Plaintiff-garnishor, Charon Hare, personal representative of the estate of Marcel D. Hare, deceased, appeals by right the circuit court’s order denying her motion for summary disposition and granting summary disposition in favor of garnishee Frontier Insurance Company (Frontier) on the ground that a New York antisuit injunction was entitled to full faith and credit. We affirm, albeit for a different reason than that relied on by the circuit court.
i
This garnishment action arises out of the drowning death of plaintiffs decedent, Marcel D. Hare (Marcel),
On February 28, 2003, plaintiff, as personal representative of Marcel’s estate, filed suit against Melvin and Starr Commonwealth in the Calhoun Circuit Court. According to plaintiff, Melvin regularly allowed Marcel to “wander the neighborhood” without adult supervision. Among other things, plaintiff alleged that Melvin had been negligent or grossly negligent by failing to properly supervise Marcel, especially given that Marcel was a special-needs child.
Frontier insured Starr Commonwealth under a professional-liability policy and a commercial, general-liability policy. These policies also included Melvin, as one of Starr Commonwealth’s foster parents, within the scope of their coverage. Frontier accordingly provided defense counsel for both Melvin and Starr Commonwealth.
On October 2, 2006, defendants Melvin and Starr Commonwealth jointly moved for summary disposition. On October 25, 2006, the circuit court granted the motion for summary disposition as it related to plaintiffs claims against Starr Commonwealth, dismissing Starr Commonwealth from the action. However, the circuit allowed plaintiffs claims against Melvin to go forward and the matter was scheduled for trial.
On October 24, 2008, plaintiff filed the instant garnishment action in the Calhoun Circuit Court, seeking a writ of nonperiodic garnishment against Frontier in the amount of $393,260 (the amount of the default judgment, plus costs and interest). On November 17, 2008, Frontier filed its garnishee disclosure statement, in which it alleged that it was not indebted to Melvin and was not responsible for any portion of the default judgment entered against her.
On January 5, 2009, Frontier moved for summary disposition. Frontier argued that plaintiffs garnishment action should be dismissed on the basis of a New York “order of rehabilitation,” which had been entered by the supreme court of the state of New York, county of New York, on October 10, 2001, and that purported to bar any and all legal actions against Frontier. Frontier attached a copy of the New York order of rehabilitation to its motion for summary disposition. The order of rehabilitation, entered pursuant to the New York insurance law, provides that Frontier is “incorporated in New York,” that Frontier is “subject to the New York Insurance Law,” that Frontier has become insolvent, that Frontier has “failed to cure its impairment of
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff argued that the New York order of rehabilitation constituted an out-of-state antisuit injunction that was not entitled to legal effect beyond the
Following oral argument, the circuit court issued a written opinion concerning the parties’ respective motions for summary disposition. In that opinion, the court observed that “[t]he dispositive issue in these motions for summary disposition ... is the effect in Michigan of a 2001 Order of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. . . which places [Frontier] in the possession of the Insurance Superintendent of the State of New York. . . and which enjoins all persons from commencing any actions and from obtaining any judgments or liens against Frontier.” Relying in part on Keehn v Charles J Rogers, Inc,
n
We review de novo a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transp,
The standard of review is less clear as it relates to the issue of comity. Courts use the term “comity” in several different contexts. In the traditional context, courts consider purely whether to enforce a foreign judgment as a matter of “comity.” See Hilton v Guyot,
In a slightly different context, courts often speak of “comity” when considering whether to dismiss litigation properly within their jurisdiction on the basis of pending or available litigation in an alternative, foreign forum. See Diorinou,
hi
We conclude that the circuit court erred by ruling that the antisuit provisions of the New York order of rehabilitation were entitled to full faith and credit.
A
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, US Const, art I\£ § 1, provides: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any... State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such.. . records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. [28 USC 1738.]
In turn, § 3 of the UEFJA, MCL 691.1173, provides:
A copy of a foreign judgment[3 ] authenticated in accordance with an act of congress or the laws of this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court, the district court, or a municipal court of this state. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the circuit court, the district court, or a municipal court of this state. A judgment filed under this act has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of the circuit court, the district court, or a municipal court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.
