Hanlon v. MooneyHanlon v. Mooney
This is an adoption case.
The Probate Court of Shelby County, Alabama entered a final decree of adoption on February 14, 1980 declaring that the infant daughter of Pamela Sue Hanlon (Sullivan) was the legally adopted child of William Joе and Jean W. Mooney. The mother appeals; we affirm.
Appellant is a seventeen year old minor residing in Seymour, Indiana. In December 1978 she gave birth in a Seymour Hospital to a baby girl, Julia Ann Hanlon. Appellant was not married to the putative father of the child at the time оf its birth but has since married another man and continues to reside in Indiana. Mrs. Sullivan was not
Dr. Maasen became acquainted with Mr. and Mrs. Mooney while he was a resident physician at the University of Alabаma in Birmingham and over the course of his residency had developed a close friendship with them. Appellees are, and have been for some time, residents of Pelham, Alabama. Mr. Mooney manages a service station business and owns and operates a lawn serviсe business. His combined yearly income from these businesses is approximately $70,000. Mrs. Mooney is not presently employed and is thus able to devote full time to the care of her fifteen year old son by a former marriage and Julia Ann.
In September of 1978 Fred DeMarco, a former assistant to Dr. Maasen, informed Mr. and Mrs. Mooney that the doctor might be able to procure a child for them which they could adopt. Mr. Mooney thereafter telephoned Dr. Maasen who told him that he knew of a young lady who would by willing to give up her child for adoption.
From July to Octоber of 1978 appellant and Dr. Maasen discussed what was to be done with the baby after its birth. It appears from the record that Dr. Maasen encouraged appellant to place the child for adoption. His theory was that appellant, because of the manner in which the child was conceived, would not love the child and as a result would not properly care for it. Appellant‘s mother testified that she tried to convince appellant that the doctor‘s statements were not necessarily true and that she might want to keeр the child.
On October 28, 1978 appellant signed a written consent to adoption in Seymour, Indiana whereby she consented to the adoption of her then unborn baby by appellees upon its birth. Paragraph six of this consent form stated that:
I [i.e. appellant] do hereby give my complete consent to the adoption of my child by William Joe Mooney and wife, Jean W. Mooney, in accordance with and with the effect given by the laws of the State of Alabama pertaining thereto, and I further consent and request that the Judge of Probate of Shelby County, Alabama, make all such orders and decrees as may be necessary or proper to effectuate said adoption.
When appellant gave birth to her baby daughter in December 1978, Dr. Maasen notified appellees of the birth. Appellees immediately travelled to Indiana, obtained physical possession of appellant‘s daughter, and returned with her to Alabama. Several weeks after giving birth to her daughter, appellant informed Dr. Maasen that she wanted her child back. Dr. Maasen replied that appellant‘s chances of obtaining the custody of her daughter were very slim.
On January 29, 1979 appellees filed a petition for adoption of the child with the Probate Court of Shelby County, Alabama.
On March 7, 1979 appellant filed a motion with the court seeking to revoke her consent to appellees’ adoption of her child. After an ore tenus hearing on the merits of the petition for adoption that same day, the probate court, on March 26, 1979, entered an interlocutory order disallowing appellant‘s attempted revocation of her consent to thе adoption of her child by appellees and directing the adoption proceedings continue under the laws of Alabama.
In refusing to allow appellant to revoke her consent, the court found as a fact that she voluntarily signed the written consent to adoption and that such was not obtained through the use of fraud, coercion, mistake, misrepresentation or undue influence. This finding was incorporated into the court‘s February 14, 1980 final decree of adoption declaring that appellant‘s child should thenceforth be legally reсognized as appellees’ child and that her name should be changed to Melana Susan Mooney.
On March 17, 1980 appellant, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, moved the probate court to vacate, alter, and amend its interlocutory and final orders in this case on the ground, inter alia, that the findings upon which it based these orders were contrary to the applicable law.
The first issue raised in brief to which we will direct our attention concerns appellant‘s contention that the validity of her consent to the adoption of her child be decided according to Indiana law rather than Alabama law.
