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Hamman v. County Court in & for the County of Jefferson
753 P.2d 743
Colo.
1988
Check Treatment

*1 engineering and construction plans successfully are feasible and can be

completed ... whether finances can [and] available”). remand, the made On wa- should

ter court allow Public Service

question witnesses and to introduce evi- feasibility about the economic

dence irrigation proposed project.

Blue River’s

VII. above, we con-

For the reasons stated proper

clude that Public Service was a diligence

ty appeal.

standing prosecute Because improperly excluded evi-

the water court identity

dence of the of Blue River’s share- feasibility of economic Blue

holders proposed irrigation project, we re-

River’s judgment and remand the matter

verse proceedings consistent with this further

opinion. HAMMAN, Petitioner,

John In and For

The COUNTY COURT JEFFERSON, OF State

COUNTY Linda and the Honorable Pal

Colorado thereof;

mieri, Judges Ar one of Hamman, known as K. now Arlene

lene Bolton, by through her next

K. mother, Mary Victoria Bol

friend and Bolton, ton; Mary Re Victoria

spondents.

No. 87SC14. Colorado,

Supreme Court of

En Banc.

April *2 Second, C.R.S. we

must decide whether county abused its discretion or juris- exceeded its granted diction when it for a minor request child at the of the custodial parent, parents when the divorced, were and the non-custodial was not notice or an opportunity to be heard. We conclude that county court did have jurisdiction under but that the was entitled to notice. We therefore conclude that the court erred in ordering requested by the custodial providing notice to the ent. We reverse the district court’s affirm- ance and remand with directions to the district court to remand to county proceedings for opin- consistent with this ion.

I. The respondent and the en- tered into a marriage common law in 1977. In the year, same a child was born of the Shade, Doyle, Klein, marriage; Frey, Otis Henry & child’s name was Arlene Frey, Greeley, petitioner. C. for Hamman. parents’ When the divorce de- cree was entered respondent Woodard, Gen., Duane Atty. Charles B. given custody was daughter. Howe, Deputy Gen., Chief Atty. Richard H. father was reasonable visitation Forman, Gen., Sol. Knaizer, Maurice First rights and support obligations. Sub- Gen., Atty. Denver, Asst. for respondents sequently, respondent remarried and Jefferson County Court and the Honorable began using her new husband’s surname of Linda Palmieri. Bolton. respondent filed a Sturniolo, Ruderman & Andrew G. Mar- petition1 in County pursu- Jefferson Court telon, Denver, respondents Arlene K. -102, ant to sections 13-15-101 and 6 C.R. Mary Bolton and V. Bolton. S. requesting a name for her daughter Hamman, Arlene eight who was VOLLACK, Justice. years old at the requested time. She petitioner, (the John Hamman fa- daughter’s name be to Arlene ther), petitioned this court for certiorari Bolton. review of the district court’s affirmance of On day the same was court’s order filed, was held in daughter to Hamman’s at the re- judge testimony elicited from quest granted of his ex-wife. We certiorari Mary both Bolton and Arlene Hamman. First, to address two issues. we must de- Mary gave following Bolton testimony: termine juris- whether the court has Q judge] Where her father? [the diction to rule on the name minor parents child of divorced under sec- A [Mary In Greeley. Bolton] caption friend, shows that mother and next MARYVICTORIABOL- actually filed "ARLENE KAYE TON.” daughter], by through HAMMAN [the her

