Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista

treated May’s pension annuity as Loydene HOMES, HANS estate, HAGEN personal May’s of Richard

part INC., Respondent, improperly seeking to is representative May’s election from a change Richard Loydene May’s pen- percentage” of “fixed MINNETRISTA, Appellant. CITY OF equal lump sum that payments sion No. A05-1686. cash value” of Richard “present May’s annuity in May’s Loydene interest Appeals Court Minnesota. personal representative payments. May 2006. argument, her un- rejects reading Loydene May stating equivocally parties agreed that

“correct”' that per- fixed May

Richard would receive a May’s annuity páy-

centage Loydene “[djiscussion

ments, value’ is ‘cash [ejstate is not

misplacedf,]” “[t]he and that Accordingly,

asking paid now.” to be cash fur- not address these concerns need

ther.

DECISION in identify failure to her Appellant’s n argued an Case issue

Statement preclude does not us from

in her brief

addressing that issue. We reverse the annuity pay- award of the court’s

district

ments; respondent, per- here to issue

sonally. spouse’s Because former entry of the dissolution

death after before the but issuance

judgment, order, does

qualified domestic .relations entry of a preclude qualified do- ' order, we affirm the mestic relations n of the district order re-

portion, court’s cooperate

quiring -.appellant

drafting- qualified domestic relations

order and remand -for issuance and appropriate

implementation order. part, part, reversed

Affirmed

remanded. city. May parcels, within the

six rezoning appli- Hagen Homes submitted city, requesting cation to the rural parcels agricultural rezone its from Cleve, Rivas, B. Gary A. Jessica Van comprehensive and amend its to R-4-PUD Ltd., Daly Lindgren & Larkin Hoffman adjust provide the plan MUSA line to MN, respondent. Minneapolis, for Hagen parcels public with ser- Homes’ Hoff, Morken, Hoff, George Amanda C. city an vices. The asked for extension of Kuderer, Prairie, MN, P.A., Barry Eden & statutory ap- time limit to sixty-day the appellant. for deny application; Hagen prove or the eventually agreed Homes a November by and decided Considered 30, 2004 deadline. LANSING, TOUSSAINT, Judge; Chief RANDALL, Judge. Judge; and 4, 2004, city the On October council held hearing application. on the A public

