Hamlet v. StotlerHamlet v. Stotler
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Thérèse Wiley Dancks
This
pro se
civil rights action commenced pursuant to
Plaintiff filed his complaint in this
pro se
The matter is now before the Court on the motion of remaining Defendants Clinton
Correctional Facility (“Clinton”) Sergeant Patrick Stotler (“Stotler”), and Clinton Corrections
Officers Joseph Collins (“Collins”) and John Doe, for summary judgment pursuant to
For reasons explained below, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Alleged Use of Excessive Force
Plaintiff alleges that on the morning of September 10, 2014, while he was housed at Clinton, he was stopped by multiple officers while on his way to an Inmate Liaison Committee [1] Page references to documents identified by docket number are to the numbers assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system maintained by the Clerk’s Office.
2 meeting as a representative of C-Block. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff claims to have been pat frisked and taken back to C-Block where he was placed in the shower area. Id . Plaintiff was thereafter placed in front of his cell while it was searched by Officer Stickney. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Stickney came out of the cell with a weapon, which Plaintiff claims was planted, in his hand and called Defendant Stotler. Id . Stotler and Defendant Collins then escorted Plaintiff to the Clinic First Floor room to strip frisk him. Id . Defendant Doe, who identified himself to Plaintiff as “D. White-Cracker,” joined the frisk and all three of them allegedly assaulted Plaintiff. Id . Plaintiff claims that Collins punched him in the back in the area of his left kidney as Plaintiff was facing the wall with his legs spread and his hands on the wall, causing Plaintiff to defecate. Id. at 5. Stotler, Collins, and Doe punched Plaintiff in the back of the head. Id. Plaintiff was then taken down to the floor with his arms and legs and torso twisted in different directions by Stotler and Collins. Id . Plaintiff was then kicked, punched, and hit with a night stick multiple times by Doe and was kicked and punched by Stotler and Collins while Collins straddled him bending his wrist and fingers, twisting his ankle, and exposing his rib area to be hit by Doe. Id.
Plaintiff was lifted to his feet and Stotler left the room. Id. With feces on his backside, Plaintiff was told to strip and squat while the officers laughed. Id. Stotler returned with clean underwear and Plaintiff was permitted to clean himself. Id. Plaintiff was told to sit in the “boss chair” and was then choked, leaving him with a sore throat and jaw. Id. Collins threatened that if Plaintiff told the nurse anything they would kill him. Id .
Plaintiff was then taken to E-Block and placed in a cell for ten minutes before being taken to the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”). Id. According to Plaintiff, he sustained a lump on his head behind his ear and broken left rib in addition to the sore throat during the alleged assault by Defendants. Id.
3
B. Grievances
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges he filed numerous grievances at Clinton after the alleged assault and sent complaints to the Clinton Superintendent. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) In his affidavit in opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff states that he wrote his first of two grievances regarding the assault and lack of medical treatment on September 10, 2014, the day of the assault. (Dkt. No. 20-2 at 1.) The September 10, 2014, grievance, which is annexed to Plaintiff’s affidavit in opposition, complained about the planting of a weapon in his cell and the subsequent assault by the “escorting Sergeant, Officer Collins, and another Unknown Named Officer.” Id . at 4. Plaintiff also complained of being denied medical care despite likely having broken ribs and suffering from dizzy spells. Id . Plaintiff asked that he be moved for his safety and be provided a camcorder, that he be given medical treatment, and that the officers be punished. Id . Plaintiff stated he wanted to file criminal charges against Defendants. Id . The grievance indicates copies were sent to Richard Langone, Esq., Clinton Superintendent Racette, and DOCCS Commissioner Anthony Annucci. Id .
Plaintiff’s second grievance, dated September 19, 2014, was more detailed regarding the retaliatory reasons for the alleged assault, the assault itself, injuries sustained by Plaintiff, and the lack of medical care for his injuries. Id . at 7. The grievance indicates that copies were sent to the New York State Commission of Correction and the Clinton County Sheriff’s Office. Id . at 9. Plaintiff states in his affidavit that he gave the grievances to the corrections officers on rounds to pick up mail in SHU unit 14 where he was housed following the alleged assault, as was the procedure at Clinton. Id . at 1.