Q position her father’s II. What is change? regard her first issue address is whether the court has really He feel like he wants rule doesn’t petition requesting to, said then she her but she [Arlene] child when the child’s gets it until she older. can’t presents divorced. The father alternative Q opposed? So *3 arguments, suggesting that the very Right, she to it A but wants do jurisdiction court cannot have over a child’s badly. jurisdiction name because that cre- custody sup- Q Tell me the and what a ates conflict with either the Children’s port are. situations Code or Colorado’s Dissolution Uniform of He custody of her. A have full Marriage disagree. Act. We month, of a pays support $145.00 weekend, every he her and sees A. upon if has the time. depending The father that the contends Q knowledge opposes that he So with juvenile or a court district court it— original jur juvenile matters exclusive Right. A change petition, name based isdiction Q —you going ahead? statutory pa the on definition “residual rights portion rental and duties” and the go Right, she ahead and wants provides: Children’s Code3 which the it, and do too. (1) Except 19-1-104. Jurisdiction. as granted petition for The law, by juvenile provided otherwise hearing. no- at the The original juris- court shall have exclusive requirements of by publication tice section (e) proceedings: ... To termi- diction were met.2 The father did not 13-15-102 parent-child legal relationship, nate the petition actual notice or receive pa- including termination residual daugh- hearing. Hamman did know his duties, as defined in rights rental and changed until week ter’s name had been 19-1-103(24); ... him her or later when Arlene told that two added). (1986) (emphasis 8B C.R.S. had to Bolton. been 19-1-103(24) states: Section daugh- Hamman learned that his When rights responsi- parental “Residual changed, had been he filed ter’s surname rights responsi- bilities” means those 24. motion to intervene under C.R.C.P. remaining after bilities denied The motion was legal custody, guardianship of na- The father then filed son, in another or have been vested both prohibition a writ of under C.R.C.P. ture of institution, including, agency, or person, County 106(a)(4) in District Jefferson respon- to, necessarily limited but Court, had asserting that the right consent sibility support, the jurisdiction, its discre- exceeded abused its adoption, right to reasonable visi- tion, process rights. and denied his due court, tation unless restricted a written order The district court entered reli- the child’s to determine affirming County orders of the Court “the gious affiliation. for the name argues (1986). that denying Motion to Inter- the Plaintiff’s 8B C.R.S. Children’s Code provisions filed for writ The father these two vene.” juve- only the court, grant- require the conclusion and we certiorari with upon jurisdiction rule nile court has ed certiorari on two issues. 8B C.R.S. extremely unlikely 19-1-101 to §§ the father It through publica- would tion, obtained notice Greeley publica- lived in because he Transcript. Golden tion of the notice was In re Marriage Nguyen, of a minor dis- child. We 684 P.2d denied, agree. cert. (Colo.App.1983), 469 U.S. S.Ct. 83 L.Ed.2d 779 juvenile court has “no appeals recognized that Colo beyond expressly given statute,” provides law jurisdic rado for concurrent provides primarily jurisdic- the statute change proceedings. tion tion delinquent children are found “where change proce noted that the name circumstanced, neglected so have been dure found in section “is in 13-15-101 addi imposed the state to to, of, not in exclusion common law custody take or act over their otherwise method for of name.” Id. at 260. Barry, Everett their protection.” Relying distinction, on this the court of 34, 39, Colo. 252 P.2d appeals held court has [district] jurisdictional provision, section power, law, founded in common to or original also provides jurisdic- “exclusive a change der of name of minor child of tion” juvenile sup- court for issuance of *4 parties the in marriage a dissolution of port orders, parentage, determinations of action,” though even there is no express orders, specific adoption other matters authorization to do so under the Uniform relationship which no to the case at Dissolution Marriage Act.5 The court of 19-l-104(l)(f)-(m). provision bar. § appeals held: grants jurisdiction relied on the father court should consider those factors [T]he in juvenile proceedings court to “ter- applicable statutory name change to a in legal parent-child relationship.” minate the grant determining a whether to 19-l-104(l)(e). change pro- The name § request_ court has wide discre- ceeding relationship at issue here no [A] bears ordering change tion in a of name and terminating proceeding parent-child a should deny application not an unless relationship. in Nowhere the Children’s special found circumstances were to ex- jurisdictional Code find provision do we a special ist. ... a circumstance argument supporting the juvenile [S]uch might change exist contributed original jurisdic- courts have “exclusive estrangement of the child from a tion” minor child’s over a name to fos- who wishes preserve parental ter and relation- B. ship. jurisdictional The father’s second Nguyen, This 684 P.2d at 260. common argument jurisdiction is that is precluded in governed by specific a law is not county court because district court provision change in in the statute. name jurisdiction change has to order a name as only a dissolution can be ordered when the of a dissolution jurisdiction district court has retained over properly jur before the district dissolution, parties seeking can change isdictional name changes only provide for name person desiring that a requires statute spouses during and children involved change file a name affidavit proceeding. course of the dissolution district, superior, or county court in petitioner’s contrast, county persons seeking of the residence.” all (1973).4 suggests change may proceed 6 C.R.S. under He name § provides jurisdic district court 13-15-101. because a has Section 13-15-101 change “every person to order in certain mechanism which desir- circumstances, so, do county change limited his name” jurisdiction merely persons in a should not have under who are involved disso- proceeding. juris- statute. lution This concurrent district, county superior, was amended court.” Section 13-15-101 in 1987. The "the (1987). 6A C.R.S. substantive statute is seeking party peti- now files a court,” -133, county 6B C.R.S. tion "in the district rather 14-10-101 to §§ than county in such newspaper and district courts diction of directs. reject improper. argument was with- that the 6 C.R.S. case, rule jurisdiction out requirements sections 13-15-101 properly conclude that regarding filing -102 of the County Court. the Jefferson publication were met in contends, however,