OPINION city planner presented Minnetrista infor- LANSING, Judge. Hagen mation Homes’ and a request, on pro- the company representative described summary judg- for On cross-motions ject hearing After further detail. ment, granted district court Hans Ha- comments, and presentations public en- gen petition Homes’ for mandamus to city finding application, denied 15.99, (2004), subd. force MinmStat. Hagen requests Homes’ were inconsistent City and of Minnetrista to directed city’s comprehensive plan with the and Hagen application Homes’ for re- approve zoning metropoli- for traffic expanding necessary. and further studies were city appeals, tan-urban-service area. The city adopt The did not findings written and, because we conclude that the district until meeting its October when it properly court construed formally passed denying a resolution Ha- 15.99, 2(c), of section subdivision as manda- request. Hagen gen Homes’ Homes did tory, we affirm. representative meeting. have city posted The minutes of the October FACTS meetings and 18 on its website before the Homes, Inc., Hagen Hans petition filed a 30, 2004 deadline for action November on compel for a writ of mandamus to application. Copies of the resolution of Minnetrista to approve Hagen Homes’ city forty- were available at hall also for and application rezoning amending for eight adoption. hours after The city its city’s comprehensive plan that would however, not, provide did Hagen Homes adjust metropolitan-urban-service-area a copy with of the resolution until Decem- (MUSA) line. On for sum- cross-motions 9, 2004, Hagen requested ber when Homes mary judgment, the district court denied copy city. from the motion, city’s granted Hagen Homes’ part, city motion in and directed the Hagen March 2005 Homes filed a approve application. The district court mandamus, petition contending for that it Hagen request denied Homes’ mandamus was entitled its approve conceptual plan, site city of law as matter because the did not disputed this denial is not on appeal. provide Hagen with a Homes written statement of denial and the reasons for agree Homes and the on the essential facts. denial before November as re- ap- Homes owns land, proximately 15.99, quired by acres of divided into subd. 2 Minn.Stat. city appeals from the district subdivisions of section 15.99. The first subdivision, summary Ha- judgment granting court’s which has no petition. contention, gen Homes’ mandamus consists of definitions. See Minn.Stat. subd. 1 (defining ISSUE request, agency, application). by concluding Did the district court err “agency” term includes all city’s that a failure applicant an Id., 1(b). home-rule cities. subd. The city with a written statement of its reasons dispute agency does that it gov- denying an rezoning erned the time deadlines agency extending a line the expira- MUSA before action. The second subdivision has three § tion of the Minn.Stat. 15.99 for deadline subparts addressing the for deadline re- in action a of resulted as matter Id., sponding (2004). to requests. subd. 2 law? of first and last subparts these are at of dispute. the core this The third and ANALYSIS final subdivision provides requirements the mandamus, To obtain a writ of a Id., applications for and extensions. subd. petitioner must establish that the law to (relating applications and ex- clearly requires performance the of the action). agency tensions Hagen mandatory purely or ministerial act for city that, Homes and the do dispute which the writ will issue. Minn.Stat. city’s request, the Hagen Homes extended (2004); Davis, 586.01 McIntosh v. city’s the deadline for response the to No- (Minn.1989). N.W.2d a Whether they vember But 2004. dispute the petitioner grounds has established the nec (c) of of significance subpart the third sub- essary to of support the issuance a writ is division, provides which agency an McIntosh, question a of law. days its response sixty sends within at 118. request the written meets the deadline for id., 3(c) agency action. (allowing See subd. summary judg The district court’s agency prove compliance by to document- ment granting the mandamus and petition ing response sixty days sent within of writ- directing city approve Hagen the to application). ten application solely Homes’ is based on the city’s provide Hagen failure to Homes with The first of core in the dis- city’s a written statement of the reasons 2(a), pute, opera- subdivision the contains for denial expiration before of the response language agency’s tive that transforms an 15.99, deadline as required by Minn.Stat. respond failure to to an within application 2(c) (2004). subd. Because Homes sixty days approval: into an city and the not dispute do the material in Except provided as otherwise facts, independent we exercise review to section, 3b, section subdivision determine whether district court the erred or chapter notwithstanding any in its language the contrary, other agency law the an undisputed the facts. Wiegel See approve deny days must or within 60 a Paul, St. request relating zoning, septic written (Minn.2002) (stating that systems, expansion metropoli- of the undisputed statute facts is de reviewed tan permit, for a urban service area novo). license, governmental approval or other city’s re of an action. Failure an agency Homes’ the spective arguments narrowly deny request the days ap- focus on a structure and text of the proval request. agency second and third an If violation it must state writ- request,

