54 Mich. 635 | Mich. | 1884
We find the facts so well stated in the brief ■of complainants that we adopt them in this opinion:
“ On the 9th day of September, 1867, Augustus D. Griswold and wife conveyed by warranty deed to Mary A. Haney the N. E. ¼ of the S. E. ¼ of section 9, in town 9 N., of range 16 W. Mary A. Haney conveyed the same premises by warranty deed to Hiram H. Haney, on the 12th day of January, 1869, who soon thereafter went into possession of .and cultivated the same and built a house thereon, in which he resided with his family until he sold and conveyed the :said premises to the defendant, David M. Roy, as hereinafter stated. On the 29th day of April, 1872, Hiram H. Haney :Sold and conveyed said premises by warranty deed to the ■defendant, David M. Roy, and at the same date Roy executed .and delivered to Hiram H. Haney his promissory notes for the sum of $700; also a mortgage on said premises for that .amount to secure that amount of the purchase price. The notes and mortgage were reduced by payment by Roy, from time to time, down to the sum of $400, represented by promissory notes, four in number, of $100 each, payable as follows : One payable January 1, 1874; another, January 1, 1875 ; and another, January 1, 1876 ; and another, January 1,1877, — with interest at 7 per cent, per annum, from date, until paid.
This bill is filed to foreclose the mortgage in default of the payment of the above amount, with the interest thereon. Upon the margin of the mortgage is indorsed the following memorandum: 'In consideration of the sale of the said premises to the said David M. Roy, and the sum of one dol
It will be seen that the passage of the last-named Act of Congress, and of the last-named Act of the Legislature of the State, afforded the first opportunity complainants had of removing the cloud upon defendant’s title to the mortgaged premises. Accordingly, on or about the 11th day of February, 1882, William A. Chappell, the general guardian of complainant, Flora B. Haney, applied to the defendant for the right to make, in the name of the defendant, an application ¡under said act to the commissioner of the general laud-office
But nevertheless, Mr. Chappell, as such guardian, made such application on or about the 16th day of February, 1882, to the commissioner for a patent to defendant under said act. In such application it became necessary by the provisions of the act as construed by the commissioner, to procure from defendant a relinquishment in writing by him to the State of all claims for a rebate of taxes which he had paid upon the premises, and for that purpose he applied to the defendant, on or about February 27, 1882, for such relinquishment, to enable him to perfect such application, but he refused so to do. Application, however, was made by the guardian, with the means at his- command, but failed. Nevertheless, the defendant himself afterwards made application for said patent, and the same was issued to him under the act, by reason solely of his possession of the premises, derived from Hiram li. Haney under the conveyance thereof to him by said Haney, which patent bears date February 28, 1882.”
The defendant is estopped by his own conduct from asserting that complainants have not complied with the memorandum endorsed on the mortgage by removing all clouds on the title before the mortgage should be foreclosed. He refused to permit his name to be used in the application for a patent under the legislation enacted to quiet titles to the lands of which these formed a part. He refused to sign a relinquishment of the taxes made necessary under the Act, and the rulings of the Land Department of the State of Michigan. Ho refused to furnish a deed in his possession, which was deemed necessary to perfect the application under the Act of'
Besides, his right to a patent accrued under the title and possession he obtained through the Griswold deed, as well as under the Bowes deed, and the title through the Griswold deed was just as efficient for the purpose of obtaining the patent as if no deed from Bowes had been obtained. The complainants state in their bill of complaint that they are willing to allow defendant the fifty dollars paid for the Bowes deed and the four dollars paid the State on obtaining the patent and also all other necessary expenses in obtaining the same. There is nothing appearing in the record that shows any other expenses were incurred, and therefore nothing can be allowed therefor.
The decree of the circuit court must be reversed, and a decree of foreclosure entered, in accordance with the prayer of the ■ bill, for the amount due on the four promissory notes stated and set forth in the bill, less fifty dollars and interest thereon at seven per cent, from September 4, 1874, and four dollars and interest thereon at seven per cent, from February 28, 1882; complainant to recover costs of both courts.