41 So. 78 | Ala. | 1906
“The rule that the payment of a less sum than the real debt will be no satisfaction of a larger sum without a release by deed applies only to conceded or undisputed demands. Where the claims are in dispute the compromise and.part payment thereof are sufficient consideration to support the discharge.”— 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) p. 288. The-cases
■It is quite true that section 1805 of the Code of 1896, declaring the effect of written releases, receipts, and discharges, has no application to this case,- because the plaintiff gave no writing of the kind mentioned in that section. A release, however, at least of a simple contract debt, need not be in writing, and no set form of words is necessary.. It may be by parol, may be express or implied or may result by operation of law. — 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 284. The dictum in Hart v. Freeman, 42 Ala. 567, that the Code section corresponding with section 1805 of the Code of 1896, requires settlements for the composition of debts to be in writing, was declared in Singleton v. Thomas, 73 Ala. 205, to be erroneous as a general proposition, although correct in the
The appellee contends that “the evidence does not show, nor tend to show, the claim of the plaintiff against defendant for services sued for in this case was ever disputed, nor that the plaintiff’s claims against J. I). Hand, or Hand Export Company, or the Baldwin County Bank Avere ever denied,” Avhile the appellant contends just the contrary. The.evidence must therefore be examined to settle this question of fact, controverted between counsel. The plaintiff’s suit was first brought for $100, and then amended so as to claim $250, and was upon the common counts.' He testified to having been employed by defendant to render legal services in three cases, but had no contract as to the amount to be paid in any of the cases, and he offered evidence of attorneys as to Avliat Avas a reasonable fee in each case. He claimed, prior to collecting the check, to which Ave refer more fully later on, that he should be paid $30 in the “Lady Jane Tug Case,” for which item he had presented a bill at one time for $22.50, and Avhen the check was received there was a suit pending by the plaintiff to recover the sum of $30 for- said fee. The plaintiff testified that he had a yearly retainer from Mr. Hand of $50 for what Ave may designate generally as certain small legal services, not including the services for AArhich this suit is brought. Mr. Hand, however, testified that he had an arrangement or contract with the plaintiff Avhereby he was to pay him $50 per year for whatever services he might.call upon him to render for himself or his companies; and that he employed plaintiff- to do Avhatever he was called on to do for any of the companies the witness Avas interested in, which Avere the Hand Export Company, the Hand Lumber Company, the Hand Land Company, and the
The question of law then arises whether the receipt and collection- of the check, under the circumstances shown,' settled plaintiff’s claim in full.. A plea of release is in the record, and appellee concedes it was sufficient as a pleading to present the defense on ■ which appellant relies. The check and-voucher as first sent the plaintiff were declined, and plaintiff would not receive the check in full of the services, as stated in. the face of the check and voucher. Plaintiff proposed, however, that if defendant would erase from-the check the words “in full of all accounts,” and return the check he would accept it as payment for his fee in the.tug case. Hand did not do as plaintiff proposed, but prepared another check and voucher, under the same number, the voucher being attached to the check, and the latter on its face stating it was to cover voucher 478; that, being the number of the-voucher attached/ From this voucher it appeared the check was given “in full of all services rendered tp any or all of the following companies, namely: Hand Lumber Company, Tug Lady Jane, Hand Export Company.” The plaintiff detached the voucher, collected the check, and thereupon sued the Hand Lumber Company in this action.
We cannot construe the correspondence and action of the parties otherwise than as constituting a proposal
The defendant was entitled to the general affirmative charge, and for the refusal to give it, as requested in writing, the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.