5 Miss. 187 | Miss. | 1839
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
Whilst the law is rigidly vigilant in guarding and preserving the purity of jury trials, yet it will not for light or trivial causes,
This question has received repeated adjudications, and it will be sufficient for me to refer to some of the decided cases, in which the reasoning is, to my mind conclusive, and the rule clearly defined.
In the case of the Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pickering, 496, the question was very fully considered,-and it is made so clear that Í shall give the language of the Chief Justice, somewhat at length. In giving the general rule he says, “it is a well settled rule of practice incident to all jury trials, that after the jury are charged and have left the court to consider of their verdict, they are to be kept by themselves, without refreshment, and without communication with others, until they have agreed. Any departure from this rule is an irregularity. But it is not every irregularity which will render the verdict void, and warrant setting it aside. This depends upon another and additional consideration, namely, whether the irregularity is of such a nature as to affect the impartiality, purity and regularity of the verdict.”
I might here pause and enquire what irregularity will, and what will not, vitiate the verdict? The objeet of jury trials suggests the answer. Common reason dictates to us what might “affect the impartiality, purity and regularity” of a verdict, and whatever might have that effect, will vitiate it, as will appear from the conclusion of Judge Shaw. After he has reviewed many of the authorities, he concludes by saying, “ the result of the authorities is, that when there is an irregularity which may affect the impartiality of the proceedings, as where meat and
The reason here given runs through all the decided cases. In the case of the Commonwealth v. McCall, I Virginia Cases, one of the jurors separated from his fellows but for a few minutes, and spoke to no one about the trial, and yet a new trial was granted. So in the case of McLain v. The State, 10 Yerger, 241, in which a part of the jury separated from the balance for fifteen or twenty minutes pending the trial; this was held sufficient ground for a new trial. In neither of these cases was any such thing as a tampering with the jury shown, the courts both held that to be unnecessary, and say that it is sufficient that they might have been subject to improper influences. In the last case the court said “there would be no safety in a different rule of prac
In the case of Knight v. Inhabitants of Freeport, 13 Mass. Rep. 218, the verdict was set aside, because a party indirectly interested spoke to one of the jurors and told him he was deeply interested in the case, and that it was a spiteful thing on the part of the plaintiff. This case is only cited for the purpose of showing the degree of strictness necessary to make a valid verdict. The court said “too much care and precaution cannot be used to preserve the purity of jury trials.” This strictness is necessary to give due confidence to the parties in the results of their causes; and every one ought to know that for any, even the slightest intermeddling with jurors, a verdict will always be set aside.
In the case of Perkins v. Knight, 2 New Hampshire Rep. 474, the court say that “it is of the highest importance that jurors should be preserved not only from all improper bias in causes, but even from the suspicion of improper bias.”
It only remains to make an application of these principles to the case before us. If for a separation of the jury, which occasions a mere exposure to improper influence, a new trial will be granted, why should it not in the present case? The thing to be guarded against is improper influence; can it not be as well exercised in the jury room by an individual who has the art and capacity to exercise it, as it can any where else? Woodley was with the jury, how long is not known: who can say that he did not speak of the guilt of the prisoner? Who can say that he had not influence, and that his influence was not exerted to procure a verdict of guilty. If it was legal for Woodley to be with the jury, it would also be legal for any one else to be there. Suppose that he had been the prosecutor, and an influential man, could it be said, under such circumstances, that the verdict was free from suspicion? Could every one rely on it as the impartial voice of the jury? Can there be any difference between admitting a stranger into the jury room, and admitting him into the company of the jury when dispersed.
To me it seems that all the evils are fully incurred by letting
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting from the judgment of the court in granting a new trial, delivered the following opinion.
William Hare was indicted in the circuit court of Hinds county
The errors assigned are, 1st. The rejection of the plea which challenged the array. 2d. The rejection of a special plea of a former arraignment and trial for the same offence. And 3d. The judgment of the court on the motion for a new trial.
