Hanson v. Smith

94 F. 960 | 9th Cir. | 1899

GILBERT, Circuit Judge,

after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the conrt.

The question of the admissibility of the offered proof of the oral contract of sale to Schlesinger was one which rested in the sound discretion of the trial court, and we discover no ground for holding that,discretion was abused. The plaintiff had filed a complaint in which it was stated that the wrongful conduct of the defendants in declaring the option forfeited was the cause of his failure to make an advantageous sale of the property. The defendants had the right to require that he specify the purchaser, and the date and the terms of the sale, and the court so ordered. After many months of delay, this information was finally furnished, and on the issues so tendered the parties went to trial. The plaintiff, failed to prove a contract of sale to Pennington. He then offered proof of a verbal contract to sell to Schlesinger. If he had such a contract, he knew it at the time when his complaint was filed and the issues were formed, and it was his duty then to have disclosed his intention to rely upon it. There could be damages but for the loss of one sale. The plaintiff had pleaded such a loss, and he had specified it as the loss of the sale to Pennington. The offer of evidence of another sale came too • late, and the court properly excluded it.

Prom the view which we take of the issues, and of the evidence which is contained in the bill of exceptions, we do not deem it necessary to discuss further the assignments of error. The option which the plaintiff obtained from the defendants contained the stipulation that his failure to perform work upon the mine for the period of one month during the life of the option should operate to forfeit the same. The agreement which accompanied the option provided that the plaintiff should expend upon the mining property during the nine months of the option $1,500, which is an average of $166.00 per month. Smith and Cleaver were employed to begin the work under this agreement, and began it in the latter part of August, 1895. The plaintiff fitted them out with tools and provisions to the extent of $70. About the middle of September he left them, promising to return in three weeks. He never did return. He testified that he wrote them a letter from Spokane, at a date not stated, inquiring about the progress of the work, but did not state that he wrote anything about furnishing them supplies, or that he asked them for a bill of what was due them. On November 26th he wrote, informing them that he had been ill, and asking what amount was due them for labor, and what supplies they had had to purchase. This letter- was received some two or three weeks later. In the meantime Smith and Cleaver had, on October 18th, quit work, and a month later had declared the option forfeited, according to the stipulation which it contained. The plaintiff did not testify that he had any contract or understanding with them whereby they were to work for him while he was away, or that they were to work for him longer than during the three weeks of his proposed absence. Up to the date of their receipt of the letter of November 26th, they had received no information from him to indicate that he intended to pay their wages or to furnish them supplies. At the time when the plaintiff left them, he already owed them $15 or $20 for work; and when they quit work they had been engaged nearly two months, during which they had received nothing except the first outfit of tools and provisions. Under the circumstances, we think the option was forfeited, and that the defendants had the legal right to so declare, and that on November 19, 1895, if not before, that instrument became canceled. The sale which was claimed to have been made to Pennington was not made, according to the evidence, until March, 1896, which was some time after the plaintiff had received notice that the option was forfeited. Up to that date the plaintiff had still made no tender of payment of any sum to Smith and Cleaver for work, nor had he employed any one in their place to keep up the work which the option called for. At that date he had no interest in the option upon which damages could be predicated, and upon that ground alone the court would have been justified in directing the jury to return a verdict for the defendants. The judgment will be affirmed.