131 F. 534 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Virginia | 1904
(after stating the facts). Two questions are presented for the consideration of the court in these causes: First, as to the jurisdiction of the court in this proceeding; second, if jurisdiction exists, whether upon the facts in the case it appears there was a dedication to the public of the land upon which the fence and gates in question are erected.
1. On the question of jurisdiction, it is manifest that as an original proposition this court would be without jurisdiction to determine the question at issue between the parties in interest, they, one and all, being citizens of the state of Virginia, and that jurisdiction can only be maintained as ancillary and auxiliary to the receivership of the Hampton Roads Railway & Electric Company. That such jurisdiction does exist in this case is quite apparent. It arises upon a proceeding ancillary and auxiliary to the original suit, of which the court clearly had jurisdiction, and made necessary in order that the receiver of the court might protect his possession of the property intrusted to his care and custody, and save the same from threatened injury and
To erect gates and a fence across Chesapeake Boulevard is in effect to close up the line operated by the receivers, and make it impracticable to do business at that resort at all; and to permit the same, if Chesapeake Boulevard exists as a public highway, would be virtually for this court to allow the opposition company, by means of closing a public highway lying immediately at the terminus of the two roads, and which is necessary for the use of the company in the hands of the court, to make its business a total loss. The absence of power in the court to prevent this wrong would be to visit upon litigants the loss of their estate, by seeking the aid of a court of equity to administer their affairs when insolvent; and no court having general equity jurisdiction, and the power to administer estates of persons insolvent and incapacitated to protect themselves, should be dependent upon or required to seek the aid of any other tribunal to prevent such injustice to litigants before it. The authorities are ample to maintain this position, and to show that the jurisdiction of the court in this class of cases in no manner depends upon the citizenship of the parties to the cause. 1 Foster, Fed. Pro. § 249; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 218, 219, 21 L. Ed. 447; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276, 4 Sup. Ct. 27, 28 L. Ed. 145; Pacific R. R. Co. v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 111 U. S. 505, 4 Sup. Ct. 583, 28 L. Ed. 498; In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 181, 13 Sup. Ct. 785, 37 L. Ed. 689; Root v. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 413, 14 Sup. Ct. 136, 37 L. Ed. 1123; White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 39, 15 Sup. Ct. 1018, 40 L. Ed. 67; Carpenter v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (C. C.) 75 Fed. 851.
Counsel for the Newport News & Old Point Railway & Electric Company have referred the court to the case of Wood v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R. (C. C.) 61 Fed. 236 — a decision by Judge Colt, of the First Circuit. This is an interesting case, and bears incidentally with the one under consideration. It was there sought by the receivers of a railroad company to enjoin in the receivership proceedings another railroad from making an alleged discrimination in rates against the road operated by the receivers. In a word, it was an intent to control the administration of the affairs of an independent railroad in the receivership suit. There was no charge of actual or constructive interference with the property under the control of the receivers, or that they did not have an equal right with the company sought to be restrained ; that is to say, to the equal use of the public highway.
2. Coming to the question of the dedication of the property at the
The relief here sought is necessary as well for the Newport News & Old Point Company as the Hampton Roads Company, since both are without title to the right of way for their trades for a considerable distance upon and over Bay View avenue, if the deed from Woodfin has never been executed. Indeed, whether the deed was ever executed or not by Col. Woodfin, if he received, upon the faith of making the same, a conveyance of the triangles exchanged for his, any party in interest could require the specific performance of the undertaking to convey on his part; the Hampton Roads Company being an occupant of part of Bay View avenue as a public highway, and by permit of the land companies, as well as that of the Woodfin heirs precedent to said lease, would itself be entitled to seek this relief, as would also any of the land companies affected by the failure to make the conveyance.
It follows from what has been said that an injunction should be awarded, enjoining and commanding the removal of the fence in the bill and proceedings mentioned, and, pending such removal, restraining defendants from closing said gates.
On the question of jurisdiction, see, also, Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 12 Sup. Ct. 905, 36 L. Ed. 829; Porter v. Labin, 149 U. S. 479, 13 Sup. Ct. 1008, 37 L. Ed. 815; Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93, 24 Sup. Ct. 399, 48 L. Ed. 629; Price v. Abbott (C. C.) 17 Fed. 506; Armstrong v. Trautman (C. C.) 36 Fed. 275; Peck v. Elliott, 79 Fed. 10, 24 C. C. A. 425, 38 L. R. A. 616.