99 N.Y.S. 404 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1906
The plaintiff was a tenant in the defendant’s tenement' house. When she-was hanging, washed clothes on-a clothes- line that ran from the window to" a clothes pole in the yard, the pole fell over arid- struck- her. She complains of the “ carelessness and negligence of the said defendant -in maintaining the' said clothes pole in - a defective and dangerous condition, liable to fall, in erecting the same improperly, and in permitting the same to become decayed and weak.” The, plaintiff, showed by a witness, who was a pile-- •' driver by trade,'that a pole left in the ground- rots at the top of the • earth, right at the- earth line. Speaking -from observation of a piece of spruce which he had' taken from the yard,, he. testified that it had ‘ “ rotted in over an inch,” He testified that at the earth line the stump was between eight and ten iridies in diameter, and ’that the ' rot had gone in an inch. He further testified that the tests for rot-, ' tenriess were easy and could.be made by axe or'gimlet. It appeared . that the pole had been set up for six years.
I think.that the rule-of liability is well stated in Alperin v. Earle (55 Hun, 211)..by Barrett, j.: -“The rules applicable. to public halls and stairways in such buildings govern -here. The landlord is responsible for injuries to his tenants resulting from the dangerous condition of those' parts of the building which he reserves for the common Use and over which lie. retains control, but only when he . has b.een guilty of actual negligence with regard thereto. To bring him 'within this rule it must appear,’ as was said in Henkel v. Murr (31 Hun, 30), ‘ that with some notice of the condition of things, or' Under some circumstances equivalent to notice, such as an unreason-’ able omission to ascertain the condition, he had failed to make the necessary repairs or changes called for By the condition or exigency.’
The precise question is whether the fall of that pole, without .any apparent outside agency for its fall, might naturally call the attention of the owner, in the exercise of due care, to the danger of a fall of No. 2. I think that such evidence was competent on the question of notice, and it was upon this ground that it Was admitted, and submitted. (Brady v, M. R. Co., 127 N. Y. 46, 49 ; Ster v. Tuety, 45 Hun, 49 ; Elliott Ev. § 185 ; Cavanagh v. O'Neill, 27 App. Div. 49.) The criterion is the.similarity of conditions (Gustafson v. Young, 91 App. Div. 433), and “ the similarity that is required is, in short, á similarity in essential circumstances, or, .as it is usually expressed, a substantial similarity, i. e., a similarity in such circumstances or conditions as might supposably affect the result in question.” (1 Wig. Ev. § 442.) In view of the similarity in size and appearance, in age, in use, in location, in the fall, and the physical conditions, I think that the court did not err in the ruling or the submission.
The plaintiff’s daughter, upon her cross-examination, had testified that she had not stated to a representative of the defendant that her mother’s false teeth had been broken by the accident and that she wanted twenty-five dollars to pay for them. The defendant thereafter called the representative and asked him whether he had any conversation with the daughter relative to the injuries • to her mother. This was objected' to as incompetent, immaterial, irrelevant and improper in form. The court ruled, “ That may stand simply as introductory,” under exception-, and the witness answered
Present—Woodward, Jenks, Hooker, Gaynor and Rich, JJ.
Judgment and order-unanimously affirmed, with costs.