Hamo v. Wilson (In Re Hamo)Hamo v. Wilson (In Re Hamo)
OPINION
The bankruptcy court rendered two separate decisions in this case, and the Debtor appealed both. First, the bankruptcy court denied the Debtor’s discharge, pursuant to
There are two issues in this appeal. The first issue is whether the bankruptcy court’s finding, that the Debtor was entitled to only a partial exemption in the amount of $20,000 of his IRA, as reasonably necessary for his support, is clearly erroneous. The second issue is whether the bankruptcy court’s finding that the Debtor’s conduct satisfied the requisite fraudulent intent for denial of his discharge pursuant to
II.JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Panel has jurisdiction over final orders of the bankruptcy courts of the Northern District of Ohio pursuant to
The bankruptcy court determined that the Debtor was entitled to exempt only $20,000 of the IRA and that he possessed the requisite intent to warrant denial of discharge. In reaching these conclusions, the bankruptcy court entered findings of fact which are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Fed. R. BaniíR. P. 8013.
See U.S.Internal Revenue Service v. Mathews (In re Mathews),
The bankruptcy court’s interpretation of Ohio’s exemption statute is reviewed under the de novo standard as it involves a question of law.
Corzin v. Fordu (In re For-du),
III.FACTS
Ronald L. Hamo (the “Debtor”) filed bankruptcy on December 15, 1995. The case began as a joint Chapter 13 with his wife, who later deconsolidated her portion of the case. On May 30, 1996, the Debtor converted his case to Chapter 7 and claimed, as exempt, his IRA in the amount of $71,257.73. The Trustee filed an objection to the Debtor’s exemption claim.
On June 1, 1998, the bankruptcy court conducted a trial to determine the extent to which the IRA funds were “reasonably necessary for the support of the person and any of the person’s dependents” pursuant to
The Debtor has no dependents as his children are grown and self-supporting. Mrs. Hamo is and has been gainfully employed for several years at her current position. She has been able to fully support the Debtor in the past, and her income is adequate for her to continue to support the Debtor in the future.
The Trustee filed an adversary proceeding to deny the Debtor his discharge. The Debtor again testified with respect to his medical problems, including psychological problems stemming from depression, which he contends cause memory loss. A review of the trial transcript, however, establishes that with regard to some matters, he was able to articulate specific dates and particulars of events in detail, while often providing evasive answers to questions posed by the Trustee.
The Trustee proved conclusively at trial that the Debtor failed to disclose that he was president of a company called Freedom Properties, Inc. (“Freedom Properties”). The Debtor and his 30-year friend and lawyer, A. Richard Valore (“Valore”), formed Freedom Properties as a vehicle for the Debtor to repay Valore for money he had loaned the Debtor over many years, totaling approximately $75,000. Freedom Properties purchased nine real properties, which it then attempted to sell for profit, and the sale proceeds were used to pay down Valore’s debt. The Debtor acted as the sole operator of Freedom Properties from its inception in 1989. The Debtor hired the contractors who rehabilitated the properties, arranged for the closings, signed the tax returns for the corporation from 1993 through 1996, and signed the sale documents on seven of the nine properties which were sold. One of the properties was sold within two days preceding the Debtor’s bankruptcy, filed December 15, 1995. The remaining properties were sold after the filing. The Debtor was actively engaged in selling these properties for Freedom Properties, yet he failed to disclose that he was president of the corporation on his schedules. Moreover, the Debtor used the net sale proceeds from these sales to reduce Valore’s debt by $38,000 after the filing. He also admitted granting Valore a mortgage on the residence (recorded on December 14, 1995, the day before the bankruptcy filing), but failing to disclose the mortgage in the schedules.
The Debtor also failed to list a $50,000 personal injury claim resulting from a car accident in 1993, which claim the Debtor filed in state court in 1995. Not until the Trustee presented evidence at trial that the lawsuit had been voluntarily dismissed pursuant to a settlement did the Debtor disclose the lawsuit in his third amended schedules and acknowledge that the case had been pending at the time of the bankruptcy filing.
The Debtor also failed to list a $62,304 judgment he and others obtained against Financial America, a company in which the Debtor had invested substantial money. The Debtor admitted his failure to list the judgment lien but attempted to justify the omission by claiming the judgment was worthless.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The IRA Exemption.
Ohio has opted out of the federal exemptions, pursuant to
(A) Every person who is domiciled in this state may hold propei'ty exempt from execution, garnishment, attachment, or sale to satisfy a judgment or order, as follows:
(10)(e) ... the person’s right in the assets held in, or to receive any payment under, any individual retirement account, individual retirement annuity, or Keogh or “H.R. 10” plan that provides benefits by reason of illness, disability, death, or age, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the person and any of the person’s dependents.
Under the Ohio retirement exemption statute, as applied by the bankruptcy courts, the standard for determining to what extent the pension benefits are reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support is not whether he has sufficient funds to sustain his former lifestyle, but whether he has- enough to sustain his present and future needs, taking into account any special needs of the particular debtor.
