15 Utah 176 | Utah | 1897
(after stating the facts):
Plaintiff was a miner, taking out ore. Breen was in the same department, loading ore on the cage, and had no control of the plaintiff. Both were under the same foreman, in the same department of labor. They were therefore fellow servants. It is the duty of a master to exercise due and reasonable care in the selection of his servants, with reference to their competency and fitness. He must also exercise the same degree of care in retaining his servants after such employment, for his responsibility is the same. The employer’s liability for injuries caused by the incompetency of a fellow servant depends .upon such incompetency being established by affirmative proof, and that it was known to the master, or that, if he had exercised due and proper diligence, he would have learned of such incompetency. In exercising this supervision by the master, to ascertain whether the servant is competent, the nature of the service and the dangers attending it should be considered. A closer supervision over the habits, competency, and conduct of an engineer is required than over a common laborer, for the obvious reason that the dangerous consequences of neglect are likely to be so much greater in the one case than in the other; the rule being, the greater the danger, the greater the care. It is the duty of the party charging incompetency and negligence to establish the fact by proof. This may be done by showing specific acts of incompetency,
It is apparent from the facts above stated that the injury would not have happened but for the negligence of the station tender in leaving the chairs in the shaft, and of Adamson, the engineer, in not discovering the fact. These two acts contributed to cause the accident. Without these two concurrent acts the accident would not have happened. The question now arises, did the incompetency of Adamson and his carelessness contribute, in a legal sense, to the cause of the injury? Bailey, Mast. Liab. p. 433, states the rule to be: “When the injury is the result of two concurrent causes, one party is not exempt from full liability, although another party was equally culpable.” Whart. Neg. § 144, states the rule to be: “The fact that another person contributed, either before the defendant’s interposition, or concurrently with such interposition, in producing the damage, is no defense.” Care must be taken in applying the rule to dis
The facts found in the case on the part of the plaintiff must be deemed to be admitted for the purpose of this discussion, as the case was not submitted to the jury. The negligence complained of in this respect was in keeping Adamson in the employ of the defendant after it knew or was chargeable with notice that he was an incompetent and careless engineer, and that his negligence and inefficiency contributed to cause the injury. The first act of negligence was on the part of Breen, who left the chairs in the shaft. The act of Adamson, the engineer, was subsequent in point of time, yet his act of negligence, if it was such, was continuing negligence, which cooperated and acted with the negligent acts of Breen to produce the common result complained of. Although Breen was negligent, yet if the defendant was chargeable with notice of Adamson’s incompetency, and, through his negligence, was therefore wanting in ordinary care and prudence in discharging its duties, and such want of ordinary care contributed to produce the injury in question, and the plaintiff did not know of such want of ordinary care and prudence on the part of the defendant, then the defendant would be liable. The mere fact of the concurrence of one who stands in the relation of a fellow servant and the one receiving the injury does not excuse the master from his contributory negligence. The injury was the result of two concurring causes, and if the defendant is responsible for or contributed to one of these causes, he is not exempt from liability, because Breen, who is responsible for the other cause, may have been
There was some testimony in the case tending to show the incompetency of Adamson, the engineer, and that defendant was negligent in keeping him in its employ after it had knowledge of his incompetency. While we express no opinion upon the weight to be given to this testimony, yet we are of the opinion that, under all the facts shown, the case should have been submitted to the jury. The judgment of the court below is vacated and set aside, and a new trial granted.