delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts in the language reported above, he continued:
The question presented by this writ of error is whether the
By the settled construction of these provisions of the Constitution and statutes of the United States, a judgment of a State court, in a cause within its jurisdiction, and against a defendant lawfully summoned, or against lawfully attached property of ail absent defendant, is entitled to as much force and effect against the person summoned or the property attached, when the question is presented for decision in a court of another State, as it has in the State in which it was rendered.
Maxwell
v.
Stewart,
Much of the argument at the bar was devoted to the discussion of questions which the view that we take Of this case renders it unnecessary to consider; such as the proper manner
No court is to be charged with the knowledge of foreign laws; but they are well understood to be facts, which . must, like other facts, be proved before they can be received in a court of justice.
Talbot
v.
Seeman,
Judgments recovered in one State of the Union, when proved in the courts of another, differ from judgments recovered in a foreign country in no other respect than that of not being re-examinable upon the merits, nor impeachable for fraud -in obtaining them, if rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of - the parties.
Buckner
v.
Finley, 2
Pet. 592;
M'Elmoyle
v.
Cohen,
Upon principle, therefore, and according to the great preponderance of authority, (as is shown by the cases collected in the margin,
*
) whenever it becomes necessary for a court of one State, in order to give full faith and credit to a judgment rendered in another State, to ascertain the effect which it has in that State, the law of that State must be proved, like any other matter of fact. The opposing decisions in
Ohio
v.
Hinchman,
27 Penn. St. 479, and
Paine
v.
Schenectady Ins. Co.,
11 R. I. 411, are based upon the misapprehension that this court, on a writ of error to review a decision of the highest court of one State upon the faith and credit to be allowed to a judgment rendered in another State, always takes notice of
When exercising an original jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws of the United States, this court, as well as every other court of the National Government, doubtless takes notice, without proof, of the laws of each of the United States.
But in this court, exercising an appellate jurisdiction, whatever was matter of law in the court appealed from is matter of law here, and whatever was matter of fact in the court appealed from is matter of fact here.
In the exercise of its general appellate jurisdiction from a lower court of the United States, this court takes judicial notice of the laws of every State of the Union, because those laws are known to the court below as laws alone, needing no averment or proof.
Course
v.
Stead,
But on a writ of error to the highest court of a State, in which the revisory power of this court is limited to determining whether a question of law depending upon the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States has been erroneously decided by the State court upon the facts befoi’e it — while the law of that State, being known to its courts as law, is of course within the judicial notice of this court at the hearing on error —yet, as in the State court the laws of another State are but facts, requiring to be proved in order to be considered, this court does not take judicial notice of them, unless made part of the record sent up, as in
Green
v.
Van Buskirk,
"Where .by the local law of a State, (as in Tennessee,
Hobbs
v.
Memphis & Charleston
Railroad, 9 Heiskell, 873), its highest court takes judicial notice of the laws of other States, this court also,-on writ of error, might take judicial notice of them. But such is not the case in Maryland, where the Court of Appeals has not only affirmed the general rule that foreign laws are facts, which, like other facts, must be proved before they can be received in evidence in courts of justice; but has held that the effect which a judgment rendered in another State has by the law of that State is a matter of fact, not to be judicially noticed without allegation and proof; and consequently that an allegation of the effect which such a judgment has by law in that State is admitted by demurrer.
Baptiste
v.
De Volunbrun,
5 Har.
&
Johns. 86, 98;
Wernwag
v. Pawling, 5 Gill
&
Johns. 500, 508;
Bank of United States
v.
Merchants' Bank,
From these considerations, it follows that the averment, in the third count of the declaration, that by the law of Pennsylvania the judgment rendered in that State against Charles Donoghue and John Donoghue was valid, and enforceable against Charles, who had been served with process in that State, and void against John, who had not been so served, must be considered, both in the courts of Maryland, and in this court on writ of error to one of those courts, an allegation of fact, admitted by the demurrer.
Upon the record before us, therefore, the plaintiff appears to be entitled, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to judgment on this count. It having been admitted at the bar that the other counts are for the same .cause of action, it is unnecessary to consider them. The general judgment for the defendant is erroneous, and the rights of both parties will be secured by ordering, in the usual form, that the
Judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland be reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Notes
Scott
v. Coleman,