MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. This case is an action for legal and equitable relief under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a), the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), and the common law tort of unfair competition. 1 Defendants Hanley Wood, LLC and Mutual Companies, LLC were served on July 13, 2010, and they have failed to answer or otherwise defend this action. The Clerk of Court entered a default on October 29, 2010, and Plaintiff has now moved for entry of default judgment pursuаnt to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). On April 8, 2011, the Court gave Defendants one final opportunity to show cause why a default judgment should not be entered. They did not respond.
The determination of whether a default judgment is appropriate is committed to the discretion of the trial court.
Jackson v. Beech,
Thе Court has reviewed Plaintiffs Complaint and finds that it sufficiently alleges facts to support Plaintiffs claims of trademark infringement, cybersquatting, and unfair competition. The Court will therefore grant the relief requested.
I. Lanham Act
Plaintiff first claims that Defendants have infringed on its valid trademarks in violation of the Lanham Act. To prevail on this count, “the plaintiff must show (1) that it owns a valid trademark, (2) that its trademark is distinctive or has acquired a secondary meaning, and (3) that there is a substantial likelihоod of confusion between the plaintiffs mark and the alleged infringer’s mark.”
Globalaw Ltd. v. Cannon & Carmon Law Office,
Plaintiff requests injunctive relief under the Lanham Act to prevent further
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violations of Plaintiffs trademark rights.
See
15 U.S.C. § 1116 (authorizing same). “In determining whether to enter a permanent injunction, the Court considers a modified iterаtion of the factors it utilizes in assessing preliminary injunctions: (1) success on the merits, (2) whether the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction, (3) whether, balancing the hardships, there is harm to defendants or other interested parties, and (4) whether the public interest favors granting the injunction.”
American Civil Liberties Union v. Mineta,
As discussed above, Plaintiff has succeeded by default on the merits of the instant action. Plaintiff has also shown, in its Motion for Default Judgment and the attached affidavit of Douglas C. Herbert, thаt Defendants have continued to infringe on its trademarks despite several informal demands to cease and desist, along with the filing of this lawsuit.
See
Mem. to Motion at 7-8. Generally, trademark infringement, by its very nature, carries a presumption оf harm.
See Health Ins., Ass’n of America v. Novelli,
The Lanham Act authorizes this Court to issue an injunction “upon such terms as the court deems reasonable.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Here, Plaintiff requests this Court to permanently enjoin Defendants from:
(1) [U]sing in any manner the marks and/or names “Hanley Wood” or “World of Concrete” or any variation of those marks and names, including but not limited to continuing to register, use, market, sell, offer for sale, dispose of, transfer, display, advertise, reproduce, or make available any services and/or products bearing such marks and/or names or any variation thereof which is likely to cause confusion, mistakе, or deception among members of the trade and public, and from participating or assisting in any such activity, including, but not limited to, domain names, directory names, metatags, hyperlinks, or any computer address to identify Defendаnts’ web site or in connection with the retrieval of data or information, or other goods and services which are likely to conflict with Plaintiffs pre-existing rights in the marks and/or names “Hanley Wood” and “World of Concrete”;
(2) [Representing by any means whatsoever, directly or indirectly, that Defendants, and any products or services offered by Defendants, including information services provided via Defendants’ web sites, the Internet or otherwise, are affiliated or аssociated in any way with, or sponsored by, Plaintiff Hanley-Wood, LLC, or its goods or services, and from otherwise taking any other action likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of con *152 sumers including, but not limited to, Internet users concerning the relationship or lack of relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants;
(3) [D]oing any other acts calculated or likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public or to lead consumers including, but not limited to, Internet users into believing that Defendants’ goods or services come from, or are the goods or services of, Plaintiff Hanley-Wood, LLC, or are somehow sponsored or underwritten by, or affiliated with, Plaintiff Hanley-Wood, LLC, and from misappropriating the goodwill represented by the make and name, which rightfully belongs to Plaintiff Hanley-Wood, LLC;
(4) [Fjorming, registering, or participating in the management of any business entity that contains in its name thе words “Hanley” or “Wood” or any variation thereof;
Proposed Order to Motion at 1-3.