denies at the 2. the denial subdivision ing reasons request. it denies time that statute, meaning a ascertaining added). 2(a) Id., The sec- (emphasis subd. legislative effectuate the goal our provisions, subdi- disputed core ond of the If the Minn.Stat. 645.16 intent. 2(c), that a the actions vision lists unambiguous, of the statute is language body, must com- council, a multimember as Id.; plain meaning. its Kersten apply effectively application: deny plete to Co., Mut. Ins. Minn. Life body governing denies If multimember statutory lan- If the 874-75 state the reasons request, must unclear, however, we consider guage is on the record denial legisla- that would reveal the other factors writing statement of applicant law, intent, including need for the tive If the written for the denial. reasons enactment, circumstances adopted at the is not same statement statute, consequences purpose denial, adopted at it must be time as con- interpretation, particular following the denial of meeting the next Minn. legislative history. temporaneous expiration the of request the but before 645.16; Loge, N.W.2d Stat. State v. 608 making a the time allowed decision 152,155 state- this section. The written under determine whether a statute We must consistent with the rea- ment be plain meaning by reviewing a its con has at the time of stated in the record sons and framework. v.1996 Mer tent Genin must the The written statement denial. (Minn. 114, 117 cury Marquis, 622 N.W.2d applicant upon adop- be to the provided 2001). Reviewing statutory language tion. analyze the plain meaning requires us to added). 2(c) Id., The final (emphasis subd. in full of the act or language the context issue, provision at contained in subdivision provision. Dep’t v. Conser Christensen of 3(c), sending a provides the deadline Fish, 493, vation, Minn. 499- Game & 285 response: (1970) 433, 500, (observing 175 437 N.W.2d 60-day the agency response An meets must be read as whole that statute if can document agency time limit the from meaning that should be ascertained was sent within 60 response that the context). a must sections of We consider the days receipt request. of of written together plain to mean statute determine 3(c). Id., subd. Ass’n ing. Chanhassen Estates Residents (c) argues subpart that because 335, Chanhassen, v. 342 N.W.2d of 2, (a), subpart of unlike does subdivision (Minn.1984); Barry, see v. 339 also Smith clause, penalty not a the violation contain 187, 324, Minn. 17 N.W.2d (c) subpart .not requirement of a in does (1944) must be (instructing that statute in of the applica- result automatic give considered as whole to harmonize and city argues tion. the a Specifically, that all provisions). to effect requirement “provide of violation Determining integrated plain writing in applicant statement meaning us “read a requires particular sixty-day for the within the reasons denial” provision in other context with deadline, extension, or an authorized does in of the same statute order determine approval. result automatic particular meaning provision.” of of requirements counters that Homes Dakota, County Eagan, ILHC LLC v. mandatory and that the subdivision are (a) (Minn.2005); see also penalty subpart applies clause Neighborhood successively aspects Glen Paul Court Ass’n focuses on various (Minn.1989) Paster, 52, 56 deadline, response a presumption that (recognizing that must sections statute the contents of each subdivision must be together arrangement read because parallel restated in the subdivisions would may provide plain Kol meaning); sections defeat purpose the obvious of the serial Inc., lodge Appliances, v. F. L. & division. The context and the coordinated 357, 360, Minn. effect that penalty establish subdivi- (stating particular provision of statute 2(a) with, sion is interrelated and applies context). cannot be read out to, 2(c). in subdivision 2(a)’s Importantly, if penalty subdivision Supreme recog Court has 2(c), did not apply subdivision the stat- that, in discerning plain meaning, nized ute no provide penalty would for violating provision ambiguous that seems in iso mandatory requirements in subdivision may lation be clarified the remainder 2(c). terminology the statute “the same because [may used be] elsewhere context 2(a) 2(c) Finally, unless subdivisions meaning only makes its clear or because provide penalty combine to of automat- permissible meanings produces one ically granting the if agen- that is compatible a substantive effect with cy response does not a written the rest of the United law.” Sav. Ass’n the applicant sixty days, the lan- Ltd., Assocs., Timbers Forest Inwood 3(c) guage of subdivision make 484 U.S. 108 S.Ct. 3(c) sense. Subdivision provides (1988) (citation omitted). L.Ed.2d 740 “agency response 60-day meets the time Thus, statutory construction includes agency limit if the can document that the only words, specific attention to the but response days was sent within 60 specific also “the context which that request.” written Unless the failure to used, language is and the broader context provide response the applicant written the statute as a whole.” v. Robinson triggers penalty, the automatic-issuance Co., 337, 341, Oil U.S.

Shell 519 117 S.Ct. the sixty-day reference to the limit would Finally, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 3(c) superfluous be and subdivision looking at the as a statute whole and read ILHC, have no effect. See 693 N.W.2d at ing each section in context with all other “[wjhenever (stating possible, that no sections, statutory satisfies the presump word, phrase, or should sentence tion that the legislature intends an entire void, superfluous, insignificant” deemed or statute be effective and certain. Minn. omitted)). (quotation 645.17(2)(2004). Stat. spirited for city’s argument reversal

