{¶ 1} Appellant, Susan Hamlin-Scanlon ("Susan"), appeals from the decision of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court reverses.
{¶ 3} On April 5, 2007, Susan filed a petition for a civil anti-stalking protection order against Gary, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 4} On April 12, 2007, a full hearing was held before a magistrate. As a result of the testimony presented at the hearing, the magistrate recommended the issuance of a permanent protection order. The order expressly allowed Gary to exercise any visitation rights that the domestic relations court had grаnted him, but prohibited him from harming, threatening, stalking, harassing, or annoying the children or their mother. On May 4, 2007, Gary filed objections to the magistrate's decision and on May 11, 2007, Susan responded to Gary's objections.
{¶ 5} On May 21, 2007, the trial court rejected the magistrate's determinations. The trial court reasoned that case matters relating to the visitation of the children were already pending before the domestic relations court. Specifically, the trial court determined that "the resolution of the parties' difficulties in this matter rest with the Summit County Domestic Relations Court and this Court declines to participate in an action which the Court concludes it has no jurisdiction to hear[.]"
{¶ 6} It is from this decision that Susan timely appeals. She asserts one assignment of error for our review. *3
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER SOUGHT BY [SUSAN] AND RECOMMENDED BY THE MAGISTRATE."
{¶ 7} Susan contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the civil protectiоn order.
{¶ 8} Initially, we note that Susan's assignment of error provides a roadmap for our review and as such, directs our аnalysis of the trial court's judgment. See App.R. 16. She contends that the trial court erred when it failed to grant the proteсtion order. However, Susan does not support her argument that the trial court should have granted the protectiоn order, but rather, argued that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the issue. Therefore, we confine our analysis to whether the trial court erred when it determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
{¶ 9} We further note that Gary agrees with Susan that "the judge erred in stating that `this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter[.]'" Gаry further states that "[t]he fact of the matter is that the Common Pleas Court and Domestic Relations Court have concurrеnt jurisdiction over allegations of menacing by stalking." Gary disagrees, however, with Susan's claim that the trial court should have granted the protection order. Gary contends that this Court should dismiss the petition and find that there is no need for a protection order separate from the *4 domestic relations proceedings. Alternatively, he urges this Court to reverse and remand to the domestic relations court for a new hearing on the anti-stalking petition. We note that this apрeal stems from a petition filed in the Common Pleas Court, not the Domestic Relations Court. Accordingly, we decline his requests.
{¶ 10} In the instant case, Susan filed her petition for a protection order under R.C.
{¶ 11} "The goal of R.C.
{¶ 12} We find that the trial court erred when it determined that it lаcked subject matter jurisdiction over this issue. We reverse and remand to the trial court to adopt or reject the magistrate's decision on the merits. See Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(a) (stating that "[a] magistrates decision is not effective unless adopted by thе court") and Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b) (stating in part that "a court may adopt or reject a magistrate's decision in whole or in part, with or without modification"). Accordingly, Susan's assignment of error is sustained.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
*6The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court оf Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall cоnstitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. Apр.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
*1CARR, P. J., DICKINSON, J., CONCUR