Plaintiff further asks this Court to order that Defendants change the name of the Limited Liability Company “Hanley Wood, LLC” on the corporate registry maintained by the District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs to a name that does not contain the words “Hanley” or “Wood” or any variation thereof within 30 days after the date of this Order. Finally, Plaintiff requests that Defendants prepare a report in writing under oath setting forth in detail the manner and form in which Defendants have complied with the injunction and submit such report to Douglas C. Herbert, counsel for Plaintiff, who will file such report with the Court.
Because Defendants’ actions in this case demonstrate a willful disregard for Plaintiffs trademark and because the relief sought directly addresses the harm caused, the Court finds that these requests for injunctive relief are reasonable.
II. Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
In addition to its claims under the Lanham Act, Plаintiff contends that Defendants’ conduct violates the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). To succeed on an ACPA claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) its trademark is a distinctive or famous mark entitled to protection; (2) Defendants’ domаin name is identical or confusingly similar to the Plaintiffs mark; and (3) Defendants “register! ], traffic! ] in, or use[ ]” a domain name with the bad faith intent to profit from it.
See
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A);
Breaking the Chain Foundation Inc. v. Capitol Educational Support, Inc.,
Here, Plaintiff has properly stated a claim under the ACPA. First, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff registered the domain names “hanley-wood.com” and “hanleywood.com” in 1996 and 1999, respectively. Comрl. ¶ 50. Second, Plaintiffs Complaint contends that Defendants registered the domain name “hanleywoodllc.com” on January 22, 2010. Id., ¶ 51. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants acted in bad faith when they registered their domain names and intended to *153 divert consumers of Plaintiffs goods to Defendants’ web sites, both for commercial gain and for the purpose of tarnishing Plaintiffs trademark. Id., ¶¶ 53-55, 57-58. Plaintiff alleges, moreover, that Defendants have no owners or employees named either “Hаnley” or “Wood.” Id., ¶¶ 56-57. Plaintiff, therefore, has successfully pled its claim under the ACPA, and the Court will now consider its request for damages.
In lieu of actual damages, Plaintiff has requested statutory damages in the amount $10,000, consisting of a $5,000 award from еach Defendant.
See Microsoft Gorp. v. McGee,
III. Unfair Competition
Plaintiffs final count is a common law cause of action for unfair competition. Unfair competition is not defined in terms of specific elements, but by various acts that would constitute the tort if they resulted in damages.
Furash & Co. v. McClave,
As relief, Plaintiff requests an injunction preventing Defendants from continuing to engage in any further unfair competition including:
(1) Falsely stating any intention to bring civil, criminal, or administrative actions against Plaintiff or its employees or against any person or entity known to do business with Plaintiff; and
(2) [F]alsely advising any рerson or entity that Plaintiff is not operating legally in the District of Columbia, that Plaintiff does not have the right to use the name “Hanley Wood” in the District of Columbia, or that Defendants “own” any organization or entity with the words “Hanley” or “Wood” in its nаme;
Proposed Order to Motion at 3. Because this Court finds that the injunctive relief is necessary to prevent Defendants from continuing to act in violation of the law, Plaintiff is entitled to an injunction on the proposed terms.
*154 IV. Costs
Finally, Plаintiffs request costs in the amount of $500.00 to cover the filing fee and process fees for this case. As a prevailing party, Plaintiff is entitled to costs under Fed.R.CivP. 54 and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Plaintiff, moreover, is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and cоsts under both the Lanham Act and the ACPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). The Court will therefore award Plaintiff $500.00 in costs.
The Court hereby ORDERS that:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED; and
2. Default Judgment is ENTERED for Plaintiff on Counts I, II, and IV of the Complaint as set forth in the accompanying Order of Judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses Count III of the Complaint for defamation without prejudice pursuant to Fed.RXiv.P. 41(a).