14 F. 705 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota | 1882
The note sned on was executed and made paya-
ble in the state of Minnesota, and is therefore to be interpreted according to the laws of that state; and in determining the question as to whether it is to be regarded as a promissory note, negotiable by the law-merchant, within the meaning of the act of congress of March 3, 1875, it is proper to inquire what is the law of the state upon the subject, as determined by its supreme court.
It has been held that a state statute, defining the requisites of a negotiable promissory note, will be followed by a federal court sitting in that state in construing a contract made and to be performed therein. Green v. Weston, 7 Biss. 360. The same rule should, we think, obtain where the law of the state has been declared by the adjudication of its highest judicial tribunal. The parties are pre
The question, therefore, is whether the instrument sued on is a negotiable promissory note according to the law of Minnesota. It is not claimed that there is any statute upon the subject, but it is in- ' sist§d that the question has been decided by the supreme court of the-state in the case of Jones v. Radatz, 27 Minn. 240; [S. C. 6 N. W. Rep. 800.] That was a suit upon a promissory note in the usual form, except that it provided for payment by the maker of “reasonable attorney’s fees if suit should be instituted for its collection.” It was held not to be a negotiable promissory note, the court saying:
“ Stipulations collateral to the obligation, such as relating to security, or to the remedy to enforce the obligation, have been held not to affect the negotiable character of the instrument. But we know of no case which concedes that the fixed character of the obligation may be changed, either by making it uncertain as to amount or time of payment, or person by whom or to whom payable, or by making it depend to any extent on a contingency without depriving the instrument of the negotiability. Certainty in these respects is essential to negotiability.”
It is manifest that the instrument sued on in the present case is not a negotiable promissory note within the rule laid down in this decision. The instrument is uncertain as to amount, for the 10 per cent, attorney’s fees is only to be paid in case suit is brought upon it; it is, as to the attorney’s fees, uncertain as to time of payment, for such fees are only to be pal'd after suit, which may be brought at any time within the statute of limitations. It is uncertain as to the person to whom payable, because we must presume that payment of attorney’s fees is to be made to whomsoever as attorney shall bring suit; and it is uncertain, because it depends upon a contingency, to-wit, the bringing of a suit. It has, it is true, one element of certainty not found in the instrument passed upon by the supreme court of Minnesota: the amount to be joaid as attorneys fees is fixed in the present case, while it was left indefinite in that case. But all the other elements of uncertainty remain, and they are sufficient, according to the law as declared by the supreme court of this state, to deprive .the instrument of its negotiability. Without, therefore, determining what construction should be given to the instrument sued on, in the absence of any settled rule having the force of law within the state where the contract is made and to be performed, and without reviewing the conflicting authorities upon that question, we think
Following the rule laid down in Berger v. County Com’rs, 2 McCrary, 483, [S. C. 5 Fed. Rep. 23,] we must also hold that the cause was not removable, because it could not have been originally instituted in this court by the plaintiff as assignee of the instrument sued on.
The motion to remand must be sustained. So ordered.
See note to Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Sevier, ante, 662, 667.