Plaintiff was transferred from Clinton to Southport Correctional Facility (“Southport”) on September 30, 2014. (Dkt. Nos. 16-5 at 3; 16-9 at 3.) A week later, on October 7, 2014,
4 Plaintiff was transferred from Southport to Five Points Correctional Facility (“Five Points”). (Dkt. Nos. 16-9 at 3; 16-7 at 3.) On October, 24, 2014, while housed at Five Points, Plaintiff wrote to the Clinton Inmate Grievance Program (“IGP”) supervisor requesting a number for his September 10, 2014, grievance. (Dkt. No. 23-2 at 4.) Plaintiff wrote in the letter that he had filed a grievance with the IGP regarding the September 10, 2014, assault and had sent the Superintendent a copy. Id . He noted in the letter that an investigation had been started by the Inspector General but that he had not received a number for the grievance he filed. Id . Plaintiff copied Richard Langone, Esq., on the letter. Id .
In an October 30, 2014, memorandum, Clinton IGP Supervisor Christine Gregory (“Gregory”) wrote “[t]he last grievance on file for DIN# 08A0598 for the year 2014 was filed on 7/9/14. There is no grievance on file for you concerning an incident of 9/10/14.” Id . at 6. Plaintiff responded to Gregory’s memorandum on November 11, 2014. Id . at 8. Plaintiff wrote that he had filed many more grievances since July 9, 2014, and he attached copies of his September 10 and September 19, 2014, grievances regarding the September 10, 2014, alleged assault. Id . at 8.
In his letter, Plaintiff asked Gregory to file the two grievances so that he could exhaust his administrative remedies on the assault claim. Id . Plaintiff also requested that a September 9, 2014, grievance regarding his religious beliefs which he had previously submitted to the IGP office be filed. Gregory responded by memorandum of November 24, 2014, acknowledging receipt of the three grievances sent by Plaintiff and informing Plaintiff that “[i]n accordance with Directive # 4040 Section 701.5(a)(1): Filing a complaint . . . The complaint may only be filed at the facility where the inmate is housed even if it pertains to another facility .” Therefore, your
5 complaints are being returned to you to submit to the IGP office at your present facility. Copies will not (sic) retained in this office.” (emphasis in original). Id . at 14.
Defendants have submitted evidence in support of their motion establishing that there are no IGP records showing that Plaintiff filed any grievance regarding the September 10, 2014, alleged assault by Defendants while he was at Clinton, Southport, or Five Points. (Dkt. Nos. 16- 5 at ¶ 14; 16-7 at ¶ 14; 16-9 at ¶ 14; 23-1 at ¶ 7; 23-2 at 2. 2 ) Defendants have also submitted evidence establishing that there was no record of an appeal to CORC of any grievance related to the assault. (Dkt. Nos. 16-11 at ¶ 15; 16-12 at 2-3.)
II. APPLICABLE SUMMARY JUDGMENT LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only if the submissions of the parties taken together
“show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
Only after the moving party has met this burden is the nonmoving party required to produce evidence demonstrating that genuine issues of material fact exist. Salahuddin , 467 F.3d at 272-73. The nonmoving party must do more than “rest upon the mere allegations . . . of the [plaintiff’s] pleading” or “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp ., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986). “Conclusory allegations, conjecture and speculation . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact.” Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg. , 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998).
A party opposing summary judgment is required to submit admissible evidence. See Spiegel v. Schulmann , 604 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2010) (“It is well established that in determining the appropriateness of a grant of summary judgment, [the court] . . . may rely only on admissible evidence.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff’s verified complaint is to be treated as an affidavit. Colon v. Coughlin , 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A verified complaint is to be treated as an affidavit . . . and therefore will be considered in determining whether material issues of fact exist . . . .”) 3 (citations omitted).
In
Jeffreys v. City of New York
, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005), the Second Circuit
reminded that on summary judgment motions “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could
reasonably
find for the plaintiff.” “To defeat summary judgment . . . nonmoving parties
‘may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.’”
Jeffreys
, 426 F.3d at
554 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “At the summary judgment stage, a
nonmoving party must offer some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not
wholly fanciful.”
