66 So. 657 | Ala. | 1914
The English and American courts have, Ave believe, AAdthout exception, held that the right to conduct one’s business, without the Avrong
They seem to- be unanimous, also, in holding that employees may rightfully organize themselves into associations for mutual protection and betterment; and that, having thus organized, they may by confederated action withdraw from, .or decline to enter, the service of any particular employer. And it may be further said that there is practically no judicial dissent from the proposition that in the accomplishment of their purposes of self-protection and self-betterment employees or nonemployees have no right to' use threats, intimidation, or violence against or upon employers, or upon their employees or strangers to induce them to- leave or not enter the service of the, former.—24 Cyc. 830, 831.
With respect to the “peaceful persuasion” of others not to enter an employer’s service, it may, perhaps, be said that such'a right is generally recognized by the courts, and injunctive relief, against it is denied, though it is to be noted that interference with existing contracts of service by inducing .those SO' contracting to violate their agreements is such a wrong as may be enjoined in equity.—24 Cyc. 838, and cases cited.
In regard to the practice of “picketing,” as that term is commonly understood, the courts are not in harmony. The consensus of judicial opinion is admirably stated in the following excerpt from the case note to
It is further said by the same writer (4 L. R. A. [N. S.] 304) : “Most of the cases that have passed upon the lawfulness of ‘picketing/- and whether the same should be enjoined, have expressly or in effect conceded that picketing is not per se unlawful, and that, if strictly and in good faith confined to the purpose of gaining information as to what persons remain in the employment, or what persons are seeking employment, or of peaceably persuading such persons, if not under contract, to leave the employment, or not to enter the employment, it Avill not be enjoined.”
It may be noted here that “pickets,” a Avord more or less appropriately borrowed from the nomenclature of warfare, is defined by the dictionaries as: “A body of men belonging to a trades union, sent to Avatch and annoy men Avorking in a shop not belonging to the union, or against which a strike is in progress.” — Century Dictionary; Webster’s Dictionary.
It is obvious that upon the established principles of the common law, and without the aid of statutory provision, the bill of complaint in this case contains equity ; and, indeed, this does not seem to be seriously controverted.
It is, however, urged on behalf of the respondents that the bill is demurrable in so far as it seeks to prevent peaceable picketing and the peaceable persuasion
“Any person who entices, decoys, or persuades any apprentice or servant to leave the service or employment of his master” is guilty of a misdemeanor. — Section 6849, Code of 1907.
This section was construed in Abingdon Mills v. Grogan, 167 Ala. 146, 52 South. 596, as being applicable not only to menial servants, but also the employees of a mill;,and in Tarpley v. State, 79 Ala. 271, it was held that a similar statute was not obnoxious to the Constitution of the State.,
“Any two or more persons who conspire together for the purpose of preventing any person, persons, firm, or corporation from carrying on any lawful business within the State of Alabama, or for the purpose of interfering with the same, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”^-Section 6394, Code 1907.
“Any person or persons who go near to or loiter about the premises or place of business of any person, firm, or corporation engaged in a lawful business,- for the purpose of influencing * * * others not to trade with, buy from, sell to, or have business dealings with, such person, firm, or corporation, or to picket the works or place of business of such other person, firm, or corporation for the purpose of interfering with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” — Section .6395, Code 1907.
“Any person who, by force-or threats of-violence to person or property, prevents, or seeks to prevent, another from doing work or furnishing materials, for
The meaning and purpose of these provisions are, we think, too- plain for serious discussion. Sections 6394 and 6856 are broad enough to include even the peaceful persuasion of would-be employees not to serve an employer, if its intention and effect is to- prevent the operation of a lawful business. And while the courts do not undertake to enjoin the conspiracy itself, the execution of the conspiracy would be a criminal tort against the employer’s property rights which may be prevented by injunction. Section 6395 is more specific in its inhibition of such forms of “peaceful interference,” and expressly forbids picketing when it is done “for- the purpose of interfering with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise.” Perhaps our Legislature has taken the view, adopted by some of the courts, that in actual practice there is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing or peaceful persuasion. Certainly this is the effect of our statutes.
It is hardly necessary to say that every criminal act which injures the person or property of another is also a civil tort, redressible by the courts, and preventable in proper cases by injunctive process. The allegations of the bill, the single purpose of which is to- protect the business and property rights of the complainant against injury by the confederated and unlawful acts of the respondents, brings its aims and equities within the principles and provisions of the common law and statutes above adverted to.
We gather from the opinion of the chancellor that he intended to sustain demurrers only to certain paragraphs of the bill — 7 to 12, inclusive. The decree,' however, in express terms sustains the demurrers to “the bill of complaint,” which at least includes the grounds of want of equity and multifariousness— grounds which from their very nature can relate only to the bill as a whole. The chancellor’s opinion may explain his reasons for the decree, but it cannot qual
The purpose of the bill, as already noted, is single, viz., to protect the property rights of complainant against the unlawful acts of respondents, which are threatened to be done in the execution of a conspiracy betwen the respondents and others. As evidence of the general as well as the specific intention of the conspirators, the bill charges th'e commission of sundry injurious and unlawful acts by respondents on their co-conspirators — all done for the purpose of interfering with complainant in the lawful conduct of its business, and all tending to- its injury in that behalf.
If the bill were filed merely for the purpose of preventing criminal acts of violence threatened against complainant or its employes, actual or prospective, it would be within the rule declared in M. & W. R. R. Co. v. Walton, supra, on the authority of which alone the chancellor bases his action. In that case it was said: “The courts of law have complete jurisdiction to punish the commission of crimes, and can interpose to prevent their commisiso-n by imprisoning the offender, or binding him to keep the peace. But equity has no-jurisdiction over such matters, at least a court of equity cannot, entertain a bill oh this ground alone.” (Italics ours.).
This qualification has been several- times recognized and applied by this court: “The mere fact that an act
See, also, Brown v. Birmingham, 140 Ala. 590, 601, 37 South. 173; In re Debs, 158 U..S. 564, 593, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 1092.
That the jurisdiction arises to prevent such acts of trespass as are here threatened, by reason of their disturbance of property rights, is thoroughly well settled.—Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077, 35 L. R. A. 722, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310, 11 C. C. A. 209, 25 L. R. A. 414; 24 Cyc. 836b.
A paragraph or part of a bill cannot be separately subject to demurrer unless it attempts to exhibit a separate and distinct basis or aspect for equitable relief.
“A demurrer to part of a bill, on the other hand, is proper when the bill presents more than one claim or basis for the suit, though the bill be not made multifarious thereby, and one of them is not a good claim, or does not constitute a cumulative ground for relief; so that the statement of it merely cumbers the cause and should be stricken out.”—Sims’ Chan. Prac. § 429, and cases cited.
The bill in this case is clearly not of that character, but must be treated as a unit. Its'essential equity .in its single aspect is stated in paragraphs 3 and 4, supplemented by paragraphs 11, 12, and 13. Paragraph 2 is by way of inducement merely. And paragraphs 5 to 10, inclusive, set up general causes and specific
The character, animus, and aims of such a conspiracy may be as well illustrated by its manifestations against other employers in the same district at about the same time, as by those directed against complainant alone; and the bill charges that all are part of one common plan and purpose.
We are of the opinion that none of the demurrers are well taken. The decree of the chancery court will be reversed, and a decree will be here rendered overruling the demurrers to the bill of complaint and to its several paragraphs separately and severally.
Reversed and rendered.