82 Pa. 36 | Pa. | 1876
delivered the opinion of the court, May 29th 1876.
The subscription of the defendants, to the stock of the plaintiff’s road, was properly treated as conditional. By their contract they obligated themselves to pay only when the subscriptions amounted to one hundred thousand dollars, and, by the same contract, the moneys so raised were to be applied exclusively to the building and equipping the proposed extension as surveyed by the Philadelphia and Beading Eailroad Co. These subscriptions were made after the approval of the Act of March 28th 1872, by which this company was incorporated, and under which it was organized. It follows, that that class of cases, of which Bavington v. The Pittsburgh and Steubenville Railroad Co., 10 Casey 358, is a representative, does not apply to this controversy, for we have here an existing corporation clothed with sufficient power to make any contract which it may deem proper for its own welfare; hence, the governing cases are those of which The Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad Co. v. Stewart, 5 Wright 54, is a type. It is true, the plaintiff was to have its letters patent only when ten per centum of its capital stock had been subscribed, but these letters were not essential preliminaries of the company’s organization, for that had been effected by the act itself, but were rather ancillary and supplemental to it.
. Undoubtedly, even ih this case, these letters could not have been obtained except upon the exhibition of absolute subscriptions to the stock of this company, equal to ten per centum of its capital, and upon which one dollar per share had been paid; but this was done, and the patent obtained; thus this corporation was clothed with all the powers necessary to accomplish the object of its creation. As the company was only in a situation to demand payment, when the conditions in the contract with the defendants had been fulfilled, it was incumbent on it to show, either the accomplishment of these conditions, or a release or waiver of them by the parties in interest. Now, whilst the plaintiff neither did nor proposed to prove a strict fulfilment of that stipulation in the agreement, which provided that the subscription should be paid only when the sum of one hundred thousand dollars had been subscribed, nevertheless, much testimony was given to show that Paris Plaldeman, who subscribed for the firm of which he was a member, by his acts and declarations, did waive
The third point we pass over as involving questions of fact upon which the jury must pass; only saying that if the company cannot show to the satisfaction of that tribunal, that Haldeman agreed that all the subscriptions, absolute and conditional, might be considered in making the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, or that he waived, as already stated, by his acts or declarations, or by both together, that condition annexed to the contract, it will not be entitled to the verdict.
The fourth and fifth points of the argument for the defendants raise the question as to the validity of the plaintiff’s charter. The allegation is, that the charter has lapsed through the malfeasance or misfeasance of the company since the bringing of this suit. To support this, it has been shown that the plaintiff had confined its operations to one of its branches, and that it has done little or nothing upon its main stem, hence, it is argued that as there has been no bond fide commencement of the principal improvement within the period of three years, as prescribed by the Act of 1849, to the provisions of which this corporation was made subject, the charter, by the terms of that statute, has become null and void, and that, therefore, this company is not in a condition to maintain this or any other suit. We are not prepared to adopt this view of the case. Granted that the plaintiff has done that in consequence of which its charter may be forfeited, nevertheless we cannot, in this collateral proceeding, inquire into such matters. As was said by Justice
The judgment is reversed and a venire facias de novo is awarded.