34 N.W.2d 203 | Iowa | 1948
This case involves the construction of section
Plaintiff was an employer as defined by the Iowa Employment Security Law in 1936 when the law took effect and remained such until January 1, 1945. In April 1942, the first year merit rating was permitted under the Iowa law, defendant, Commission, fixed plaintiff's rate of contribution for 1942 at .9 per cent. This rate was also established for 1943 and 1944. During the calendar year 1944 plaintiff did not have in his employ eight individuals for fifteen weeks and his coverage was terminated as of January 1, 1945, as provided by Code section
During 1946 plaintiff had eight or more employees for a sufficient time so he again became liable as an employer under the law. Defendant, Commission, then fixed plaintiff's rate of contribution for 1946 at
Code section
"* * * No employer's rate shall be less than two and seven-tenths percent after December 31, 1937, unless and until there shall have been three calendar years after he * * * becomes liable for contributions under this chapter throughout which any individual in his employ could have received benefits if eligible."
[1] Defendant, Commission, construed the "three calendar years" to which the statute referred as the three consecutive years immediately preceding the computation date. The district court held the statute referred to any three years after plaintiff first became liable for contributions under the law.
We think the trial court correctly construed the provision of section
The Commission asks us to interpret the quoted provision of section
"* * * No reduced rate shall be granted to any employer, until there shall have been three (3) consecutive calendar years of coverage after such employer * * * first became liable for contributions and immediately preceding the computation date."
[2] Plaintiff argues in effect that this amendment amounts to legislative recognition the original section
Our conclusion finds support in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Sun Ray Drug Co.,
"The plain words of the statute cannot be disregarded under the pretext of accomplishing a given purpose. * * * Particularly is this true where, as here, the language is not equivocal and a literal application of the language will not defeat the purpose of the legislation. The Act in plain language provided that contributions must have been paid for `four full calendar years'. * * * It did not provide that the `four full calendar years' be successive and immediately precede the computation date. Had the legislature so intended it would have so provided. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Cartwright v. Cartwright,
Aside from the trial court's decision in this Pennsylvania case, the only decision defendant has cited to us is First National Bank of Miami v. Florida Industrial Comm.,
Defendant's contention that its construction of section
"(a) State standards. A taxpayer shall be allowed an additional credit under section 1601 (b) with respect to any reduced rate of contributions permitted by a State law, only if the Federal Security Administrator finds that under such law — (1) No reduced rate of contributions to a pooled fund or to a partially pooled account, is permitted to a person (or group of persons) having individuals in his (or their) employ except on the basis of his (or their) experience with respect to unemployment or other factors bearing a direct relation to unemployment risk during not less than the three consecutive years immediatelypreceding the computation date." (Italics supplied.)
Defendant's argument is that unless its construction of section
It is true the federal and state laws (Title IX of the Federal Social Security Act and Iowa Code, chapter 96) were intended as integral parts of a plan to alleviate the ill effects of involuntary unemployment. However, section 1602 (a) above quoted is an amendment which was not enacted by Congress until 1939. Our state act was passed in 1936. Our state legislature could not have intended the act, in the absence of amendment by it, to conform to any future changes in the federal law Congress might later see fit to adopt. *1144
If the 1939 amendment to the federal law had preceded the enactment of section
"(a) A taxpayer shall be allowed the additional credit under section 909 [1601 (b) and (c)] with respect to his contribution rate under a State law being lower, for any taxable year, than that of another employer subject to such law, only if the Board finds that under such law — (1) Such lower rate, with respect to contributions to a pooled fund, is permitted on the basis of not less than three years of compensation experience." 49 Stat. at L. 639, 644, section 910 (a).
[3] There is nothing in our construction of section
Applicable here is Equitable L. Ins. Co. v. Iowa Emp. Sec. Comm.,
"And in the language of the trial court, which we approve, the court should not `write into the previously existing Iowa statute the congressional enactment of 1939. If the court may *1145 do this, then as time goes on and the courts decide, future acts of Congress pertaining to this or other phases of the law will become part of state statute, with resultant further departure from the legislative enactment.'
"And had the Iowa legislature itself attempted to give Congress authority to bind the state by acts to be passed in the future affecting the disposition of funds appropriated under the Iowa Employment Security Law such attempt would have been of doubtful validity. Cowiche Growers v. Bates, supra [
See, also, Unemployment Comp. Div. v. Valker's Greenhouses,
We think we are not justified under the guise of construction in writing into section
Defendant has advanced some other contentions we feel need not be discussed. Nor is it necessary to consider some of plaintiff's argument for an affirmance. We may observe however that a reversal would be quite inequitable to plaintiff under the record here. — Affirmed.
All JUSTICES concur. *1146