this case. The father court erred III. requested change daugh- his mother’s granted certiorari to decide alsoWe providing ter’s surname without actual no- erred when it agree. tice to him. We granted for the the name mother, child, request at the A. providing parent, custodial a non-custodial has Whether parent. to the the non-custodial right in bearing an interest or a child’s his Colorado’s or her surname after the child’s vides: question impres of first are divorced is proceedings. 13-15-101. Petition — jurisdic sion Colorado. desiring Every person issue, tions which has addressed the how ef- may present a to that ever, recog “a has held that a affidavit, district, fect, verified nized in his or her child’s sur interest” *5 in county court superior, or Tubbs, 384, P.2d 387 name. In re 620 petitioner’s residence. The (Okla.1980). paternal has “The interest name, forth full shall set various terms-a natural been alluded desired, and a concise the new name right, right, primary a a or fundamental desired of the reason such statement right, right, a a time-honored common-law change. The order such court shall legal right.” protectible interest and even a made, spread upon change to omitted).7 (footnotes Id. at 386 form, proper in of the court records held, also of states has is that satisfied is, parent at agree, a non-custodial we proper, and not detri- change would be minimum, party pro- in an interested a a interests mental ceeding change the surname the child. person. 58, 60, Laks, Ariz.App. 540 25 Laks v. See added).6 (1973) (emphasis 6 C.R.S. 1277, (1975)(“[T]he a father has 1279 public provision requiring notice having in his child bear protectible vides: with parental surname in accordance custom, though the mother even the usual Publication 13-15-102. custody of the may have awarded notice such of name been

Public 34, child.”); Hansel, 302 Minn. in v. least three times a Robinson shall be at (“A 35-37, 138, (1974) 140 N.W.2d newspaper published where 223 surname, long- so a child no residing change in person twenty such is obvi- made, father’s is er bears his days after order concern to natural published ously in is of inherent newspaper if no is standing to he should have published in so that county, such notice shall be " life, liberty property’ Id. or umbrella.” der the supra 6. See note 4. Tubbs, 288, 15.): 620 P.2d at at 565 S.W.2d recognized jurisdictions 7. Most which have (Without specifying it is classified whether 387 parent right in or interest' of the non-custodial life, property, liberty, non-custodial or specified have not use of this is to be child’s surname said ent’s interest in life, liberty, property falls under the protection under subject of constitutional See, process due clause. classifications of the Equal Protection Process and both the Due 284, 280, Johnson, e.g., 263 Ark. 565 Carroll omitted). (footnote Clauses.”) Id. (The (1978) non-custodial S.W.2d included un- "protectible is held interest” requires Section 13-15-102 object, but sense a is a real by publication hearing. However, after the implica having significant status societal by publication is not sufficient when tions.”); A.D. Cunningham, Cohan v. parent par a non-custodial is an interested (1984) 716, 716, 2d 480 N.Y.S.2d ty and the name and the address of the recognized interest (“[A] father has a parent readily are known or having his surname ... his child bear [but] Tubbs, 620 P.2d at 385. ascertainable. right to deter superior neither has by publication inadequate partly is Notice child.”); Brown v. mine the surname of the publication does not occur until because (Tex.Civ.App. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d after the court has entered the name 1984)(“It a father has a is undeniable that person’s legally pro order. “[A] having his children protectable interest adversely tected interest not be affect surname.”). agree bear his judicial proceeding ed in a ‘unless a method addressing this jurisdictions majority of employed is reason of notification which a child question, and conclude when give ably knowledge calculated to him at a parent’s sur the non-custodial meaningful meaningful time and in a man par to the dissolution attempted jurisdic ner of the exercise of parent has marriage, a non-custodial ents’ ” opportunity to tion and an be heard.’ Id. in a minor child’s use of his an interest Appeals applied The Texas Court her surname. virtually similar statute to identical facts Williamson, 475 S.W.2d 380 Eschrich v. B. (Tex.Ct.App.1972), (applied in Scucchi v. a non-custodial Because (Tex.Ct. Woodruff, S.W.2d in minor child’s use of his or an interest Eschrich, App.1973)). In the minor child’s divorced, her surname after mother, parent, the custodial filed who was an that a non-custodial it follows to have the child’s name change proceed party in a name interested of her second husband. to the surname ing 13-15-101.8 In constru under section changed without notice to The name was statute, legisla assume that the parent. The the father/the *6 just result. ture intended a and reasonable provided: governing statute 1000, Schwartz, 1006 People v. 678 P.2d to the interest of Whenever it shall be (Colo.1984). just In order to achieve change any minor to his application of this reasonable result of said minor guardian or next friend statute, non-custodial we conclude that a judge application.... file his shall “any other parent is included within the court, alleged if of said the facts language the statute. person” change will proven satisfy him that such and interest of be for the benefit section 13-15-101 re- change grant authority to his minor shall ruling which is on a name quires a court adopt original name and another. (1) change petition to determine if the de- though the statute did (2) at 380-81. Even proper, Id. is sired given expressly require that notice be interests change is “not detrimental father, the Tex- non-custodial natural 6 any person.” construed the statute as court (1973). Because a non-custodial C.R.S. notice: party the name ent is an interested under is statute, of the minor that parent must be afforded It is the interest involving sought paramount court action