Id
. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]o satisfy
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc. , 542 F.3d 290, 309 (2d Cir. 2008). Where a party is proceeding pro se, the court is obliged to “read [the pro se party’s] supporting papers liberally, and . . . interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Burgos v. Hopkins , 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). However, “a pro se party’s ‘bald assertion,’ unsupported by evidence, is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Cole v. Artuz , No. 93 Civ. 5981 (WHP/JCF), 1999 WL 983876 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1999) 4 (citing Carey v. Crescenzi , 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991)).
III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
A. Legal Standard for Exhaustion Under the PLRA
Under the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
The PLRA requires “proper exhaustion,” which means using all steps required by the administrative review process applicable to the institution in which an inmate is confined and doing so properly. Jones , 549 U.S. at 218 (citing Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)); see also Amador v. Andrews , 655 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2011) (exhaustion necessitates “using all steps that the [government] agency holds out, and doing so properly”) (internal quotations omitted). In New York State prisons, DOCCS has a well-established three-step IGP. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7 (“7 NYCRR”), § 701.5.
First, an inmate must file a complaint with the facility IGP clerk within twenty-one days of the alleged occurrence. Id . § 701.5(a)(1). A representative of the facility’s IGRC has sixteen calendar days from receipt of the grievance to informally resolve the issue. Id . § 701.5(b)(1). If there is no such informal resolution, the full IGRC conducts a hearing within sixteen calendar days of receipt of the grievance, id . § 701.5(b)(2), and issues a written decision within two working days of the conclusion of the hearing. Id . § 701.5(b)(3).
Second, a grievant may appeal the IGRC’s decision to the facility superintendent within seven calendar days of receipt of the IGRC’s written decision. Id . § 701.5(c)(1). If the grievance involves an institutional issue (as opposed to a DOCCS-wide policy issue), the superintendent must issue a written decision within twenty calendar days of receipt of the grievant’s appeal. Id . § 701.5(c)(3)(ii). Grievances regarding DOCCS-wide policy issues are forwarded directly to CORC for a decision under the process applicable to the third step. Id . § 701.5(c)(3)(I).
9 Third, a grievant may appeal to CORC within seven working days of receipt of the superintendent’s written decision. Id . § 701.5(d)(1)(I). CORC is to render a written decision within thirty calendar days of receipt of the appeal. Id . § 701.5(d)(3)(ii).
Grievances claiming employee harassment, including claims of excessive force, “are of particular concern to the administration of [DOCCS] facilities,” and subject to an expedited procedure whereby the grievance goes directly to the facility superintendent. Id . § 701.8; see, e.g., Torres v. Carry , 691 F. Supp. 2d 366 (S.D.N.Y.) (Section 701.8 has been found applicable to claims of excessive force). The superintendent is required to initiate an in-house investigation by higher ranking supervisory personnel; request an investigation by the inspector general’s office; or request an investigation by the New York State Police Bureau of Investigation if the superintendent determines that criminal activity may be involved. Id . at 701.8(d).
A grievance referred to the superintendent and determined to be an allegation of harassment, may not be withdrawn and must be addressed by the superintendent. Id . at 701.8(d). The superintendent is required to render a decision on the grievance within twenty-five calendar days, and extensions may be granted only with the consent of the grievant. Id . at 701.8(f). If the superintendent fails to respond within the required twenty-five days, the grievant may appeal the grievance to CORC by “filing a notice of decision to appeal (form #2133) with the inmate grievance clerk.” Id . at 701.8(g).
Generally, if a prisoner has failed to properly follow each of the required steps of the above-described grievance procedure, including receiving a decision from CORC, prior to commencing litigation, he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and is barred from commencing a federal lawsuit. Woodford , 548 U.S. at 93; Neal v. Goord , 267 F.3d 116, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2001) (inmate commencing litigation before receiving a decision from CORC does not
10 satisfy PLRA’s requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted before filing suit), overruled on the other grounds , Nussle , 534 U.S. 516; Martin, II v. Niagara County Jail , No. 05- CV-868 (JTC), 2012 WL 3230435, at * 6 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012) (inmate who fails to exhaust his administrative remedies is barred from commencing a federal lawsuit).