Reading the subdivisions of section 15.99 ambigu- does not that the statute is assert together plain meaning reveals that argues plain meaning ous but for a that interdependent functioning evident the would isolate rather than harmonize subdi- 2(c) the in- subdivisions. Subdivision 2(a) 2(c). accept city’s visions To the 2(a) by terrelates with provid- subdivision argument, reject we would have to the ing specific additional and more explana- plain meaning contextual inheres in that requirements. tion of its The district interdependent sections, the divide rather correctly court that sub- reasoned because (c) text, than the (a), harmonize and constrain or part subpart refers the back 3(c). void penalty applies though leg- same even the effect subdivision We the reject islature did not it a into would have to appellate insert second time also caselaw (c). subpart In that explicitly implicitly interprets a subdivided section initially applica- commission denied Veit’s subdivision requirements section deadline, pro- 2, mandatory necessary complete tion within the but failed as agency action. Id. reasons for the denial. the deadline vide written county it fulfilled argued 727. The Fairmont, Inc. v. Town In Manco of pro- purpose of the statute because Township, 583 N.W.2d Rock Dell Board of denial time limit vided written within the (Minn.App.1998), review denied action, agency public-hearing and the 1998), (Minn. this court deter Oct. transcript county demonstrated requirements subdivision mined that denying had a basis reasonable mandatory because statute were Id. at concluded application. 727-28. We consequences of a failure to “expresses that, transcript even if the had suffi- been Demoli comply provisions.” with requirement satisfy writing Services, cient City Du tion LLC Landfill 2(a), the luth, record contained no subdivision (Minn.App. 281-82 (Minn. 25, 2000), ap- 2000), county provided that the July evidence review denied plicant copy with a deadline again characterized the before the 2(c). mandatory expired, required by as essen as subdivision subdivision After court tial to an effective denial. Consequently, at 730. we held that the Id. Landfill, issued and Demolition Manco approved was as a matter of by2 amended subdivision legislature law. Id. (b) (c). subparts Minn. adding plain meaning of subdivision 41, § Although the Laws ch. 1 at 322. agency appli that the must impact directly do not our amendments cant a written statement of the reasons for analysis, notably did not legislature denying sixty-day an application within the indication include in amendments deadline, or an authorized exten that the subdivision were sion, failing and that to do so results in Id.; mandatory. see Minn.Stat. as a matter of 645.17(4) (stating presumption 645.16; Ed law. Minn.Stat. Herman & that, statute, leg court after has construed Russell, Sons intends same construction in sub islature laws); Anderson, sequent v. 666 State (Minn.2003) (“[Wjhen meaning Plain is 696, governing 700 N.W.2d statutory principle applying all lan legislature does not amend our construc Yet, statute, give guage. tion of a the court’s construction Minnesota courts will not stands.”). Finally, year plain produces earlier this effect to if it meaning that concluded simultaneous-written- absurd unreasonable result that is 2(a) reason subdivisions plainly at policy variance with the 2(c) mandatory are and must be com legislation as a whole. Minn.Stat. deadline, sixty-day or an pleted 645.17(1) within the (2004); see also Olson Ford extension, for agency authorized action. (Minn. Co., 491, Motor 495 County, Veit Co. v. Lake 1997) (discussing to avoid re need absurd (Minn. (Minn.App.2006), 730 review denied sult); Revenue, Wegener v. Comm’r 2006). Apr. (Minn.1993) (discussing N.W.2d need to avoid unreasonable result at vari Significantly, presented an issue Veit ance purpose). with statute’s This court required hybrid application that also 2(a) 2(c) that under previously has determined subdivisions because both (a) (c) lying purpose of 15.99 to “estab subparts writing address the section is Veit, requirement. county planning governments time for local lish[ ] deadlines (Minn. applications.” on zoning (Minn.App.2002), to take action review denied Dev., River, City Inc. v. Elk 25, 2002); Sept. see also v. City Moreno Tollefson (citing 554 (Minn.App.2003) N.W.2d Minneapolis, 6 (Minn.App N.W.2d Tower, Grant, City Am. L.P. v. 636 .2004).(holding that was ap (Minn.2001)). 309, 312 our N.W.2d Thus proved as matter of law though it even was plain determination of statute’s mean extraordinary remedy). harsh and When ing purpose is consistent with the manifest language plain, a statute’s is the function 15.99. section of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms. Minn.Stat. 645.16. We there city contends the auto fore affirm the district- summary court’s matic dis application is a judgment petition on the fail proportionate sanction for technical mandamus. Hagen ure to mail the resolution to Homes, particularly because DECISION dispute does not Homes had actual Because the to provide failed application’s notice denial. We Homes with a written statement of the harsh, agree that penalty and we reasons for denying within special share the observations of the con agreed-on extension of the sixty-day prejudice currence that requirement deadline, the district court did err temper injustice. the risk of public granting judgment summary in the manda- statutory But provision when on clear mus determining action and appli- that the its face and consistent with the manifest approved cation was as a matter of law. purpose legislature, courts do not

