Hankinson v. CooperHankinson v. Cooper
Cook Howard Law, Ltd., and Melynda W. Cook Howard, for appellant.
S. POWELL, J.
{1} Appellant, Clayton Cooper, appeals the decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, granting the petition for a domestic violence civil protection order (“DVCPO“) against him filed by his former girlfriend and the
The Parties
{2} Cooper and Hankinson are the biological parents of one child, a girl, born on February 13, 2018. Cooper and Hankinson were never married. Cooper resides in Johnstown, Cambria County, Pennsylvania. Hankinson resides in Butler County, Ohio. Cooper and Hankinson‘s daughter, as well as Hankinson‘s older son from a previous relationship, also reside with Hankinson in Butler County, Ohio.
Facts and Procedural History
{3} On July 9, 2021, Hankinson filed a petition with the domestic relations court seeking a DVCPO against Cooper. Hankinson also requested the domestic relations court grant her an ex parte order of protection against Cooper. To support her petition, Hankinson alleged that Cooper had “repeatedly” sent her threatening “letters and emails” as “that‘s his only means of contact.” Because of Cooper‘s unwanted contact with her, Hankinson alleged that she had “changed [her] number several times” and “debated” moving “for [her] children‘s and [her] protection.” Hankinson also alleged that she had “previously had a protection order in the State of Pennsylvania, Indiana County” because of Cooper “assaulting” her while she was pregnant with their daughter. Hankinson further alleged that Cooper had “threatened [her] life” and “threatened [her] children.”
{4} Shortly after Hankinson filed her DVCPO petition, a domestic relations court magistrate held a hearing on Hankinson‘s request for an ex parte order of protection against Cooper. Following this hearing, the magistrate issued an order denying Hankinson‘s
{5} On July 13, 2021, Cooper was personally served with the magistrate‘s order denying Hankinson‘s request for an ex parte order of protection against him. Cooper was also personally served with notice that a full hearing on Hankinson‘s DVCPO petition was scheduled to take place on July 21, 2021. Eight days later, on July 21, 2021, the previously scheduled full hearing on Hankinson‘s DVCPO petition went forward before another domestic relations court magistrate. Despite receiving notice of the July 21, 2021 hearing date, there is no dispute that Cooper did not appear at this hearing. There is also no dispute that Hankinson appeared at this hearing pro se.
{6} During this hearing, Hankinson testified she had previously received an order of protection against Cooper in 2017 while she was living in Pennsylvania and pregnant with her and Cooper‘s daughter. Hankinson testified she received this protection order after her obstetrician noticed she had “bruises” on her stomach. Documentation related to that Pennsylvania order of protection, as well as several letters that Hankinson had since received from Cooper, were then admitted into evidence. Within those documents, Hankinson alleged that while living in Pennsylvania in 2017 that Cooper had called her names, pushed her, hit her, and “shoved her against the wall” after she found him rifling through her jewelry. This is in addition to Hankinson alleging Cooper had previously told her that “he knows how to get away with murdering someone” and that Cooper had “threatened [her] if [she] ever was to leave him.”
{7} Although successful in her efforts to obtain an order of protection against Cooper in Pennsylvania in 2017, Hankinson testified that she later had that order of protection lifted in 2019 because she was “under the misconception” that she needed to “lift
{8} Following this hearing, the magistrate issued a decision granting Hankinson‘s petition for a DVCPO against Cooper. After its decision was filed, the magistrate then issued the order of protection to Hankinson. In so doing, the magistrate noted on the second page of that protection order that it had made the following three findings of fact:
The Court hereby makes the following findings of fact:
I find, by a preponderance of the evidence, Respondent committed acts or engaged in behaviors directed toward a family or household member in violation of
R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a) :☒ (a) Attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury
☒ (b) Placing another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm or committing a violation of
section 2903.211 (menacing by stalking) or2911.211 (aggravated trespass) of the Revised Code☒ (c) Committing any act with respect to a child that would result in the child being an abused child, as defined in
section 2151.031 of the Revised Code☐ (d) Committing a sexually oriented offense
{9} On August 4, 2021, Cooper filed an objection to the magistrate‘s decision granting Hankinson‘s DVCPO petition. To support his objection, Cooper argued the magistrate‘s decision was “contrary to law” and against the manifest weight of the evidence. Cooper also argued the magistrate‘s decision was “based upon erroneous findings of fact,”
{10} On October 13, 2021, the domestic relations court filed a decision and order overruling Cooper‘s objection to the magistrate‘s decision set forth above. In so doing, the domestic relations court initially stated that it was granting Hankinson an order of protection against Cooper based on Hankinson‘s uncontradicted testimony “that there was prior violence between the parties, and produced documentation of prior violence in [Pennsylvania] * * *.” The domestic relations court also stated that it was granting Hankinson an order of protection against Cooper because Cooper “poses a threat of further violence” against Hankinson. In reaching this decision, the domestic relations court specifically stated that it had “carefully reviewed the evidence” and conducted a de novo review of the record prior to issuing its decision.