See, e.g., In re Parker,
The burden is on the trustee to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the exemption should be disallowed.
Hoppes,
1. The debtor’s present and anticipated living expenses;
2. The debtor’s present and anticipated income from all sources;
3. The age of the debtor;
4. The health of the debtor;
5. The debtor’s ability to work and earn a living;
6. The debtor’s job skills, training, and education;
7. The debtor’s other assets;
8. Liquidity of other assets;
9. The debtor’s ability to save for retirement;
10. Special needs of the debtor; and
11. The debtor’s financial obligations (e.g., alimony or support).
In re Parker,
In this particular case, the bankruptcy court accurately set forth this test and analyzed each of the eleven factors in accordance with the circumstances of the Debtor as presented through the evidence at trial. The bankruptcy court determined that the Debtor, age 54, suffers from a degenerative heart condition and depression. The Debtor has no dependents, as his two children are grown and his wife is self-supporting. The Debtor has been unemployed since 1994, but has not applied for public assistance or Social Security benefits and maintains that he is unable to find a job, although his efforts at obtaining employment have been minimal. The
Mrs. Hamo has been able to fully support the Debtor, including all medical needs and insurance coverage, and no evidence was presented to indicate that the Debtor’s future living expenses would substantially increase or that his wife would become unable to continue to pay his expenses. The Debtor has been able to subsist without withdrawing any money from the IRA, which is his only asset, other than a $150,000 life insurance policy with a cash surrender value of $8,000. Ms. Hamo owns all of the assets, including a $185,000 marital residence in which there is equity of approximately $37,000. She also owns stock worth $20,000 and has a pension valued at $46,000.
The Debtor’s special needs include ongoing medical treatment, most of which is covered by insurance, and $400 per month in medication not covered by insurance. He has no secured debts, no unsecured priority debts, and $260,000 in unsecured, nonpriority debts resulting from the denial of his discharge. He has no assets for creditors to attempt to attach, except for the life insurance policy with an $8,000 cash surrender value and any portion of the IRA determined not to be entitled to an exemption pursuant to
The bankruptcy court found that the bulk of the IRA was not necessary for the Debtor’s present support as his basic needs have been continually met despite his unemployment. The Debtor’s operation of Freedom Properties post-petition, when he demonstrated his ability to manage and effectuate the resale of real properties, buttresses the bankruptcy court’s finding that the Debtor could obtain some employment. The bankruptcy court found $20,000 of the IRA exempt as reasonably necessary to sustain his basic needs in the future. While the bankruptcy court did not set forth in mathematical detail how it arrived at the figure of $20,000, the Panel may infer the appropriate findings in this regard from the detail in which the bankruptcy court discussed the factors in its slip opinion.
See Dolph v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Dolph),
B. Denial of Discharge.
On September 21, 1998, the bankruptcy court issued an opinion and entered a judgment denying the Debtor’s discharge pursuant to
Section
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless—
(4) the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case—
(A) made a false oath or account.
Under
“A party objecting to a debtor’s discharge pursuant to
The bankruptcy court concluded that the Debtor demonstrated a “continued pattern ... of making omissions and false statements in his bankruptcy schedules” and exhibited reckless indifference for the truth, notwithstanding any memory loss. The bankruptcy court based its decision on the following omissions from Debtor’s schedules and amendments: the Debtor’s position as president of Freedom Properties; his debt-reduction agreement with Valore; his $50,000 personal injury action, listed only in the third amended schedules as a pending claim; and the Debtor’s $62,304 judgment lien against Financial America. The Debtor had knowledge of his involvement with Freedom Properties but asserted that he did not consider it an asset of the bankruptcy estate.because he had no ownership interest in the company. He also knew that Financial America owed him money but explained that he thought the claim was worthless and did not know a judgment had been rendered. We agree that the “recalcitrant debtor may not escape a
The very purpose of ...11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) , is to make certain that those who seek the shelter of the bankruptcy code do not play fast and loose with their assets or with the reality of their affairs. The statutes are designed to insure that complete, truthful, and reliable information is put forward at the outset of the proceedings, so that decisions can be made by the parties in interest based on fact rather than fiction ... Neither the trustee nor the creditors should be required to engage in a laborious tug-of-war to drag the simple truth into the glare of daylight.
A discharge is a privilege and not a right and therefore the strict requirement of accuracy is a small quid pro quo. Thesuccessful functioning of the bankruptcy code hinges upon the bankrupt’s veracity and his willingness to make a full disclosure.
Hillis v. Martin, Martin v. Martin (In re Martin),
Appellate review of the bankruptcy court’s decision under
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the order of the bankruptcy court denying the Debtor’s discharge and the order of the bankruptcy court allowing the Debtor a partial exemption in his IRA in the amount of $20,000.