notice when Certainly under some circum- necessary minors. for the court to make the order minor’s best stances it could be determinations. 101, right. In order concluding parent rather than a constitutional has that a non-custodial In interest, parent who is an interested be a for a non-custodial party interest to such an we hold this right, or she is entitled person" to exercise this statutory right “other as an detrimentally to the name may to reasonable notice an interest that who has proceeding. by section 13—15— under affected

749 interests of to retain natural father’s best the minor child. interest Some held father courts have “the sole We hold that the natural name. considera in a such as tion when contest a an interest surname This no- should be child’s interest.” and must be notice. best Schiff 640, 647, Schiffman, guaranteed by the Fourteenth man v. 28 Cal.3d 620 tice 579, 583,169 918, Cal.Rptr. (1980); P.2d 922 to the United States Consti- Amendment Harris, 422, 1, 19, 424-26, the Texas In re 160 and Art. Sec. W.Va. 236 tution 426, Constitution, 428 and as S.E.2d Other courts much [the explicitly suggested above], if additional factors considera quoted as tion, such as the and interests by legislature. motive into the article written parent. may custodial properly A court (citations omitted). 383 Id. at consider “whether mother seeks to ad Virginia used highest court of West bringing peti vance her own interest in reasoning same to arrive at the the same tion and whether the mother’s interest is Harris, 236 in In re 160 W.Va. result child.” also best interest of the (1977). A 426 child’s surname S.E.2d Omelson, Ill.App.3d Marriage re request of the custodial at 725, 729-31, 307, 311, Ill.Dec. N.E. require- parent; publication by notice appropri 2d factors Other Virginia met. statute was ment of the West ruling ate for consideration on The court held: length of time the name are the general proce- powers our over [U]nder surname, minor child has the im used the hold that equity in courts of dure requested change on pact of the proceed consider a a court can before relationship and on the mother-child father- there petition for a of name when relationship, id., prefer the child’s living notice must be is a actual ence, the non-custo misconduct father given to the if his whereabouts justify a dial which would diligence known or with reasonable change, make the non-custodial ascertained. could be Carroll, “possibly Brown v. deleterious.” 424-26, 236 S.E.2d at 428. Id. at (Tex.Ct.App.1984); 683 S.W.2d see Laks, Ariz.App. at reasoning results adopt the and the Laks v. Harris, of Eschrich and and conclude “the natural has an necessity these for consideration

