baldwin Cоunty, Georgia. Trial commenced on September 7, 1999, and on September 10, 1999, a jury found appellant guilty. He was sentenced that same day to life imprisonment. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on October 4, 1999. Ahearing was held on August 12, 2011 following the appointment of new counsel to represent appellant and the trial court’s granting of appellant’s motion for out-of-time review by amended order entered March 21, 2011. The trial court denied appellant’s motion for new trial on November 17, 2011 and he filed a notice of appeal directed to the Court of Appeals on November 22, 2011. By order entered March 6,2012, the case was transferred to this Court and docketed to the April 2012 term where it was submitted for decision on the briefs.
OCGA § 17-8-75 provides:
Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and prevent the same. On objection made, the court shall rebuke the counsel and by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he may order a mistrial if the prosecuting attorney is the offender.