Because failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, defendants bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that a plaintiff has failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. See Murray v. Palmer , No. 9:03-CV-1010 (GTS/GHL), 2010 WL 1235591, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010); Bailey v. Fortier, No. 09-CV-0742 (GLS/DEP), 2012 WL 6935254, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2012) (the party asserting failure to exhaust bears the burden of proving its elements by a preponderance of the evidence).
B. Plaintiff’s Failure to Exhaust
Plaintiff has averred that he submitted the September 10 and 19, 2014, grievances regarding the assault to the officers making mail rounds while he was in SHU at Clinton. (Dkt. No. 20-2 at 4, 7.) The undisputed record evidence establishes that there is no record of those grievances having been filed at Clinton, Southport, or Five Points, or appealed to CORC. (Dkt. Nos. 16-5 at ¶ 14; 16-7 at ¶ 14; 16-9 at ¶ 14; 16-11 at ¶ 15; 16-12 at 2-323-1 at ¶ 7; 23-2 at 2.) Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the DOCCS IGP before commencing this lawsuit. See Woodford , 548 U.S. at 93; Id . §§ 701.8(f) and (g).
C. Availability of the DOCCS IGP with Respect to Plaintiff’s Alleged Assault by Defendants
A prisoner’s failure to exhaust does not end a court’s exhaustion review. While the PLRA mandates exhaustion of administrative remedies, it also “contains its own, textual
11
exception to mandatory exhaustion.”
Ross
, 136 S. Ct. at 1858. More specifically,
To guide courts in the “availability” analysis, in Ross , the Supreme Court identified three circumstances in which a court may find that internal administrative remedies are not available to prisoners under the PLRA. Id . at 1859-60. First, “an administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.” Id . at 1859. “Next, an administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use.” Id . Finally, an administrative remedy is not “available” when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id . at 1860. When one of the three circumstances is found, “an inmate’s duty to exhaust ‘available’ remedies does not come into play.” Id. at 1859. Once a defendant has satisfied the burden of establishing a failure to exhaust, the plaintiff must establish that the IGP was unavailable to him. See Jones , 549 U.S. at 216.
The Court finds that the question of availability in this case is governed by the Second
Circuit decision in
Williams v. Corr. Officer Priatno
, 829 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2016), in which the
Court held that the opacity of
12
unavailable to the plaintiff inmate and found that the plaintiff had exhausted his administrative
remedies by giving his grievance to the corrections officer. As in this case, the inmate plaintiff
in
Williams
claimed to have drafted a grievance complaining of an assault by corrections officers
and given it to a corrections officer for delivery to the IGP office because he was in SHU.
Id
. at
120-21. The plaintiff in
Williams
, like Plaintiff herein, was transferred to another facility before
hearing anything regarding the grievance he had given to corrections officers for filing.
Id
. As
in this case, it was undisputed in
Williams
that the inmate plaintiff never received a response to
the unfiled grievance and did not appeal the grievance to CORC under
The Second Circuit acknowledged in
Williams
that under
Id
.
Even if Williams technically could have appealed his grievance, we conclude that the regulatory scheme providing for that appeal is “so opaque” and “so confusing that . . . no reasonable prisoner can use [it].” Ross , 136 S.Ct. at 1859 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 23).
The regulations simply do not contemplate the situation in which Williams found himself, making it practically impossible for him to ascertain whether and how he could pursue his grievance.
Id . Accepting Williams’ allegation that the officer to whom he had given the grievance did not file it, the Court found:
Under that circumstance, the regulations do not adequately outline the process to appeal or otherwise exhaust administrative remedies.
On their face, the regulations only contemplate appeals of grievances that were actually filed. For example, if the grievance had never been filed, the superintendent would never have received it and the timeline for her to provide a response within 25 days of “receipt of the grievance” would never have been triggered.
NYCRR tit. 7,
grievant to appeal to the CORC would never have come into effect.
See. Id . 701.8(g) (“If the Superintendent fails to respond within the required 25 day calendar day time limit the grievant may appeal his/her grievance to CORC.”) Accordingly, the regulations give no guidance whatsoever to an inmate whose grievance was never filed.