1st. The record states that the panel of jurors for the term was drawn by the sheriff and clerk in-vacation, without the assistance of any other officer. This was irregular, for the act of 1830 provides that the venire shall be drawn if in the circuit court, in open court, in presence of the judge, by the clerk and sheriff; but if this shall be omitted, the same may afterwards be done by the clerk and sheriff in the presence of the judge of probates. The plea should, therefore, have been received, unless the act of 1836 can
2. Very few remarks are deemed sufficient to dispose of the second ground of error. The plea alleges, in substance merely, that the prisoner had before been arraigned and tried for the same offence. It does not aver either a conviction or acquittal. It is, therefore, neither a plea of autrefois acquit, or autrefois convict. The plea was attempted in the argument to be sustained on the authority of that great principle of the common law applicable to criminal jurisprudence, that no man shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence. There is no question as to the principle, and it has been expressly sanctioned m this country by a constitutional enactment; In the constitution of the United States it is thus expressed: “Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” This phrase is well known in the law, and is considered as descriptive of the class of punishments inflicted for crimes amounting to felony, whether the punishment.be loss of life or limb. And hence, this clause in the constitution is considered as equivalent to a declaration that no man shall be twice tried for the same offence. In the application of this maxim, it is important however, in each case to consider, whether the party who claims its benefit has been really put in jeopardy, and for the same offence. For a man may have been tried, and yet have been in no jeopardy, in the sense in which this term is understood at common law, and in the constitution. Thus if the court have no jurisdiction, no valid judgment could be rendered, and the maxim does not - apply to a trial before such a tribunal. Or, if the indictment was detective, so that no punishment could be awarded upon a conviction, or, if during the trial, a juror is suddenly taken ill or dies, or the prisoner becomes so indisposed as not to be able to attend his trial, or from any other urgent necessity the progress of the trial is interrupted, another jury may be empannelled, and the prisoner again put upon his trial. And so when the prisoner has been convicted, and the judgment has been arrested at his instance, and likewise, when the jury cannot agree after the proper efforts, and there is no prospect of a verdict, and
3. I come now to consider the objection to the verdict, which is the only remaining subject of inquiry; and regret that I cannot agree with the other judges on this point. This objection is rested on the single ground that Woodley was in the jury room for a few moments, whilst they were consulting about their verdict. This man was an entire stranger to the prisoner, for aught that appears from the record, and there is no fact presented to the court upon which any imputation can be made against him on the score of interest or feeling. He is not shown to have had any motive to prejudice the .cause of the prisoner, and he neither did nor said any thing for or against him. The jury had no agency in procuring his presence, nor are they charged in any thing with impropriety, or misbehavior. Woodley was a mere intruder, nor is it shown that his presence was at all countenanced by any member of the jury. Is this naked, dry fact, standing by itself on the record, sufficient to destroy the deliberate and solemn determination of the jury. I confess I can see no pretext for giving it such influence, either in principle or adjudged cases. On that principle I do not see how any verdict can stand. Verdicts may and should be set aside for a mistake in the jury, by which injustice has been done, or for corruption or partiality in any of the members of the jury; or for such misbehavior as naturally tends to affect the impar
The ground on which the court is asked to vacate this verdict, is the mere impropriety of Woodley, a stranger. The case of the Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. Rep. 516, fully sustains the views which I have here expressed, and as this is the case on the authority of which the majority of the court have considered themselves bound to reverse the judgment in the present case, I will notice it somewhat at length.
Roby was indicted for murder, and convicted. A motion was made to set aside the verdict, on the ground of irregular conduct in the jury. The irregularity complained of consisted of the following facts: — After the jury had retired to consider of their verdict, and after they had been for some time engaged in their deliberations, some of them told one of the constables that they were faint, and asked him whether they could not obtain some refreshment; and the constable thereupon went to a grocer’s shop and procured crackers and cheese, and two bottles of cider, which were carried into the jury-room by the constable and the grocer’s boy; that whilst the constable and the boy were in the room one of the jurors said that two bottles were not enough, and the constable told the boy to bring two more; the boy brought them and delivered them to the constable, who carried them into the room, &c. The court refused to set aside the ver
There was in that .case an irregularity charged against the jury: in this case there is none. In that case the judge says, that the question whether misbehaviour in the jury shalL set aside their verdict, depends upon another question, and that is, whether the misbehaviour or irregularity is of such a nature as to affect the impartiality, purity, and regularity of the verdict. Here the judge gives the rule and also a practical illustration of it, and he did not consider the irregularity complained of in that case as necessarily tending to affect the verdict. How, then, can this court hold that the irregularity of a mere stranger, in which the jury in no way participated, can affect their verdict ?
In the conclusion of his opinion, Judge Shaw observes, that the result of the authorities is, that when the jury have so acted as to expose themselves to influences which may affect their verdict, as when they have improperly separated themselves, or had communications not authorised, then, as there can be no certainty that the verdict has not been improperly influenced, the proper mode of correction is to set aside the verdict.
The rule is herejqifl^down in terms as broad as possible for the prisoner at the jDgj^aijdj^in terms much broader than what the judge in theípréceding paiVof his opinion had allowed himself. For he hasAjJac^ several. authorities in his opinion to show that an unauthorised separation of the jury is not ground to reverse the judgment.;’..had aipongst others, that of the King v. Kinnear, 2 Barn. & Ald. 462; St. John v. Abbott, Barnes, 441. And he might also have fefeiasedWmany other cases, to show the same doctrine, and where the judges have determined that though it is a misdemeanor of the jury, for which they may be fined, yet it will not of itself vitiate their verdict. In King v. Moseley et al. 18 Eng. C. L. Reports, 115, this point was fully settled, after full argument. But as there was no separation of the jury in this case, it is unnecessary to consider this point further. And it is quite evident to me that Judge Shaw could only have intended, at most, by the irregularity referred to in his concluding remarks, some positive act, such as an unjustifiable separation of the jury,
This case cannot therefore, in my opinion, come within the rule thus laid down, any more than the case he was considering. The case of Park, in 2 Roll’s Reports, 85, is identical in principle with the one at bar. In that case a juror was challenged and withdrawn, but went out with the jury and remained with them above half an hour; and yet the judges held that this, though a misdemeanor in the juror, for which he might be punished, yet that it was not of itself sufficient to set aside the verdict. This was as strong a case as the one at bar. That was surely a case where there was as much room for conjecture that improper influence had been exerted, as in the present case; yet the court very properly, as I conceive, refused to indulge in conjecture, or to visit upon the jury the impropriety or misbehavior of a stranger.
I am clearly of opinion that there is no ground for reversing the verdict.