18 Mo. App. 459 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1885
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
Defendant’s objection is that as plaintiff’s petition is for furnishing him pasture for his cattle, during the season, from the middle of April till about the middle
There is no doubt that there can not be a suit upon one cause of action and a recovery on another; the number of adjudications on this subject, in this and other courts, makes this a familiar rule. But it is not a question of easy solution, often, as to what cases will fall within that rule. The one before us is not without difficulty. It turns really upon the word " furnish. ’ ’ Plaintiff agreed to furnish him pasturage from April till October, and did put him in possession of the pasture by allowing, or having him turn in on April 15, and seeing that the pasturage, in quantity sufficient, was there till October. This, we think, was furnishing the pasturage as contemplated by the petition. In effect, plaintiff, on April 15, the day defendant turned in, says to him, here is the pasture I agreed to furnish you for this season ; I now furnish it to you : I turn it over to you.
The fact that after having it furnished to him he refused to make use of it for the full time, can make no difference. This case must be looked at from the standpoint of its own facts and circumstances. It is not like a case where a man might agree to furnish, on demand, things not yet in his possession or in existence perhaps; for here plaintiff did absolutely furnish the pasture, and defendant took possession of it. Of course, plaintiff did not, on April 15, bodily turn over to defendant, grass, then grown, sufficient to sustain Ms cattle during the season, but he did turn over to him the growing grass, and the land upon which it grew, and in nature would continue to grow.
It can not be objected to this view of “furnish” that, if he furnished to defendant when he turned
If one should agree to “furnish” another, for one year, forty acres of land to put in corn, and twenty acres of pasture land for his teams, and put him in possession of it, but at the end of six months the lessee quits the place, has not the one performed his contract % Has he not furnished him the land, and can he not sue squarely on the contract, alleging his own performance, and the other’s failure to pay ?
We do not believe the allegation of the cause of action, to which the proof was directed in this case, was unproved “in its entire scope and meaning,” as contemplated in section 3702, Bevised Statutes, 1879.
The second point must, likewise, be ruled against defendant. That part of the verdict of the jury dividing rhe costs between the parties, was wholly outside of the issues submitted to them, and was properly treated as surplusage by the court.
In the case of Marquand v. Wheeler (52 Cal. 445), the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for thirty-five hundred dollars “in gold coin.” In that case it is held the jury’s adding “in gold coin” to the verdict was of no legal consequence, and judgment should have been entered disregarding the mere character of the money. This decision was at a time when the difference in legal tender and gold coin, made a difference of several hundred dollars. To the same effect are Watson v. Ry. Co. (50 Cal. 523); Chamberlain v. Vanee (51 Cal. 85.)
In the case of State ex rel. Webster v. Knight (46 Mo. 83), the jury returned'the following verdict: “We, the jury, find a verdict for defendants, they to pay the costs of this suit.” The court says of this that “the
Although this was a mandamus proceeding, we think it fully applicable to the status of this case. The fact that the supreme court ordered the writ to issue commanding the circuit court to enter the verdict as a simple finding for defendant, but gave plaintiffs leave to file their motion for new trial in the same manner as if the verdict had been received and entered at the proper time, we do not conceive to be an intimation as suggested by counsel, that a new trial should be granted because of the. verdict being framed as it was, but rather, as the regular time had passed for plaintiffs to file their motion, on account of the mandamus proceedings intervening, the court was simply still holding open to them that right, if from any cause which took place at the trial, they desired to appeal.
We think the judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
Rehearing
MOTION EOR REHEARING.
The appellant asks for a rehearing in this case, based on the grounds, first, that the court misconceived the law as to the proper construction of the contract in questionand, second, as to the alleged error of the trial court in entering up judgment on the verdict.
As to the first ground, we think the suggestions made in the motion for rehearing are fully met by the opinion of Ellison, J., filed herein. We adhere to that construction.
As to the second point made in the motion the apjjellant insists that this court misconceived the ground on which he assails the action of the trial court. He claims that the verdict of the jury, in the form in which it was returned, was the result of a mistake, and that the jury would not have returned a verdict for the plaintiff at all but for their belief that they had a right, under the law,
The inquiry naturally arises, how is the court to ascertain the existence of the fact thus alleged to have influenced the minds of the jurors ?
No rule of law and practice is better settled than that the proper evidence of what the jury does decide is the verdict returned by them upon oath, and affirmed in open court. On the verdict returned into court in this case, the law, as shown in the opinion herein, required the court, without more, to treat so much of it as undertook to divide the costs between the litigants, as outside of the province of the jury, and, therefore, mere surplusage, to be rejected by the court in entering up judgment.
The appellant, recognizing the necessity laid upon him to show, aliunde, the mistake, or the influence, operating upon the minds of the jurors, in arriving at their conclusion, introduced the affidavits of the jurors to show that they thought they had a right to so apportion the costs, and that but for such impression they would not have voted for the verdict.
Counsel for appellant assumes that the affidavits are competent for such purpose, as supporting, and not impeaching, the verdict. This position, we think, is not tenable. No rule of practice is more firmly rooted, founded, as it is, on the highest principles of policy, than that the deliberations, the discussions and reasonings of the jury in their retirement, belong to the secrets of the jury room, and are inviolable. This question is ably discussed, and the authorities reviewed, in Woodard v. Leavit (107 Mass. 453), et seq.; from which the following principles are deducible: The decisive reasons for excluding the testimony of the jurors to the motives and influences which affected their deliberations, are equally strong, whether the evidence is offered to impeach or to support the verdict; after the return of the verdict into open court, and its aflirmance, no statement or testimony of a juror can be admitted as to the motives or
The authorities amply support the decision. In State v. Underwood (57 Mo. 52), our supreme court say : “The rule is perfectly settled, that jurors speak through their verdict, and they cannot be allowed ta violate the secrets of the jury room, and tell of any partiality or misconduct that transpired there, nor speak of the motives which induced or operated to produce the verdict. But they may testify, in support of their verdict, that no disturbing influence was brought to bear upon them, and that they were not interfered or tampered with;” citing Woodard v. Leavitt, supra.
The affidavits of the jurors offered by appellant herein come clearly within the rule of inadmissibility above laid down. The motion for rehearing is overruled.