Id . The Court noted in Williams that the obscurity of the regulation was compounded by Williams transfer to another facility approximately two weeks after having given the grievance to the corrections officer. Id . at 126.
Plaintiff in this case, as in Williams , does not rest his claim that he gave two grievances to Clinton corrections officers for filing on a mere conclusory assertion to that effect. See Hicks v. Adams , 692 F. App’x 647 (2d Cir. 2017) (contrasting Williams in which plaintiff had followed up with the superintendent on the grievance he had given to a corrections officer for filing, with the conclusory assertion by plaintiff in Hicks that his appeals were not transmitted by the prison staff without alleging any facts regarding when the appeals were submitted, to whom, and what, if any, steps he took to follow up on the grievance). Plaintiff herein followed up on his September 10, 2014, grievance with an October 24, 2014, letter to Gregory at Clinton and a subsequent letter to her on November 11, 2014, enclosing the two grievances relating to the assault for filing after being informed by her that no grievances had been filed. (Dkt. No. 20-2 at 11, 15.)
In response to Plaintiff’s opposition, Defendants submitted Gregory’s November 24, 2014, memorandum returning the three grievances Plaintiff had sent to her for filing on November 11, 2014, including his September 10 and 19, 2014, grievances regarding the assault, and advising him they had to be filed in the facility in which he was then being housed. (Dkt. No. 23-2 at 14.) In her reply declaration, Gregory states that Plaintiff nonetheless never properly submitted any grievance with regard to the assaults. The Court finds that the direction given to
14
Plaintiff to file the grievances at Five Points where he was then held does not render
Williams
inapplicable in this case. Gregory’s memorandum regarding the proper place for filing
grievances regarding matters that had occurred at another facility does nothing to clarify
Furthermore, under the DOCCS IGP, Plaintiff was required to file his grievance within twenty-one days of the occurrence of the incident being grieved. See id . § 701.5(a)(1). The alleged assault on Plaintiff by Defendants occurred on September 10, 2014, rendering his September 10 and 19, 2014, grievances timely. By the time the Plaintiff learned from Gregory’s October 30, 2014, memorandum that no grievances had been filed regarding the assault, not only had the twenty-one day deadline expired, but the forty-five day limit on requesting an extension of time to file a grievance based upon mitigating circumstances had expired as well. See id . § 701.6(g)(1)(i)(a). There is nothing in the summary judgment record suggesting that had Plaintiff filed the grievances at Five Points after October 30, 2014, they would not have been rejected as untimely under the regulations.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that motion for summary judgment of Defendants Stotler, Collins, and Doe on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies be denied. (Dkt. No. 16).
WHEREFORE, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds (Dkt. No.16) be DENIED ; and it is hereby
15 ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report- Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders , 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to
Syracuse, New York
5 If you are proceeding
pro se
and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation
by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have
seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve
and file objections.
16
Bailey v. Fortier, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
complaint be dismissed on this procedural basis, without addressing its merits. Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, I. BACKGROUND N.D. New York. Bailey is a federal prison inmate currently being held in the custody of the BOP as a result of a 2007 criminal
Everton BAILEY, Plaintiff, conviction entered in the United States District Court v. for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See generally M. FORTIER, Defendant. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1); see also VanWeelden Decl. (Dkt. No. 10–4) ¶ 5; June 20, 2012 Hearing Transcript (Dkt. Civ. Action No. 9:09–CV–0742 (GLS/DEP). No. 44) at p. 84. 2 While he is presently housed in another | BOP facility, at times relevant to this litigation Bailey Oct. 4, 2012. was designated by the BOP to the Ray Brook Federal Attorneys and Law Firms Correctional Institution (“FCI Ray Brook”), located in Ray Brook, New York. Id. Hancock Estabrook LLP, Michael J. Sciotti, Esq., Robert Thorpe, Esq., of Counsel, Syracuse, NY, for Plaintiff. On the morning of February 23, 2009, while housed in a six-person cell in the Mohawk Housing Unit at FCI Ray Hon. Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney, Brook, Bailey was confronted and physically assaulted by Charles E. Roberts, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, of one of his cellmates after being accused of stealing that counsel, Syracuse, NY, for Defendant. inmate‘s prayer oil. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 8–9; see
also VanWeelden Decl. (Dkt. No. 10–4) Exh. D. Bailey REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION reported the incident to Fortier, and requested that he be moved to another cell. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶ 10. That DAVID E. PEEBLES, United States Magistrate Judge. request was denied, and Bailey was directed by Fortier to return to his cell in light of an impending inmate count. *1 Plaintiff Everton Bailey, a federal prison inmate, Id. at ¶ 11. has commenced this Bivens 1 action against defendant
Michelle Fortier, a corrections officer stationed at the Following the inmate count, Bailey again was accosted by prison facility in which Bailey was confined at the the same inmate, who on this occasion threw hot oil from a relevant times, alleging deprivation of his civil rights. ceramic mug onto his face. 3 Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶ 13; Bailey‘s claims are based upon Fortier‘s alleged failure to VanWeelden Decl. (Dkt. No. 10–4) Exh. D; Tr. 100, 145. protect him from an assault by a cellmate, despite having Bailey suffered second degree burns to his face resulting registered prior complaints expressing fear for his safety.