subject analysis the statute to further be Affirmed. cause without deference to clear language, “legislators difficulty will have RANDALL, Judge (concurring special- imparting a meaning stable to the statutes ly)- Co., they Republic enact.” Krzalic v. Title (7th Cir.2002) today correctly interprets The court (recog F.3d 879-80 express nizing plain language meaning deference to of Minn.Stat. 15.99 keeps government branches in equilibri Today’s represents decision “preserve[s] um language as an effec present legislative intent of section tive legis medium of communication from requires municipalities which to courts”). latures petition- written notice of a decision to the (a strict) ing party days. Am. presume that legisla We must Grant, 309,' Tower ture understood the effect of its words and (Minn.2001), County, 313 Veit Co. v. Lake intended the to language statute be 725, 707 (Minn.App.2006), N.W.2d 728-29 effective and certain. Minn.Stat. (Minn. 2006). 18, review denied Apr. To- 645.17(2); Olds, § Asperen Van Darling day’s finding is in with the accordance Inc., 690, 254 Minn. I plain language of section 15.99. write approval of “While automatic a separately to underscore the inherent dan- permit application extraordinary is an ger rigid I legislative, sug- this scheme. remedy, appellate Minnesota courts have gest by this must be issue revisited grant remedy shown no reluctance to this Supreme Court legisla- Minnesota or the and enforce the of section changes pro- ture to make the a needed satisfy has failed to clear 15.99[if] its requirements.” municipalities citizenry N. tect their from States Power Co. and Heights, 919, negligence Mendota unnecessary liability, while not of par- policies passing of decisions or due right aggrieved

interfering with the deadlines, arbitrary legislature remedies. pursue ties to in Terrell to amended the statute at issue Minnetrista, find like Municipalities, showing a of actual require prejudice. in a difficult situation. When themselves 592, § Laws ch. at 1282. 1984 Minn. variance, a asked for Minne- Hagen Hans then Subsequent decisions from court injurious a variance trista deemed such scrutiny ad- apply did same strict deny ultimately sought request. supreme court Terrell ministered today, this court reaches decision statute, legislature’s change rigid partly due to the on a based See, type take into consideration cannot v. State Farm e.g., heart. LaFriniere Hagen, Hans and the sought by Co., C5-88-1582, variance Mut. Auto. Ins. No. any actual Hans to exhibit failure of Mar.21,1989). *2 (Minn.App. at WL prejudice. general, prejudice actual need be shown a L & may recovery. or there limit to instance, Hagen sought to had Hans