{11} After its decision was filed, the domestic relations court then issued the order of protection to Hankinson. On the second page of the DVCPO, the domestic relations court noted that, unlike the magistrate‘s three findings of fact set forth above, it had made the following single fact finding:
The Court hereby makes the following findings of fact:
I find, by a preponderance of the evidence, Respondent committed acts or engaged in behaviors directed toward a family or household member in violation of
R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a) :☒ (a) Attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury
☐ (b) Placing another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm or committing a violation of
section 2903.211 (menacing by stalking) or2911.211 (aggravated trespass) of the Revised Code☐ (c) Committing any act with respect to a child that would result in the child being an abused child, as defined in
section 2151.031 of the Revised Code☐ (d) Committing a sexually oriented offense
Cooper‘s Appeal and Single Assignment of Error
{12} On November 10, 2021, Cooper filed a timely notice of appeal. Cooper‘s appeal now before this court for decision, Cooper raises one assignment of error for review challenging the domestic relations court‘s decision granting Hankinson‘s petition for a DVCPO. To support this claim, Cooper argues the domestic relations court erred by granting Hankinson a DVCPO against him in Ohio in 2021 based on “past acts of violence” that occurred between him and Hankinson in Pennsylvania in 2017.
DVCPO Standard Under
{13} “The purpose of a DVCPO is the protection of a petitioner from violence by the respondent.” Halcomb v. Greenwood, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2019-03-019, CA2019-03-020, CA2019-03-023, and CA2019-03-024, 2020-Ohio-2768, ¶ 11. A petition requesting the issuance of a DVCPO against the respondent is governed by
{14}
- Attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury;
- Placing another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm;
- Committing any act with respect to a child that would result in the child being an abused child; and
- Committing a sexually oriented offense.
{15}
Manifest Weight of the Evidence Standard of Review
{16} “‘A trial court‘s decision to grant or deny a DVCPO will not be reversed where such decision is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.‘” Porter v. Porter, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-11-185, 2020-Ohio-4504, ¶ 36, quoting Barrett v. Barrett, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2016-04-033, 2017-Ohio-250, ¶ 19. The standard of review for a manifest weight challenge in a civil case is the same manifest weight of the evidence standard that is applied to a criminal case. Dunn v. Clark, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-06-055, 2016-Ohio-641, ¶ 8, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 17. Under a manifest weight challenge, this court weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the
Cooper‘s Arguments and Analysis
{17} As noted above, in support of his single assignment of error, Cooper argues the domestic relations court erred by granting Hankinson‘s petition for a DVCPO based on “past acts of violence” that occurred in Pennsylvania in 2017, several years prior to 2021 when Hankinson filed her petition for a DVCPO in this case. This is because, as Cooper correctly notes, successive petitions for a DVCPO involving the same parties arising out of the same underlying facts are subject to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Clagg v. Clagg, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-570, 2009-Ohio-328, ¶ 16 (the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply to successive petitions for a DVCPO where “the petitions did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence“); see, e.g., Bach v. Crawford, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19531, 2003-Ohio-1255, ¶ 15 (“[t]he trial court did not err in determining that res judicata barred Mr. Bach‘s claims stemming from incidents before August of 2000 and that the evidence of events after that date did not amount to domestic violence under
{18} The domestic relations court, however, did not base its decision to grant Hankinson‘s petition for a DVCPO against Cooper solely on the “past acts of violence” that occurred between Cooper and Hankinson in Pennsylvania in 2017. The domestic relations court also based its decision to grant Hankinson‘s petition on its finding that Cooper “poses a threat of further violence” against Hankinson. Although the domestic relations court was not explicit in its decision, this seems to be a reference to the definition of “domestic violence” set forth under
{19} The domestic relations court, however, did not make this finding within the DVCPO it issued to Hankinson. Rather, as set forth previously, the domestic relations court made only one finding. That being:
The Court hereby makes the following findings of fact:
I find, by a preponderance of the evidence, Respondent committed acts or engaged in behaviors directed toward a family or household member in violation of
R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a) :☒ (a) Attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury
☐ (b) Placing another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm or committing a violation of
section 2903.211 (menacing by stalking) or2911.211 (aggravated trespass) of the Revised Code☐ (c) Committing any act with respect to a child that would result in the child being an abused child, as defined in
section 2151.031 of the Revised Code☐ (d) Committing a sexually oriented offense
{20} The ambiguity between what the domestic relations court stated within its decision and order, and what box the domestic relations court checked on the DVCPO itself,
Conclusion
{21} For the reasons outlined above, and finding an ambiguity in the domestic relations court‘s decision and order that must be resolved, we reverse and remand this matter to the domestic relations court for further proceedings.
{22} Judgment reversed and remanded.
M. POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.
S. POWELL, J.
M. POWELL, P.J.
HENDRICKSON, J.