Hardin v. HardinHardin v. Hardin
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Jordan
On May 17, 1906, appellant applied to the Hendricks Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus. In bis verified complaint be alleges that be “is tbe grandfather of Mills Hardin, a minor child of tbe age of five years, to whose custody and possession be is rightfully entitled; * * * that defendant, Lora Hardin, has wrongfully seized tbe body of said child and removed him from the state’ of Kentucky, and now illegally and without cause restrains him in the town of Danville, Hendricks county, Indiana, and wrongfully deprives this petitioner of the *354custody and possession of said child, by forcibly confining and restraining him in and about the residence of said Lora Hardin; that said restraint is unlawful and without cause or right; that on May 15, 1903, in the McLean Circuit Court, in the state of Kentucky, said Lora Hardin obtained a judgment for divorce against Mark L. Hardin, * * * and for the care and custody of said infant child, Mills Hardin,” which care, control, and custody of said child she was to have subject to the further order of said court.
It was further ordered by said court that said Mark L. Hardin should be permitted to have a reasonable opporr tunity to see and associate with said child. It is further alleged that “on September 22, 1903, said Mark L. Hardin served written notice upon said Lora Hardin that he would move at the aforesaid court for an order to be permitted to see and have the custody of said child, at such reasonable times as the court might prescribe; that this notice was properly served upon said Lora Hardin, and the service thereof by her accepted.
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2. It will be noted that appellant, in his complaint, alleges that he is the grandfather of the child in controversy. While the complaint does not expressly show that the appellee is the mother of the child in question, nevertheless, from the facts therein averred, the inference reasonably and naturally arises that she is. Apparently, therefore, whatever right, if any, appellant may have to the custody of the child, is, as against the appellee, predicated on’ the decree of the McLean Circuit Court, whereby, as averred, its custody was awarded to appellant for the time as alleged and shown in the complaint. It is disclosed that by the Kentucky court appellee was awarded a decree of divorce from Mark L. Hardin, and the court gave her the care and custody of the infant child, Mills Hardin, subject to its further order. Subsequently, however, upon notice to her, the court modified its order in respect to the custody of the child to the extent that appellant should, on behalf of said Mark L. Hardin, have the custody thereof for one week out of every three weeks, and that appellee and Samuel H. Mills should have the custody of the child for two weeks out of every three weeks, until the further order of the court. The complaint then alleges that she, in violation of the judgment and order of the court and without authority or permission therefrom, and without permission from appellant, removed said child from Kentucky and beyond the jurisdiction of the McLean Circuit Court and deprived appellant of the possession thereof. Appellant’s counsel ‘contend that, under the judgment of the McLean Circuit Court, appellant had the right and was entitled to the custody of the child. They argue that by §1, article 14, of the federal Constitution full faith and credit must be accorded to the judgment of the Kentucky court by the courts *357of Indiana, that so long as that judgment stands it must be held to be binding on the parties, and that thereby the right to the custody of the child involved in this action is fixed and determined. It is true that a decree rendered, divorcing a husband and wife and providing for and settling the care and custody of their child or children, by a court of a sister state having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties thereto, in the absence of any fraud affecting the jurisdiction in the particular case, will be given or accorded full force and effect by the courts of this State. Hood v. State (1877), 56 Ind. 263, 26 Am. Rep. 21; Watkins v. Watkins (1890), 125 Ind. 163, 21 Am. St. 217; Hilbish v. Hattle (1896), 145 Ind. 59, 33 L. R. Á. 783; Middleworth v. McDowell (1875), 49 Ind. 386. In fact, §1061 Burns 1901, §1049 R. S. 1881, declares that “a divorce decreed in any other state, by a court having jurisdiction thereof, shall have full effect in this State.”
In further support of the general rule that a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage relation of the parties and therein determining and fixing the custody of the children of such marriage, when rendered in accordance with the laws of another State, by a court thereof which is shown to have had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, will be regarded as valid, and will be given full force and effect in all other states when the same matters come in issue. See 14 Cyc. Law and Proc., 814, 815, and authorities cited.
It follows, and we so adjudge, that for the failure of the complaint to show jurisdiction, as required, of the court in controversy, the pleading was not sufficient to support the writ of habeas corpus, and therefore the court did not err in sustaining the motion to quash.
Judgment affirmed.
Hadley, J., did not participate.