[T1] Appellant Virginia K. Hanks was awarded initial worker's compensation benefits but appeals from the district court's order which affirmed the hearing examiner's decision to deny the additional benefits she sought after being diagnosed with fibromyal-gia. Wе affirm.
ISSUE
[T2] The issue is: "Whether there is any substantial evidence that supports the denial of compensation benefits in this case."
FACTS
[T3] On July 22, 1998, Appellant, a community service officer with the City of Cas-per, suffered a work-related injury to her left side from wаlking into a street sign. The Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division paid for chiropractic treatment. X-rays of hеr cervical and lumbar spine revealed no abnormalities.
[T4] On September of 1998, Appellant was referred by her chiropractor to Michael Kaplan, M.D. On September 9, 1998, she saw Dr. Kaplan with complaints of diffuse museu-lar pain. On Sеptember 28, 1998, Dr. Kaplan diagnosed her with fibromyalgia. On October 6, 1998, the Division denied all claims for benefits after Septembеr 9, 1998, as not being related to the original work injury.
[T5] The standard for review is set forth in W.R.A.P. 12.09(a), limiting judicial review to the matters contained in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. The language pertinent to this appeal is as follows:
The reviewing court shall:
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@) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:
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(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on thе record of an agency hearing provided by statute.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999).
DISCUSSION
[T6] An employee-claimant in a worker's compensation case has the burden of proving all the statutory elements which comprise a compensable injury. Thornberg v. Statе ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division,
[T7] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(A) (LEXIS 1999) states that "injury" does not include "[alny illness or communicable disease unless the risk of contracting the illness or disease is increased by the nature of the employment." Appellant does not contend that the risk of contracting fibro-myalgia was increased by the nature of her employment. Instead, she assеrts that her fibromyalgia was caused by the July 22, 1998, injury.
[T8] Appellant relies upon this testimony from Dr. Kaplan:
A. I would say that in patients that develop fibromyalgia, sometimes we can link it to а triggering episode. And I think that she did have the triggering episode at work. So we can say that the fibromyalgia was linked to that.
But tо say that all of her pain complaints now are related to that injury-she may have been predisposed to develop fibro-myalgia, and she may have developed it from another type of episode. She could have had a fall at home and ended up with it a year from now. So I always have a little caution when I say that a particular injury caused fibromyalgia.
I think that a patient may develop it, and it just takes a little triggering episode. And that's a trigger; it's not аn event that causes some irreversible syndrome and we can blame it on that event.
So I can't say that greater than 50 percent of her symptoms are because of her work injury. I can say that she had a work injury that triggered this syndrome, and now she has some residual museculo-skeletal complaints. It's always a difficult call, from my perspective, when thesе patients come up with fibromyalgia.
Q. And the triggering event to which you refer is when she walked into the steel signpost?
A. Yes. And now shе's got this diffuse musculoskeletal kind of picture; correct. And that happened to occur when she was at work,. And like I sаid, she easily-if she hadn't hit that signpost, she may have been home in her basement a year from now and slipped down a stair and developed it then, as well.
[T9] Appeliant contends that the only reasonable way to interpret this testimony is tо say that there was a causal connection between the injurious collision and the fibro-myalgia. However, there are sufficient qualifications in the testimony to allow a reasonable person to conclude that she did not mеet her burden of proving a causal connection between the collision and the fi-bromyalgia. The witness did not say that the collision caused fibromyalgia but noted that he was cautious about saying that. He went on to say that a triggering episode, such as this collision, is not an event that causes a syndrome such as fibromyalgia.
[T10] Appellant cites three cases in support of her position. In the case of Associated Seed Growers, Inc. v. Scrogham, 52 Wyo.
[T11] The case of Wright v. Wyoming State Training School, TL Wyo. 1783,
[T12] In the case of Exploration Drilling Company v. Guthrie,
[T13] More to the point is the case of Safeway, Inc. v. Mackey,
CONCLUSION
[T14] There is substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's finding that Appellant failed to prove the workplace injury caused her fibromyalgia.
[T15] Affirmed.