Initially we nоte that appellant did not notify appellees in her pleadings or in any other written memoranda prior to entry of a final decree by the probate court of her intent to contest the court‘s subject matter jurisdiction over this cause on the basis of a foreign law, i.e. its authority to decide the validity of the consent to adopt on the basis of Indiana law. Ordinarily, the giving of such notice would be a condition precedent to the maintenance of a defense grounded upon foreign law to appellees’ petition for adoption pursuant to the laws of this state. Semo Aviation, Inc. v. Southeastern Airways Corp., Ala., 360 So.2d 936 (1978);
Appellant‘s contention that Indiana law should determine the validity or invalidity of her consent to adoption is in effect a suggestion that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to decide the adoption request, for we have held that where a mother has not consented to the adoption of her child an Alabama court has no jurisdiction to permit that child to be adopted. See Davis v. Turner, Ala.Civ.App., 337 So.2d 355, cert. denied Ala., 337 So.2d 362 (1976);
Of course, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time before or during the trial or even on appeal by any party or by the court before which the case is being tried or to which an appeal has bеen taken. Norton v. Liddell, 280 Ala. 353, 194 So.2d 514 (1967); Wells v. Wells, Ala.Civ.App., 376 So.2d 750 (1979);
All of the events surrounding appellant‘s execution of the consent to adoption occurred in Indiana and the consent was, in fact, given in Indiana. However, the validity of a consent to an adoption is generally determined by refеrence either to the laws of the state in which the adoption proceedings are commenced or the laws of that state in which, according to the consent form such proceedings will be initiated or by which the form indicates that its validity will be judicially determined. See In re Adoption of a Minor Child, 127 F. Supp. 256 (D.D.C. 1954); Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 118 Ariz. 437, 577 P.2d 723 (Ariz.App. 1977), aff‘d, 118 Ariz. 428, 577 P.2d 714 (Ariz. 1978); Susko Adoption, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132 (1949).
The cоnsent form signed by appellant clearly shows that the consent being given by appellant was for an adoption to take place in Alabama. Appellant knew
Adoption of a child in this state is purely statutory and such statutes must be strictly adhered to. Davis v. Turner, supra.
It is undisputed that the child was illegitimate, that the natural mother‘s parental rights had not been terminated, that the child‘s paternity had not been established, that the name and address of the father were not shown on the petition, and that the father‘s name and address were not otherwise known to the court. Under these circumstances appellant‘s consent to the adoption of her child was sufficient to permit the trial court to go forward with the adoption proceedings. Whether appellant gave her consent orally or in writing, before or after the birth of the child, even though she was a minor at the time of the consent does not militate against this conclusion. See Davis v. Turner, supra. Thus appellant‘s consent to the adoption was рresumptively valid from the moment she signed it unless such presumption can now be rebutted.
Under Alabama law, an otherwise valid consent to an adoption may be revoked only for “legal cause.” Davis v. Turner, supra. Obtaining the consent of a mother to the adoption of her child by fraud, mistake, coercion or undue influence can be “legal cause” for the revocation of her consent to the adoption. Williams v. Pope, 281 Ala. 416, 203 So.2d 271 (1967), appeal after remand, 284 Ala. 456, 225 So.2d 861 (1969); Davis v. Turner, supra. By the same rationale, a decision by the trial court that the child‘s best interests would be served by being returned to its natural mother could also be “legal cause” for revoking the mother‘s consent to adoption. Willams v. Pope, supra. Based on the record evidence in this case, we cannot say that the trial court‘s conclusion that the appellant voluntarily consented to the adoption and that such adoption would be in the сhild‘s best interests is so erroneous as to require a reversal of its decree. Walker County Department of Pensions Security v. Mason, Ala.Civ.App., 373 So.2d 863 (1979).
Appellant‘s next contention is that the decree of adoption should be set aside because the child was brought into Alabama in violation of
In Smith v. Smith, Ala.Civ.App., 365 So.2d 88 (1978), we said:
Whether a statute operates prospectively or retrospectively is a matter of legislative intent. Statutes generally will be held to operate prospectively unless the
purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect clearly appears. Fuqua v. Fuqua, 268 Ala. 127, 104 So.2d 925 (1958); Bell v. Mar-Mil Steel Supply Co., 54 Ala. App. 432, 309 So.2d 471 (1975).
After a careful review of
Appellant‘s final contention is that the trial court erred by not according an Indiana decree of February 29, 1980 declaring the consent to the adoption of her child null and void full faith and credit in accordаnce with
A final decree of adoption was rendered by the trial court on February 14, 1980, fifteen days before the Indiana decree was handed down. Hence, there was no final decree of an Indiana court for the trial court to give full faith and credit to when it entered its finаl judgment of adoption. In Pruitt v. Key, 281 Ala. 433, 203 So.2d 450 (1967) the Alabama Supreme Court observed:
The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution does not compel a court to set aside a judgment rendered in an action involving the same issue which is subsequently adjudicated with a different result by a court of a sister state. To so conclude would result in giving greater faith and credit to the judgment of the other state than to the judgment duly entered in the court of the state rendering the first judgment. Hammell v. Britton, 19 Cal.2d 72, 119 P.2d 333.
The failure of the trial court to accord full faith and credit to the Indiana decree does not amount to reversible error.
Finding no error in the judgment of the probate court, its final decree of adoption is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
WRIGHT, P.J., and HOLMES, J., c