“[A] judgment entered in another state is presumptively valid and subject to recognition in Michigan under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,” Poindexter v
“Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires recognition of the judgments of sister states, ‘collateral attack may be made in the courts of this [s]tate by showing that the judgment sought to be enforced was void for want of jurisdiction in the court which issued it.’ ” Blackburne,
In order to qualify for recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a sister-state judgment must constitute a final judgment on the merits. Alabama ex rel Governor v Engler,
B
“As a general rule, judgments are to be construed like other written instruments, and the legal effect of a judgment must be declared in light of the literal meaning of the language used.” 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments, § 74, p 447. It is true that the New York order of rehabilitation at issue in this case contains no language indicating that it is to be afforded extraterritorial effect beyond the boundaries of the state of New York. However, it is equally true that “a State is permitted to determine the extraterritorial effect of its judgments . . . only ... indirectly, by prescribing the effect of its judgments within the State.” Thomas v Washington Gas Light Co,
c
The New York order of rehabilitation at issue in this case actually consists of two separate parts. The first part of the order declares that Frontier, a New York insurance company, has become insolvent, directs the New York Superintendent of Insurance “to take possession of Frontier’s property,” and authorizes the New York Superintendent of Insurance to perform various
However, the New York order of rehabilitation also consists of a second part. This second part provides that “[a]ll persons are enjoined and restrained from commencing or prosecuting any actions, lawsuits, or proceedings against Frontier” and that “ [a]ll persons are enjoined and restrained from obtaining preferences, judgments, [and] attachments or other liens ... against Frontier’s assets[.]” There is an important distinction to be drawn between the first portion of the New York order of rehabilitation, taking control of Frontier’s assets and appointing the New York Superintendent of Insurance to rehabilitate Frontier’s affairs, and the second portion of the order, purporting to operate as an antisuit injunction and to bar all claims against Frontier. See Cook v Delmarva Power & Light Co,
Bearing these principles in mind, we conclude that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require the circuit court to recognize or enforce that portion of the New York order of rehabilitation purporting to bar “[a]ll persons” from “commencing or prosecuting any actions, lawsuits, or proceedings against Frontier,” and from “obtaining preferences, judgments, [and] attachments or other liens . . . against Frontier’s assets[.]” Because this portion of the order effectively operated as an antisuit injunction, it fell “outside the full faith and credit ambit.” See Baker, 522 US at 236 n 9. Moreover, there has been no showing in this case that plaintiff was ever subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of New York. Because the New York Supreme Court lacked
iv
Nor can we conclude that the circuit court was required to recognize and enforce the antisuit provisions of the New York order of rehabilitation pursuant to the traditional rules of interstate comity.
As explained earlier, courts use the term “comity” in a variety of different ways. See Diorinou,
At times, state courts have given recognition to sister-state antisuit injunctions, and in almost all such circumstances, recognition has been based on the doctrine of interstate comity. See Fuhrman v United America Insurors,
Comity is a discretionary doctrine. See Hilton,
As noted previously, there has been no showing in this case that plaintiff was ever subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of New York. Furthermore, recognition of the New York antisuit injunction, requiring dismissal of the present action, would certainly contravene the rights of plaintiff — a citizen of this state.
v
Nevertheless, we find that the circuit court should have abstained from the present controversy, deferring to the courts of New York on grounds similar to those underlying the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
As explained earlier, abstention in favor of an alternative, foreign forum has often been described as a species of “comity.” See, e.g., Radeljak,
“ ‘Forum non conveniens’ is defined as the ‘discretionary power of [a] court to decline jurisdiction when convenience of parties and ends of justice would be better served if action were brought and tried in another forum.’ ” Radeljak,
Frontier is an insolvent New York insurance company that is subject to the New York insurance laws. Through the order of rehabilitation at issue in this case, the New York Supreme Court has placed its imprimatur on the complicated and intricate process of rehabilitating Frontier’s affairs and restructuring Frontier’s business operations. This process, which is carried out in accordance with the laws of the state of New York and under the direction of the New York Superintendent of Insurance, does not fall within the general experience of
Allowing plaintiffs instant garnishment action to go forward would tend to undermine New York’s attempt to rehabilitate Frontier Insurance Company — a process that has already been ongoing for several years. Given the complexity of New York’s insurance laws and the purpose of New York’s rehabilitation process for insolvent insurers, we conclude that the circuit court should have abstained from the present garnishment action, dismissing the matter and deferring to the courts of New York on grounds similar to those underlying the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Radeljak, 475 Mich at 625 (Markman, J., concurring).
VI
In sum, while the circuit court erred by ruling that the antisuit provisions of the New York order of rehabilitation were entitled to full faith and credit, it reached the correct result by denying plaintiffs motion for summary disposition and granting summary disposition in favor of Frontier. Although the circuit court employed incorrect reasoning in this case, it correctly observed that “[p]laintiff[’s] remedy, if any, against
In light of our resolution of the issues, we need not consider plaintiffs argument concerning Frontier Ins Co v Blaty,
Affirmed. No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219, a public question having been involved.
Notes
Frontier also argued that it was entitled to summary disposition for an alternative reason. Frontier asserted that Melvin’s act of discharging defense counsel and failing to appear for trial violated certain provisions of the insurance policies requiring the insured to cooperate with counsel and assist in defending the action. Because Melvin had not cooperated with counsel or assisted in the defense of the matter, Frontier argued that Melvin was no longer covered under its insurance policies and that it was therefore not required to indemnify her for the default judgment entered against her in the underlying litigation.
With respect to Frontier’s alternative argument, see footnote 1, plaintiff asserted that Melvin’s failure to appear for trial had not prejudiced Frontier and had not nullified the coverage provided for Melvin under the Frontier insurance policies. Plaintiff noted that Melvin had been fully deposed in the litigation and that, although Melvin did not appear, her deposition testimony could have been used at trial.
The UEFJA defines “foreign judgment” as “any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court that is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.” MCL 691.1172.
For the same reasons, the UEFJA did not require the circuit court to recognize and enforce the antisuit provisions of the New York order of rehabilitation. Blackburne,