Harding v. United States

See case details

HARDING v. UNITED STATES

No. 72-1646

Supreme Court of the United States

June 25, 1973

413 U.S. 964

had, seen, heard, bought or sold, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”

It is my view that, “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.”

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 2A:115-2 is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in

Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with my Paris Adult Theatre I dissent. In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See

Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

No. 72-1646. HARDING v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of

Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973);

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49 (1973);

Kaplan v. California, 413 U. S. 115 (1973);

United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U. S. 123 (1973);

United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139 (1973);

Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483 (1973);

Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U. S. 496 (1973); and

Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U. S. 836 (1973). MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, being of the view that federal obscenity regulation is prohibited by the First Amendment (see

United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U. S. 123, 130 (1973) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting)), would grant certiorari in this case and reverse judgment of conviction.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concur, dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on charges of using an express company for carriage of allegedly obscene matter in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, which provides as follows:

“Whoever . . . knowingly uses any express company or other common carrier, for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce—

“(a) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character

“Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both . . . .”

I adhere to my dissent in

United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 147 (1973), in which, speaking of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, I expressed the view that “[w]hatever the extent of the Federal Government‘s power to bar the distribution of allegedly obscene material to juveniles or the offensive exposure of such material to unconsenting adults, the statute before us is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face.”

Id., at 147-148. For the reasons stated in my dissent in

Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and remand for further proceedings consistent with my dissent in

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 73 (1973). In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See

Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

Case Details

Case Name: Harding v. United States

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Oct 23, 1973

Citation: 414 U.S. 964

Docket Number: 72-1646

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS