Hardcastle v. MohrHardcastle v. Mohr
Appellant sheriff of Sarasota County challenges a final judgment of dismissal allowing appellee Neil C. Mohr to refile an action for false arrest. The sheriff asserts that the final judgment should have been entered in his favor on the merits.
On October 21, 1982, Mohr sued the sheriff for false arrest. The trial court granted the sheriff‘s motion to dismiss the complaint because Mohr had failed to comply with the requirements of
In his amended complaint of February 24, 1983, Mohr alleged that he had provided such notice to the sheriff, but he did not allege that he had furnished the required notice to the Department of Insurance. In his answer, the sheriff filed an affirmative defense that Mohr had failed to comply with
The case came on for jury trial in December 1984. After Mohr rested his case, the sheriff moved for a directed verdict (now referred to as a motion for involuntary dismissal under
Mohr moved to vacate the order granting a directed verdict. On March 21, 1985, the court denied the motion to vacate and entered final judgment of dismissal. The judgment provided that “although this is not a finding on the merits, this Court finds that a jury could not lawfully return a verdict in Plaintiff‘s favor, and therefore,
On appeal, the sheriff argues that the court erred in failing to enter final judgment on the merits in his favor. The sheriff bases his contention on Mohr having rested his case after a full and fair chance to prove every material fact essential to recovery and having failed to prove compliance with
We think the trial judge erred in allowing Mohr to refile his complaint. In Levine, the supreme court held that a trial court had no alternative but to dismiss the plaintiff‘s complaint with prejudice for failing to comply with the notice requirement of
Logic would support Mohr‘s proposition if Mohr had suffered a dismissal on the pleadings like the plaintiffs in Lee and Askew. Instead, Mohr chose to present his case at trial in the face of the sheriff‘s affirmative defense of his failure to provide the required notice. Since Mohr did not establish a prima facie case that he had complied with the notice requirement, it was incumbent on the trial judge to render judgment on the merits for the defendant sheriff. See Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Florida v. K.M.A., Inc., 349 So.2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). At this point, it was too late in the proceedings for Mohr to rectify his error of having failed to show compliance. See City of Miami Beach v. O‘Hara, 166 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964), cert. denied, 172 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1965).
Procedurally, this case is more closely analogous to Calhoun v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 354 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1978), than to Levine. In Calhoun, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking damages for personal injuries sustained in a car accident. At that time,
Similarly, Mohr had a fair and full opportunity to plead and prove his cause of action. Consequently, public policy and the interests of justice require the application of res judicata to bar him from relitigating the identical facts and issues. See, e.g., Hay v. Salisbury, 92 Fla. 446, 109 So. 617 (1926); Husky Industries, Inc. v. Griffith, 422 So.2d 996 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of an order of involuntary dismissal with prejudice against Mohr and in favor of the sheriff.
SCHOONOVER and LEHAN, JJ., concur.