For Inc., unit, Transport, Agency, H Inc. v. Drew tire-burning industrial a construct a (Minn.App.1985), a monstrous metal- power plant, coal-fired aff'd (Minn.1986) battery/freon dispos- plant, a car ... shredder 384 N.W.2d 435 etc., grant plant, today’s al decision Respondents responsibly admit injurious too potential business allow arbitrary Minnetrista’s decision was Any- operate in Minnetrista. residential notice capricious that actual oral something they one seeking variance rejection was received the Octo- willing are get, have no chance to but meeting. ber “take pay fee and a shot” supreme legislature If the court and just could for a to see what file variance interpretation maintain the strict of Minn. happens. slip an administrative With 15.99, today, that we inher- Stat. see here, have and with no pen, as we right municipality duty ent to fulfill (with candor, showing prejudice actual protect citizenry unhealthy from respondent agrees that the short time- none) variances emasculated. Normal statutes lapse like the law caused looks two, three, commonly granting mandates that variance. of limitation are years six to allow organiza- individuals and precedent I examin- suggest there is ability adequately protect tions the ing limita- extremely short statute See, liability. themselves from Minn. e.g., prejudice tions actual to see whether (2004) (imposing Stat. 541.07 two-or- resulted, and, so, has if not to work that three-year claims), limitations on certain reading into a the law. common-sense (im- Minn.Stat. subd. 5 held that Supreme The Minnesota Court posing six-year on statute limitations arbitrary “unduly are sometimes deadlines violations). time agricultural contract Co., harsh.” Farm Terrell v. State Ins. days. limit here Hans admits In Ter- N.W.2d they given were constructive knowl- rell supreme court conducted similar request reject- edge the variance was analysis today regarding as this court does meeting. after vote the first ed at a Id. strictly legislative worded scheme. showing a actual prejudice, Without noted that absent such supreme court Hagen’s request Hans for relief should direction, policy statutory public direct ideally—scrutinized and the interests require injustice would an avoidance be— public weighed against those through prejudice. actual Id. requiring Hagen. 151. In recognizing on forfeiture Hans disfavor delay, relatively days, question short nine to turns on the facts of each of denial in actual notice case. Reuter v. New Hope, Minnetrista’s 745, within highlights (Minn.App.1990), the flaw the harsh N.W.2d case review (Minn. 1990). by 28, interpretations required Minn.Stat. denied Feb. Minnetrista supreme protection I discretionary § 15.99. believe that the court has immu ordinance, nity to legislature pass or the needs reexamine the debate an or not one, require or pass grant grant automatic of a variance and to not zoning showing prejudice of at actual Municipalities a least some variances. are shielded municipality’s they overriding right before a to when balance laundry the standard list, economic, safeguard social, itself Hans Hagen political, from harm. etc. Nusb Earth, unable to v. any prejudice County was show suffered imm Blue 713, (Minn.1988). delay. If day regard because the nine Minne- With to min letter had arrived after required public official, trista’s six isterial duties a months, year, showing Supreme or one a of actual Court has stated that if “he neglects That prejudice act, could be doable. is a case or such may refuses to do he day compelled another those facts. in respond damages for based on to the injury arising extent from his con in huge The second “bear the kitchen” is A duty duct. mistake as to his and honest potential liability of unlimited Minne- intentions will not excuse the offender.” and situated similarly trista other munici- Amy Supervisors, v. 11 Wall. 78 U.S. ministerial palities negligence classic 136,138, 20 L.Ed. 101 easily provable damages. With the in right plant neighbor- noxious a Once place formally Minnetrista denied Hans nine-day delay, Hagen’s request, hood because of a or a six- the instructions to the delay, delay, or day one-day every statutory a abut- clerk to follow the instructions landowner, commercial, or ting mailing residential were purely ministerial. Af- possibly every receiving homeowner within a ter a from directive council, strong smelling plant wind’s distance of a there is no “discretion” an em- through be able to indepen- ployee put something would show the mail appraisal clearly dent of their a prop- the value within delineated time- absolute, was erty by negligence reduced ministerial line. That is directive is not debatable, municipality. economic balancing involves no (other expenditure of interests than the The doctrine of common-law official im- stamp), giving a $.39 without advi- munity protects municipalities from liabili- sory opinion, conjure it is difficult to aup discretionary ty arising from decisions. argument decent that the failure here to v. Rice County, Elwood (albeit 60-day just observe the deadline boilerplate That is law late) days anything purely nine was but But and needs no elaboration. it is also ministerial. A case could be built municipalities clear that equally are sub- competent lawyer failure to do so ject negligence. to claims for ministerial unambiguous statutory time absolute, act An is ministerial it is “when enough “slight negli- constitutes at least imperative, involving merely certain and gence” to build a cause of action on. duty specific arising execution of a from State, that, designated This apocalyptic fixed facts.” Rico is the scenario like (Minn.1991) day, (quoting April tax too far off. In a never Trovatten, hypothetical involving power Cook 200 Minn. coal-fired (1937)). metal-shredder, etc., etc., given Whether a or a plan N.W. discretionary municipality action is ministerial be difficult is infer Hans will damages actual own- This not to a claim defend anywhere sight- property good neighbor; be a to state ers of real is areas, lines, or the en- the wind-blown neighbor unequivocally that bad community. tire in the Hans be same shoes as power- and it courts are today, appears the that with section strongly suggest I justice. less to do prejudice showing actual some of the issue before determinative should be bonding If are forced into municipalities determining preju- whether actual us. power their of eminent domain to exercise shown, lapse of time would dice can be (to homeowners, buy out affected similar case-by- determining liability on assist in noise”), “airport or face to excessive case basis. possibility multiple lawsuits for devalued scrutiny determining the neces- When hollering for property, taxpayer will be this, judges sary in matters like need justice. the harshness of the flexibility to balance respectfully point I concur but out what in relation to shortness of penalty I flaw in believe serious what prejudice to actual time limit relation compelled today. are to do delay minor In the shown. case here, Minnetrista given should be involved ability to in their make

some latitude severely impact that will those the

decision charged protect.

municipality

Case Details

Case Name: Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Minnesota

Date Published: May 16, 2006

Citation: 713 N.W.2d 916

Docket Number: A05-1686

Court Abbreviation: Minn. Ct. App.