6 Ga. App. 793 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1909
Hattie Hankinson was convicted of violating what is commonly known as the “labor-contract law” (Acts 1903, p. 90). Her motion for a new trial, based .alone on the general grounds, was overruled, and she brings error. The accusation, so far as material, charges that the defendant “on the 15th day of February, 1909, after having entered into a contract with William Wesley to perform services for him as a cropper for and during the year 1909, did procure from William Wesley on said contract $15 in money, meat of the value of $7.25, meal of the value of $1.86, flour of the value of $2, lard of the value of .95, rice of the value of .65, one pair of shoes of the value of $2.50, having procured said money and articles of value with intent not to perform services so contracted for, and having procured said money and articles of value upon the faith of performing said services, and having failed to perform said services as contracted for with
This case is an exception to the general rule. Generally, in alleged violations of this “labor-contract law,” the prosecutor is a white man and the defendant a black man or woman. It does not, however, differ from the majority of these cases, in that the facts fail to show any violation of the statute. In the first place, there was no evidence to show that the accused, under the alleged contract, was to perform any services or labor herself. According to the prosecutor, she contracted to make a crop for him on shares during the year 1909. He was to furnish the land and stock and one half the guano, and to feed the stock, and she was to furnish the labor and one half the guano and to feed the labor, and the crops were to be divided between them equally, except the cottonseed. There was nothing in the contract or in the evidence to show that she herself was to do the work; according to the evidence she was simply to furnish the labor, and therefore she was not, strictly speaking, a laborer, but a contractor or cropper; and therefore she did not fall “within the scope of the act under which the accusation was framed.” See Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. 243 (54 S. E. 184), an analogous case where the exact point
It is unnecessary to consider the question whether the defendant had a good and sufficient cause to leave the prosecutor’s place. The testimony in her behalf shows that she had. This the prosecutor denied, and the issue was decided against the defendant, but there can be no question under the evidence in this case, even in behalf of the State, that the essential element of fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant when she received from the prosecutor the advance of $15, as well as the advances of provisions, was not proved, and that her conviction was therefore xmauthorized. We therefore reverse the judgment refusing to grant her a new trial.
Judgment reversed.