174 Mass. 268 | Mass. | 1899
The question in this case is whether the moiety of the rest and residue of which the son had the income for life vested in the children of the son living at his death, or in the children of the son living at the death of the testator. We think that, in view of the peculiar language of the will, the moiety must be regarded as vesting in the children who were living at the son’s death. It seems to us that the words “on the decease of . . . my said son or daughter, then, and not till then, I give and devise the said moiety ... to their respective children in fee,” when taken in connection with what follows, more naturally point
The defendant relies on Shattuck v. Stedman, 2 Pick. 468, and Marsh v. Hoyt, 161 Mass. 459. But in neither of those cases was it manifest, as we think it is here, that the remainder should not vest till the death of the life tenant. Of the two cases Shattuck v. Stedman more nearly resembles this, but even that differs from it in material respects.
Upon the whole case we are of the opinion, as already stated, that the children living at the death of the son take. Olney v. Hull, 21 Pick. 311. Hale v. Hobson, 167 Mass. 397. Heard v. Read, 169 Mass. 216. Decree accordingly.