proceeding such as must be this and is in the determining what child’s factors ... as [the supports conclusion that interests our best explicitly written into the article was] parent is entitled rea- legislature.” to do notice. If desires sonable so, attend the party, an interested As requested testify to his views about notice that *7 parent is entitled reasonable properly change. cannot name court petition parent filed a custodial of the and the best interests assess change the child requesting for if the in- appropriate considerations other rea- Reasonable notice is notice children. parent is denied the terested notify to the non-custo- sonably calculated present be name opportunity to pending in a mean- parent of the action dial Harris, at 429. change hearing. 236 S.E.2d manner, the non- ingful time and so that hearing if parent can attend the conclusion, empha- custodial coming we In to this pro- participate wishes to in the he or she to a non-cus- size that we objection ceeding or voice to the necessarily power pre- to todial making objec- change by vent Rather, hold tions known. C. is entitled interested particu- Whether making wheth reasonable notice. the determination to reason- constitute facts before requested change is detrimen lar er the question for the notice is factual person,” able “the interests other tal to question The determination. lower court’s must take into consideration the court 13-15-102, (1973), change is the no- requested name Section C.R.S. of whether change statute, child is also a provision of the tice of the name in the best interests court, the trial for factual determination states: standard subject the abuse of discretion change Public notice of such of name of review. given shall be at least three times in a newspaper published county in the where court’s order and reverse the district person residing twenty such is to remand to the directions remand with made, days the order of the court proceedings consistent after is county court for opinion. newspaper published and if no in with this county, published in such notice shall be LOHR, J., part in and concurs newspaper in county such as the court MULLARKEY, J., part, dissents directs. and dissent. joins in this concurrence provision This statute contains no for no- LOHR, Justice, concurring anyone tice to be advance dissenting part: hearing on a for a of name. grant- Only after a name has been agree I with required, ed is notice and that notice is to on the name had to rule Therefore, accomplished by publication. be of a minor child divorced language is no in the I there basis 6 C.R.S. under section however, majority, support petitioner’s agree statute to conten- do not petitioner, a noncustodial tion that he was entitled to notice and an name-change entitled to notice of a concerning peti- opportunity to be heard respect to his minor child proceeding with of name of his minor child. provisions of sections 13-15-101 under the petitioner concedes that the Furthermore, -102, 6 C.R.S. express requirement contains no that no- is not constitu- hold that such notice would hearing to him on tice be hold required. I would therefore tionally peti- of name. The err in order- court did not however, argues, tioner that such a notice change requested by the ing the name implicit in section 13-15- mother, legal physical custody had who petitioner refers to the child, providing notice to the provides that of section 13-15-101 that petitioner. change to court shall order “[t]he [a name] 6 C.R.S. which Section is satisfied that made ... Colorado,1 changes governs name detri- would ... [be] vides: interests of mental to the desiring change his Every person contends that a court son.” petition to that ef- may present a such a determination without cannot make district, affidavit, fect, verified giving interested noncustodial an superior, or opportunity an notice of the petitioner’s residence. heard. petitioner’s full shall set forth the argument, ma- which the desired, and a concise the new name majority op. at appears accept, see jority for such desired statement the reason language of the ignores plain 748 n. such change. The court shall order require- no The statute contains statute. made, spread upon the to be *8 persons given to all ment that notice be form, proper of the court in records detrimentally af- might whose interests the court is satisfied that the change of name. When fected proper, and not detri- would be clear, a court must of a statute the interests of mental to E.g., as written. give to the statute effect son. ed, 1987, 6AC.R.S. is found the statute In the statute was amended to refer or court” rather than "the district district, superior, court.” As amend-