in his being hospitalized at an outside medical facility for a period of fourteen days. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 13– Currently at the forefront of the action is the threshold 14; Tr. 32, 84–85. Upon his return to FCI Ray Brook, question of whether Bailey, who admits that he did not file Bailey was placed in a special housing unit (“SHU”) cell, a grievance following the procedures in place at Bureau where he remained until he was transferred to another of Prisons (“BOP”) facilities, should be excused from the BOP facility. Tr. 59–60, 85. requirement of exhausting administrative remedies before commencing suit due to the alleged refusal of prison The BOP has established an Administrative
officials to provide him with the forms necessary to file
Remedy Program (“ARP”), comprised of a four-step
a grievance. Because I find, based upon an evidentiary
administrative process through which inmates can seek
hearing conducted, that Bailey was not prevented by the
formal internal review of any complaint regarding any
actions of prison officials from filing a grievance regarding
aspect of their imprisonment. Tr. 10;
protocol, an inmate must first attempt informal resolution
Bailey v. Fortier, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
of his or her complaint by presenting the issue informally
team that included Barbara Darrah, his unit manager;
to staff, and staff must attempt to resolve the issue. 28
Michelle Gonyea, a case worker; Hawley Snyder, his
C.F.R. § 542.13(a);
see also Johnson v. Testman,
380 F.3d
assigned corrections counselor; and one other corrections
691, 693 (2d Cir.2004). This informal, initial procedure
counselor. 6 Tr. 46, 86, 140–41. Members of Bailey‘s
typically begins with the filing of a “cop-out,” which
unit team, particularly his corrections counselor, were in
can be submitted either on a BP–8 form available to
frequent contact with him.
See, e.g.,
Tr. 126, 129–30, 140–
inmates through several sources, including their assigned
41, 165.
counselors, or on paper of any other description. Tr. 10,
22, 27, 66–67, 129, 142.
Various other BOP officials were also in regular
contact with Bailey, making periodic rounds of the FCI
If the complaint cannot be resolved informally, the inmate
Ray Brook SHU. Tr. 35. For example, at the times
may next submit a formal written Administrative Remedy
relevant to this litigation, the facility‘s warden typically
Request (“ARR”) to the warden of the facility, utilizing
visited the SHU every Wednesday morning, normally
a BP–9 form, within twenty calendar days of the event
accompanied by Robin Van Weelden, who in February
that generated the inmate‘s complaint. 4 Tr. 22, 32, 44;
2009 served as a legal assistant, as well as one or two
Tr. 72, 131, 146–47, 153, 155, 168; see also Tr. 49 (Robin Ray Brook receiving outside treatment for his injuries Van Weelden); 161 (Jean Marie Diehl); 166 (Michelle during the fourteen-day period immediately following Gonyea). I credit the testimony of defendant‘s witnesses the inmate assault. In accordance with FCI Ray Brook and find that Bailey failed to ask his corrections counselor, policy requiring visits by prison officials to any inmate or any other BOP employee at FCI Ray Brook, for the hospitalized for more than five days, Darrah, as plaintiff‘s necessary forms to commence the grievance process. unit manager, visited him in or about March of 2009, while he was a patient at the Adirondack Medical Center in The record also reflects that Bailey had abundant Saranac Lake, in order to insure that his needs were being opportunity to secure the necessary grievance forms. In February and March of 2009, he was assigned a unit
Bailey v. Fortier, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) met. Tr. 133. When asked on that occasion whether he A. Governing Legal Principles needed anything, Bailey replied, “No.” 7 Id. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”),
Pub.L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), which imposes
several restrictions on the ability of prisoners to maintain
II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
federal civil rights actions, expressly requires that “[n]o
Bailey commenced this action on June 29, 2009. Dkt. No.
