52 So. 932 | Ala. | 1910
Plaintiff (appellant)' sued defendant for damages alleging that defendant, who was a physician and surgeon, conducted himself in an ignorant, unskillful, or negligent manner in the professional treatment of plaintiff’s son. After the-treatment had continued for some months, the patient was taken to a hospital in the city of Atlanta, Ga. The deposition of the attending physician there was taken for, and offered by, the defendant. He was allowed to repeat the history of the case as it had been stated to him on arrival at the hospital by the defendant in the presence and hearing of plaintiff and others, among them the plaintiff’s mother. The bill of exceptions recites that the history given by the defendant “was corroborated as far as they were able to do so by the father and mother of the boy.” The bill does not purport to set out all the- evidence in the cause, nor even all the testimony of the physician in Atlanta. One charge brought against the defendant was that he erred in diagnosis. It must be presumed that the testimony of the Atlanta physician tended to support the defendant’s contention in some way, as that he had not erred in diagnosis, or that correct diagnosis
Plaintiff’s son had been thrown by a mule. Some days afterwards the condition developed Avhich made it necessary to procure medical attention. Defendant treated for acute articular rheumatism. Other physicians of good reputation concurred in his diagnosis and treatment. There was testimony, hoAvever, which went to show that the boy’s trouble was periostitis or osteomyelitis. The court, on defendant’s request, charged the jury that the question for their determination was not whether the boy had periostitis, osteomyelitis or rheumatism, but whether the defendant was possessed of reasonable skill,- and whether he had been reasonably dili
It is urged that the third charge given on defendant’s request should have been refused, because it did not require of the defendant that he should, be skillful in his profession. Due care in the treatment of disease requires of course skill, the ability to know and to do what ought to be known and done. But if there is lack of due care in treatment, as respects consequences, it is immaterial whether it results from lack of skill or a failure to exercise it. The charge does no more than assert that there could be no recovery unless the jury were reasonably satisfied that there had been lack of skill in the treatment of plaintiff’s son. The charge was rightly given.
Charge 4 required of defendant only that he should have exercised that degree of skill usually employed by physicians. Appellant’s criticism of the charge is that it fails to exact of defendant that degree of skill usually employed by physicians of reasonable care and skill under like conditions. By reference to the rule already stated it is to be seen that the charge might have been amplified substantially as suggested without error. The rule makes concession to physicians who have not the learning nor the 'advantages of observation and experience enjoyed by the most learned and advantageously situated of their profession al brethren. The charge, however, applied the standard attained by physicians generally. The qualification contended for would have amounted to a concession to the defendant. There was, under the circumstances, no error of which the appellant can complain.
Affirmed.