751 Hall, law, common Co. v. property 690 At there is no Trinity Universal Ins. Rio, Moreover, 227, (Colo.1984). name. Rio v. 230 to the use of a P.2d 132 provision for legislature’s 316, 959, of a inclusion 504 (Sup.Ct. Misc.2d N.Y.S.2d 960 change of entry of (at law, notice after an order 1986) proper common no one has a it name shows that considered ty right personal to a name such that one re- to include a question. Had it desired keep using it); from Petition can another in advance of quirement for notice Falcucci, 588, 200, 355 Pa. A.2d 50 202 of so legislature have done hearing, the could (1947) (same). Although hereditary sur provision. The the text of the notice customary, names are has nev that custom a re- legislature provide chose such legal right er amounted to common law therefore, hold, quirement. would of a father to his children bear 13- nor section neither section 13-15-101 Laks, his surname. Laks v. Ariz.App. 25 given requires that notice be 15-102 1277, 58, (1975). Thus, 540 P.2d 1279 at a court orders noncustodial before minor common law a could his change for minor child. resorting legal formality. name without petitioner argues that if the statute Laks, purposes 540 P.2d at 1279. For of a him requirement notice to contains no process analysis, may due while a father hearing, in advance of the it violates recognized having “a interest his process clause of the Colorado Constit due surname,” Cohan v. Cun his child bear II, 25, Article of the Colo ution.2 716, ningham, 104 A.D.2d 480 N.Y.S.2d per provides that rado Constitution “[n]o (1984), proper 657 the interest is not a life, deprived liberty or of son shall be process protec entitled to ty interest due of law.” process without due property, Laks, 540 P.2d (father’s 1279 in tion. at process question The resolution a due property terest is not interest entitled to analysis. two The first step involves a rather, protection; constitutional de petitioner was question is whether the persons reflects custom to bear inter constitutionally protected of a prived parents). names of their Lamb, People v. est. 732 P.2d Paul, v. Fulghum 229 Ga. In (Colo.1987). Only if interest is deter Georgia Supreme S.E.2d protected does constitutionally mined to be this issue in the context Court considered process is due question how much similar to that of a fact situation somewhat Chavez, People arise. See Fulghum, case. present (Colo.1981). 1045-46 required ad- state consti argument assumes that he has some by publication petition for vance tutionally protected interest his requirement no but contained petitioner make name. The does not child’s given. plaintiff, a notice be that actual interest.3 the exact clear nature father, sought to va- noncustodial divorced type of inter Presumably, only possible judgment changing the surname cate a daugh have in his petitioner est the would stepfa- minor child to of the child’s his quasi-property is some ter’s name sort stat- plaintiff ther. The contended I would hold that whatever interest. due unconstitutional under the ute was peti the correct characterization of federal consti- clauses of state and cess interest, it interest is not an tioner’s require personal it did not tutions because “life, mean liberty property” within the biological him as the process service due clause of the Colora policy The court stated that as a the child. do Constitution. brief, petitioner implies part specifically of his In one mentions liberty that a father daughter’s F.Supp. Roe, process Constitution. due clause of the Colorado Conn, name, citing Roe v. however, clear, altogether It is not (M.D.Ala.,N.D.1976). The court in process con- also relies on the due however, liberty held that a child had to the Unit- amendment tained fourteenth made no his own name. The court interest in question Concerning the States Constitution. hand, ed liberty interest on reference to analysis be the result would Roe, See in his child’s name. child's provision. same under either constitutional F.Supp. at 782-83. *9 matter, that no- appropriate would seem that constitutional actual it provided, we re- tice be have no basis to present a known the state with notice.5 quire such minor of his address should receive notice change. The petition for child’s Neither the statute nor the father had a also conceded that process requires clause notice due that be in his child's protectible interest certain parent prior given to a non-custodial however, held, that The court name. change of the of that child. right as con- property not a interest was required, such notice is not Because of by process clause templated due that did not hold would constitution. the federal or state either ordering petitioner’s daugh- err There- Fulghum, 192 S.E.2d at 377-78. providing be ter’s name legisla- fore, of the prerogative it petitioner.6 to the prior notice notice, any, prescribe ture “to what MULLARKEY, J., joins in this to the required court’s action concurrence dissent. of name.” Id. 377.4 reasoning of the Geor- I would follow noncustodial

gia The interest of a name, while in his or her child’s important parent, is not of

certainly

constitutionally protected magnitude. Therefore, notice the lack of an actual SANT, Plaintiff-Appellee, John W. change statute in Colorado’s name vision process our con- not violate due under does the wisdom This is to affirm stitution. STEPHENS, Ella Trustee for Public requirements. notice It present of County, Garfield State no- policy requires sound

well be that Colorado, Defendant, given to a be- tice be noncustodial her child’s name is his or fore Roginski Elisabeth D. Edmund W. This, however, question best changed. is a Getzen, Defendants-Appellants. Indeed, legislature to address. left for in- contexts considerations myriad No. 85SA463. sug- name-change proceedings volved Colorado, Supreme Court peculiarly appro- gest subject that this is En Banc. forum, legislative all for the where priate April exposed, de- relevant considerations can be generally Rio v. and resolved. See bated

Rio, Misc.2d 504 N.Y.S.2d statutory or

(Sup.Ct.1986). Absent identity persons the issue must be made as to the 4. Some courts that have considered might detrimentally affected kind of consti whose interests held that father has some have tutionally protectible task, daunting in his child’s This will be legal standpoint, requiring from both a factual and the father Tubbs, accuracy name-change proceeding. be little In re there will assurance statutory (Okla.1980) (“The nothing interest com result. I find parental subject suggest legislature contem- prised bond is the scheme to protection plated the Due it. under both constitutional Clauses”); Equal Esck Process and Protection Williamson, (Tex.Ct. S.W.2d rich v. for his basis 6. The asserts no other (father name-change App.1972) has interest in order- erred in contention that the child, requir concerning his minor ing no occasion There is name. quantum under federal and state constitu quality and in this case to consider the tions). re- necessary support court’s of evidence quired determination under 13-15-101 adopted proper, 13-15-101 "the desired would be construction that in would seem to detrimental interests hearing in determination each case a son.” advance

Case Details

Case Name: Hamman v. County Court in & for the County of Jefferson
Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado
Date Published: Apr 11, 1988
Citation: 753 P.2d 743
Docket Number: 87SC14
Court Abbreviation: Colo.
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