Tracey HANSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 09-0454 (RMU).
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
May 7, 2009.
Yet, even modifying the subpoena to seek this limited information is unduly burdensome because of the absence of any showing that the information sought is not available from other sources.
First, there is no indication that Burlodge sought the information that the DVA had about its relationship with Standex by filing a demand under the Freedom of Information Act, and there is no showing whatsoever that there is any impediment to the use of that statute by Burlodge.
Second, the only statement about Burlodge‘s effort to secure the information it seeks from the DVA from Standex is the following:
Burlodge knows, from a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Standex, that the DVA purchased those retherm carts from Standex for the use at a number of facilities. (Exhibit 7)6 Unfortunately, Standex would not provide details as to how the DVA facilities use/used the Standex manufactured retherm carts. Id. This is what brought about the present non-party subpoena at issue.
Mot. to Compel at 2. Surely, counsel for Burlodge knows of the resources and remedies available to Burlodge under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to compel Standex to produce relevant information in the discovery process. Until Burlodge at least makes the effort and fails for some reason not attributable to its own fault, this Court cannot possibly determine whether any subpoena to DVA, no matter how limited, is still unduly burdensome because the information sought “can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the limitations set above, Burlodge‘s Motion will be denied. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Andrew J. Saindon, D.C. Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE AND DENYING AS MOOT THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY PENDING BRIEFING
RICARDO M. URBINA, District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on the defendants’ motion to consolidate. The plaintiffs, residents of the District of Columbia (“the District“), challenge the constitutionality of the rule prohibiting certain handguns from being manufactured, sold, given, loaned, exposed for sale, transferred or imported into the District. The defendants enacted the rule in the wake of the Supreme Court‘s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (”Heller I“). The defendants ask the court to order that the instant action be consolidated with Heller v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 08-1289 (”Heller II“). The plaintiffs oppose the motion. Because the court determines that the relevant factors weigh in favor of consolidating the two cases, it grants the defendants’ motion. As a result, the court denies as moot the defendants’ motion to stay the proceedings pending briefing on the motion to consolidate.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Heller I and the District‘s Response
In Heller I, released on June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court held that “the District‘s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.” Id. at 2821-22. Following the release of the Heller I deci-
B. Heller II
The plaintiffs in Heller II brought suit on July 28, 2008, see Compl., Heller II (D.D.C. July 28, 2008), and filed a First Amended Complaint on July 29, 2008, see Am. Compl., Heller II (D.D.C. July 29, 2008), and a Second Amended Complaint on March 25, 2009, see 2d Am. Compl., Heller II (Mar. 25, 2009). The Second Amended Complaint alleges, inter alia, that Ҥ 504 of the [Firearms Registration Act], which prohibits pistols not on the California Roster, and
C. The Instant Action
The plaintiffs in the instant action filed suit on March 9, 2009. Like the plaintiffs in Heller II, they challenge the use of the California Roster in the Firearms Registration Act as unconstitutional. See generally Compl. On March 30, 2009, the defendants moved to consolidate this action with Heller II. See generally Defs.’ Mot. The plaintiffs oppose the motion. See generally Pls.’ Opp‘n. The court turns now to the parties’ arguments.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Consolidation Under Rule 42(a)
Actions that involve the same parties are apt candidates for consolidation. 9 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. 3D § 2384. Moreover, consolidation is particularly appropriate when the actions are likely to involve substantially the same witnesses and arise from the same series of events or facts. Davis v. Buffalo Psychiatric Ctr., 1988 WL 47355, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. May 10, 1988). If the parties at issue, the procedural posture and the allegations in each case are different, however, consolidation is not appropriate. Stewart v. O‘Neill, 225 F.Supp.2d 16, 21 (D.D.C.2002)Chang v. United States, 217 F.R.D. 262, 265 (D.D.C.2003).
B. The Court Grants the Defendants’ Motion to Consolidate
The defendants assert that the instant action should be consolidated with Heller II because “both sets of plaintiffs challenge the District‘s gun-control regime under both the Second Amendment and the Supreme Court‘s decision in [Heller I], under similar theories, and seek the same relief.”
The plaintiffs disagree. They point out that the instant action constitutes a narrow challenge to the constitutionality of the District‘s adoption of the California Roster, whereas the Heller II plaintiffs not only raise the same challenge, but also take issue with a host of other aspects of the District‘s gun laws. Pls.’ Opp‘n at 1-2. As a result, the plaintiffs predict it will take more time and resources to resolve the Heller II plaintiffs’ claims than to resolve their claims. Id. Further, the plaintiffs declare that in contrast to their “narrower, considered approach,” the litigants in Heller II will have “less space in which to more fully develop arguments with respect to each particular theory.” Id. at 2. In sum, the plaintiffs maintain, “this case can be resolved much quicker and more easily than Heller II.” Id. at 3.
In determining whether to exercise its discretion to order consolidation of the instant case and Heller II, the court weighs the time and effort that consolidation would conserve against any inconvenience, delay or expense that consolidation would cause for the parties or for the court. Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Svc., 422 F.Supp.2d 240, 245 (D.D.C.2006); see also 9 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. 3D § 2383. The two actions proposed for consolidation share the same defendant;1 in addition, the plaintiffs in both actions, though not the same, are all residents of the District of Columbia who seek to possess firearms.2 Compl. ¶¶ 1-3; 2d Am. Compl., Heller II (Mar. 25, 2009) ¶¶ 2-6. Moreover, both actions present an identical question of law, namely, the constitutionality of the District‘s adoption of the California Roster. Thus, consolidation would save time and effort for the court and for the defendants by resolving this issue in one proceeding rather than than two. See, e.g., Utah v. U.S. Dep‘t of Interior, 45 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1281 (D.Utah 1999) (ordering consolidation of cases brought by different plaintiffs against the same defendant because they presented the same issues of law and fact).
On the other hand, it is possible that consolidation would delay resolution of the issue for the plaintiffs in the instant action, given that it might take longer to resolve the host of claims the Heller II plaintiffs have raised than it would to resolve the plaintiffs’ comparatively narrow claims here. But any delay caused to the plaintiffs would not be significant, as both cases are still in their nascent stages. Cf. Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 761-62 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that consolidation was improper because the two actions were filed more than two years apart and the parties in the earlier-filed action were ready for trial, whereas the plaintiffs in the later-filed action still sought to designate experts and depose witnesses). And in any event, it is the court‘s duty to consider not only the delay that consolidating the cases might cause for the plaintiffs, but also the delay that not consolidating the cases would cause for the defendants and for the court. See, e.g., Devlin, 175 F.3d at 130 (recognizing that consolidation is “a valuable and important tool of judicial administration” (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., 72 F.3d 1003, 1006 (2d Cir.1995))). Finally, the court rejects the plaintiffs’ suggestion that they will have “less space in which to more fully develop [their] arguments” if the matters are consolidated. The parties are fully able to brief—and the court is capable of rendering a well-reasoned judgment on—multiple issues within the context of one unified civil action. On balance, the court concludes that the factors militate in favor of consolidation.
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendants’ motion to consolidate and denies as moot the defendants’ motion to stay the action pending briefing on the motion to consolidate. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued this 7th day of May, 2009.
RICARDO M. URBINA
District Judge