CertioraA'i tо industrial commission to review an order denying compensation for death. The decedent was a factory superintendent and traveling salesman in the employ of Robitshek-Schneider *597 Company. Hе did much journeying in his own automobile and carried samples of the woolen clothing and sports wear manufactured by his employer. On the evening of January 18, 1939, Hanson, with a fellow employe and one of his employers, worked overtime and on into the evening marking and tagging samples. Those to be used by Hanson were placed in his sample cases and left in the office. Then, after dark, at about 8:30, Hanson went for his automobile, which was in a garage a few blocks distant. His plan was to return for his samples preparatory to going on a sales journey into Iowa the next morning.
While proceeding dоwn the west sidewalk on First avenue north in Minneapolis and at the alley between Third and Fourth streets, he was assaulted by two young men unknown to him. Shortly thereafter, he staggered into the garage with wounds from which he hаd already bled profusely and which proved fatal within a few months. That his death Avas due to the assault is not questioned.
Hanson Avas 54 years of age and an abstainer from intoxicants. He was without “an enemy in thе world” to the knoAvledge of his long-time intimates. The record is barren of even suggestion that his life and its activities had been such as give any man or group of men occasion or motiAe for assaulting him. As motivе for the assault, reasonable inference excludes everything but robbery.
On the evening of the injury it Avas necessary for the deceased, in the course of his employment, to work at the plant of his еmployers. That plant is located in the Avholesale district of Minneapolis. Endeavoring to show that the risk of assault Avas concomitant with employment in that district after dark, relator introduced evidеnce Avith respect to criminal activity therein. Reliance is placed upon data taken from a sociological study known as “Social Saga of Two Cities” (published by the Minneapolis Counсil of Social Agencies). The area surrounding the plant is designated therein as Census Tract No. 45. During the period studied (three years or more prior to July, 1936, varying Avith types of crime studied), it Avas found that this area rаnked first *598 in the city in number of automobile thefts, first in larceny from person, second in larceny from places of business, and “has a very high instance of both homicide and robbery, as Avell as certain other major crimes.”
Rebuttal of that evidence is sought by respondents in the fact that Census Tract No. 45, of Avhich the territory immediately surrounding the plant is but a small part, contains a large area of the loop district, Avith diversity in nature and degree of business activity. Taking judicial notice of the specific area in question and of the diversity referred to, Ave think it beyond question that the survey taken over the larger arеa is relevant in inquiry Avith respect to conditions in the smaller.
We hold that the injury arose “out of” deceased’s employment. 3 Mason Minn. St. 1940 Supp. § 4272-1. To us, that appears the only reasonable inference from the unquestioned evidence. Hanson’s nightAvork required activity in this district Avhere crime Avas prevalent and, upon this occasion, at an hour tending to subject him to foul play. Attendant thereon Avas exрosure to risks of injury by felony such as that Avhich proved fatal for Hanson. His employment exposed him to a different and greater hazard of injury from assault than if he had been pursuing ordinary personal affairs. Corcoran v. Teamsters & Chauffeurs Joint Council,
It is significant that in defining compensable accident the workmen’s compensаtion laAv makes no mention of cause or causation as such. Impliedly, it thereby rejects or at least modifies the standard of proximate causation determinative in tort litigation. Therefore, care must be exercised lest long judicial habit in tort cases allows judicial thought in compensation cases to be too much influenced by a discarded or modified factor of decision.
It is аpparent that the neAV standard “arising out of and in the course of” employment does not require that the latter be the *599 proximate cause of injury. If the legislature had meant that it would have said sо. The words “in the course of” impose a requirement in respect to time and place. The phrase “out of” expresses a factor of source or contribution rather than cause in thе sense of being proximate or direct.
Because of the intervening wrongful act of third parties or some such extrinsic contribution, the employment may not be the proximate cause. But it may be nоnetheless so much source of the event that the latter in a very real and decisive sense arises out of the employment, much as a plant arises from the soil although growth would have been imрossible but for the seed. So it is enough that injury follows “as a natural incident of the work * * * as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment.” Novack v. Montgomery Ward & Co.
We next consider whether the death, having been caused by injuries inflicted intentionally, is not compensable by reason of 1 Masоn Minn. St. 1927, § 1326(j), where the words “personal injuries arising out of and in the course of employment” are declared not to include—
“an injury caused by the act of a third person or fellow employe intended tо injure the employe because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employe, or because of his employment.”
That the injury is intentionally inflicted does not
ipso facto
preclude compensation. Statе ex rel. Common School Dist. v. District Court,
In contrast and compensable are injuries resulting from assault where provocation or motivation arises solely out of the activity of the victim as an employe. Maher v. Duluth Yellow Cab Co.
In a middle ground are cases, of which this is one, where the assault was directed against the victim, neither “as an employe” nor for “reasons personal to him.” Injuries so arising are ordinarily compensable. State ex rel. Anseth v. District Court,
A noncompensable assault must have been for “reasons рersonal” to the victim. Also, it must not have been “directed against him as an employe or because of his employment.”
Here there is no suggestion of reasons personal to Hanson. The motive for robbery is neither the person nоr personality of the victim. Rather and only it is his purse. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Herring,
And that presents the difficulty in this case. If the record reasonably supports an inference justifying a denial of compensation, or if conclusion must rest on conjecture, we should аffirm the commission’s order. But the only inference which appears to us to have support in the record is that the assault on Hanson occurred *601 “because of his employment” within the meaning of thе statute.
Relator showed the probable absence of “reasons personal” to the victim. The burden of proof was on her and did not shift; but, with the record as it is, we think that the need of going forward with evidence to show reasons personal to the employe did shift to the employer and insurer. On that issue, relator made a prima facie case which should prevail with no evidence against it.
In Pennsylvania the statute requires compensation for all injuries sustained in the сourse of the employment although not arising therefrom. The rule there is that the burden rests on the employer “to show an intention to injure deceased, owing to reasons personal to him and not bеcause of his employment.” O’Rourke v. O’Rourke,
Our decision seems well supported by the reason of the matter and the weight of authority. Its thesis is largely that of the so-called “street i*isk” and “night watchman” cases. They and numerous assault cases arising under compensation laws are reviewed in the cаse note “Compensability of injuries resulting from assaults on employees by strangers to employment.” 6 N.C.C.A. (N.S.) 670.
We are disposing of the matter favorably to relator as matter of law. In passing, we may be pеrmitted the observation that it is impossible for us to see upon what theory compensation can be denied in this case and allowed in Corcoran v. Teamsters & Chauffeurs Joint Council,
So ordered.