26 Ga. App. 494 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1921
1. The petition was not subject to general demurrer. Whether the defendant was negligent in permitting the bales of cotton to fall from the dray upon the city streets, whether he was negligent in permitting them to there remain for an undue and unreasonable length of time, and whether such bales of cotton, showing the white sample splotches when left at night in such an unusual place, were calculated to frighten an ordinary roadworthy horse, were questions of fact, which were properly left to the determination of the jury. In like manner, under the allegations of the petition, it was for the jury to say whether the negligence of the defendant, if there was such negligence, constituted the proximate cause of the runaway and injury. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Hartley, 25 Ga. App. 110 (103 S. E. 259) ; Ga. Ry. & Power Co. v. Ryan, 24 Ga. App. 288 (1) (100 S. E. 713). “The most generally accepted theory of causation- . . is that of natural and probable consequences.” Mayor &c. of Macon v. Dykes, 103 Ga. 847, 848 (31 S. E. 443). Thus, where a wrongful act puts other forces in operation, resulting in injury to another, which the jury might be authorized to say were the direct, natural, and probable consequences of the original act of negligence, the wrongdoer can be held liable on the theory of his responsibility for the first ■ efficient cause. Where, however, as in the case just cited, the resultant injuries could not reasonably be foreseen as the natural, reasonable, and probable consequences of the original wrongful act, there can be no recovery.
2. Ordinarily, contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is an affirmative defense of which the defendant can avail himself by proper proof, but it is not the general rule that one who seeks to recover for the negligence of another is required to negative by his petition such lack of care on his own part. Great Metropolitan Shows v. Petty, 7 Ga. App. 236, 237 (66 S. E. 624); Fisher Motor Car Co. v. Seymour, 9 Ga. App. 465(1) (71 S. E. 764).
3. The verdict for the plaintiff was authorized by the evidence.
Judgment affirmed.