180 Misc. 1008 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1943
Motion for reargument granted. Upon the original motion, the papers submitted presented questions of fact and therefore a trial of the issues was ordered.
Upon this application, the parties have entered into a stipulation pertaining to the factual matters and request a final disposition of the controversy as a- matter of law.
Petitioners seek to compel the Board of Education to utilize the services of the employees of the Bureau of Construction in the preparation of plans for projects constituting a portion of the “ Post-War Works Program.” The facts as they appear relevant are as follows: . On July 9, 1941, the
Respondent asserts further that it is evident that the unequivocal intention of the city administration and that of the Board of Education is to “ keep existing engineering and architectural staffs in the departments of government employed to their full capacity * * * .” Further, that the City Planning Commission, the Board of Estimate and the City Council, in approving a post-war works program in compliance with the Mayor’s message, have ratified and confirmed the plan and the policies governing the conditions attendant on the program. In further support of the respondent’s contentions there has been submitted the affidavit of Robert Moses, a member of the City Planning Commission, City Park Commissioner and member of the State commission for postwar public works planning, which states in part: “ * * * The reason why it is a special case is because of the paramount necessity of completing the design program, to be ready by the end of the war. By this method the regular permanent civil service staffs are fully employed and the services of the very best architects and other technicians in private practice are secured. Only by this method can the completion of this emergency design program be assured.”
In connection with the postwar construction program and on October 28, 1942, the Board of Education of the City of New York adopted a resolution to award to private architects, contracts for the preparation of plans and specifications for 8 proposed school buildings selected from among the projects in the capital program of the Board of Education. In challenging the legality of the foregoing resolution, petitioners rely on subdivision 4 of section 451 of the Education-Law, which reads
This proceeding presents for determination, therefore, the question whether such contracts constitute a “ special case ” within the meaning of the above-quoted section of the Education Law. My attention has not been called to any decision bearing directly upon the problem presented, and research has failed to discover such a precedent. The construction of a statute is a question of law for the court and the primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. Such meaning is to be ascertained from the statute itself, and where the language is clear and unambiguous courts may not speculate as to possible meanings. They must take the act as they find it and construe it according to .the plain meaning of the language used. Words of ordinary import should receive their understood meaning and the definitions of lexicographers are considered useful as guide posts in determining the sense in which the words were used. (McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 1, §§ 71, 92, 232, 234.)
The court must assume that the last sentence of the above statute was intended for some useful purpose. The plainly expressed intention is that in a “ special case ” the Board of Education, with the approval of the Board of Estimate, may authorize the employment of private architects. Just what is a “ special case ” is not defined. These words, however, convey the idea that it is something which is out of the ordinary. Webster defines “ special ” as “ 1. distinguished by some unusual quality; uncommon; noteworthy; extraordinary; * * * . 6. additional to the regular, extra; utilized or employed for a certain purpose in addition to the ordinary. 7. confined to a definite field of action; designed or selected for a particular purpose, occasion or the like
Moreover, the court is also of the view that a departure should not be lightly made from the practical construction placed upon the statute by the officers whose duty it is to operate thereunder and to enforce it. In fact, much weight should be given to their interpretation and where, as here, the Board of Education and the Board of Estimate have determined that the situation is one which presents a “ special case ”, the court is constrained to concur with that conclusion.
Petitioners’ contention that the designed program is detrimental to the merit system is not substantiated by the facts. Parenthetically it may be stated that this court has always been most zealous in its efforts to uphold and protect the merit system in the civil service of the State. In the present case, however, it clearly appears that the Post-War Works Program will have no such harmful effect inasmuch as one of its primary purposes is to provide work for such employees for the duration, for otherwise priority restrictions and governmental regulations might well necessitate a drastic reduction in the staff of the Bureau of Construction. In the circumstances, the PostWar Works Program thus redounds to the benefit of such civil service employees in that it seeks to maintain their continued employment.
Petitioners’ application for final order is, therefore, denied and the petition is dismissed.
Settle order on notice.