204 P. 660 | Idaho | 1922
This is an action for trespass tried originally in a justice’s court, resulting in judgment for respondent. On appeal to the district court it was tried by the court without a jury. The court found that the respondent was the holder and in possession of the land described in the complaint, that the defendant was the
The first specification of error is that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The complaint in a justice’s court may be an informal statement of the cause of action. (Rabb v. North American Acc. Ins. Co., 28 Ida. 321, 154 Pac. 493.) The complaint is awkwardly drawn, and far from clear. However, buried in a mass of immaterial allegations are the following: that the plaintiff was the holder and in possession of 640 acres in Payette county, state of Idaho, describing it; that a large band of sheep belonging to defendant were herded upon this land, thus consuming and killing the grass to plaintiff’s damage in the sum of $250. As against a mere tort-feasor, actual possession of land, under a claim of right, is sufficient to maintain trespass. (Golden Gate etc. Co. v. Joshua etc. Works, 82 Cal. 184, 23 Pac. 45; Marks v. Sullivan, 8 Utah 406, 32 Pac. 668, 20 L. R. A. 590; Omaha etc. Co. v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41, 16 Am. St. 185, 21 Pac. 925, 5 L. R. A. 236; Beaufort etc. Co. v. New River Lumber Co., 86 S. C. 358, 68 S. E. 637, 30 L. R. A., N. S., 243; Albin v. Lord, 39 N. H. 196; 38 Cyc. 1017 (6).) It is true that many decisions limit the rule to recovery for injury to possession, and hold that mere possession is insufficient where the injury is to the freehold. (38 Cyc. 1020, notes 73 and 74.) Where the recovery is for damage to grasses and crops as in the present case, the recovery is for injury to possession and not to the freehold. (Albin v. Lord, supra; Boyington v. Squires, 71 Wis. 276, 37 N. W. 227; International etc. Co. v. Ragsdale, 67 Tex. 24, 2 S. W. 515.) We conclude that the complaint states a cause of action.
Respondent attempted to show the value of the grasses destroyed by proving'.the rental value of the land as pasture. Appellant claims that this was not in accordance with the rule laid down in Risse v. Collins, supra. Ordinarily, the rental value of the land would not be proof of the value of the crops. However, where it is shown, as in the present case, that the land was used for pasture and that this was the use to which it would ordinarily and reasonably be put, proof of its rental value as pasture is a proper method of showing the value of the grass. In fact, it seems to be the only method which could be adopted. In Risse v. Collins, supra, the court said, at p. 698 of 12. Ida., 87 Pac. 1008, that it would have been proper for plaintiffs to have shown the price they could have secured for their pasture or the number of livestock they could have pastured thereon, and' the value per month for the pasturage qf each head of such livestock. As to the value of the grasses there is some conflict in the evidence, but there is evidence sufficient to support the finding of the court that the grass and crops destroyed were of the value of $100.
Appellant also complains that the court erred in admitting testimony as to the condition and value of the grass after it had been grazed off by the sheep. This was admissible to show the extent of the damage done.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs to respondent.