36 Colo. 106 | Colo. | 1906
delivered the opinion of the court:
Action for divorce by the appellee, Jessie Harding, against Walter J. Harding, the appellant, on the ground of extreme cruelty. The jury found defend
The fifth subdivision of section 1 of our-divorce act of 1893 (Session Laws 1893, 236), provides that the injured party to- the marriage relation may obtain a divorce if the other party thereto has been guilty of extreme or repeated acts of cruelty, which may consist as well in the infliction of mental suffering as of bodily violence. This is a legislative- affirmation of the doctrine previously in force in this jurisdiction, announced in Sylvis v. Sylvis, 11 Colo. 319, and followed in Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 21 Colo. 16. The only grounds relied on for reversal are that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict and decree, but if so, the plaintiff, by condonation, is estopped to claim a divorce. No fault is found with the sufficiency of the complaint. It charges generally a course of cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant, and this general averment is followed by six specifications of particular acts of cruelty, which are alleged to have occurred at different times. No physical violence was inflicted upon the plaintiff, the evidence being confined -to- acts and conduct of defendant which caused her great mental suffering, impaired her health, and endangered her life. The particular objection to- the evidence is that it does not sufficiently show that plaintiff’s mental suffering in any wise impaired her health, or endangered her life.
1. It would serve no useful purpose to- detail the disgusting facts which the record discloses. It is sufficient merely to say that there is evidence tending to show persistent and continuous ill treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant, consisting of inattention and neglect during her pregnancy, the use of
2. The second ground relied on for reversal is that, even if the evidence establishes the extreme cruelty charged, defendant’s conduct was condoned
This court is not disposed to uphold decrees of divorce for trivial causes, or those resting on inadequate proof, and when satisfied that good and sufficient grounds have not been established, it is not slow to set them aside. Upon plaintiff’s evidence, supposing it to be true, and the inferences properly deducible therefrom, the jury were warranted in the verdict they returned. They, as well as the trial judge who approved their finding, saw the witnesses and heard them testify, and were better able than we are to determine their .credibility.
Por the reasons given the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Chief Justice G-abbert and Mr. Justice Steele concur. -