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
1. His complaint identifies Corrections Officer M. Fortier
under
are available are exhausted.”
495 F.3d at 41; see Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir.2004). Under the prescribed rubric, a court must first determine whether administrative remedies were III. DISCUSSION
available to the plaintiff at the relevant times. Macias,
Bailey v. Fortier, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 495 F.3d at 41; Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 686. If such a Also complicating matters is the fact that several remedy existed and was available, the court must next courts have held that once a defendant satisfies the burden examine whether the defendant should be deemed to have of demonstrating that an inmate has failed to exhaust forfeited the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion by administrative remedies, it then becomes incumbent upon failing to properly raise or preserve it, or whether, through the plaintiff to counter with a showing of unavailability, the defendant‘s own actions preventing the plaintiff from estoppel, or special circumstances. See, e.g., Murray exhausting otherwise available remedies, he or she should v. Palmer, No. 9:03–CV–1010 (GTS/GHL), 2010 WL be estopped from asserting failure to exhaust as a defense. 1235591, at * 4 and n. 17 (N.D.N.Y. Mar.31, 2010) Id. In the event the proffered defense survives these (Suddaby, J.); see also Calloway v. Grimshaw, No. 9:09– first two levels of scrutiny, the court must determine CV–1354, 2011 WL 4345299, at *5 and n. 5 (N.D.N.Y. whether the plaintiff has established the existence of Aug.10, 2011) (Lowe, M.J.) (citing cases); report and special circumstances sufficient “to justify the failure recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 4345296 (N.D.N.Y. to comply with applicable administrative procedural Sep.15, 2011) (McAvoy, S.J.); Cohn v. KeySpan Corp., requirements. 10 , 11 Id. 713 F.Supp.2d 143, 155 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (finding that,
in the employment discrimination context, defendants bear the burden of establishing the affirmative defense B. Burden of Proof of failure to timely exhaust his administrative remedies, Before applying the foregoing legal principles, I must first but once defendants have done so, the plaintiff must consider who bears the burden of proof, and whether that plead and prove facts supporting equitable avoidance burden shifts throughout the analysis prescribed under of the defense.). Those decisions, while referencing the Hemphill. burden of proof on an affirmative defense, seem to
primarily address an inmate‘s burden of production, or of As an affirmative defense, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, going forward, to show facts that would form the basis 216, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007), exhaustion is for finding of unavailability, estoppel, or a finding of a claim upon which the party asserting it typically bears special circumstances, rather than speaking to the ultimate the ultimate burden of proving its essential elements by a burden of persuasion.
preponderance of the evidence. Soria v. Girdich, No. 9:04–
CV–727, 2007 WL 4790807, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 2007) I have been unable to uncover any cases squarely holding (DiBianco, M.J.) (citing McCoy v. Goord, 255 F.Supp.2d that the defendant bears the ultimate burden of proof 233, 247 (S.D.N.Y.2003)); McEachin v. Selsky, No. 9:04– with regard to all elements of a Hemphill analysis. In CV–83(FJS/RFT), 2005 WL 2128851, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. the final analysis, however, Hemphill addresses all of the Aug.30, 2005) (Scullin, C.J.) (citing Howard v. Goord, No. elements a court is required to consider when analyzing 98–CV–7471, 1999 WL 1288679, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, an exhaustion defense. See Macias, 495 F.3d at 41 1999)), aff‘d in part, vacated in part, 225 F. App‘x 36 (2d (“In Hemphill we “read together” [a series of cases] Cir.2007). The issue is somewhat complicated, however, and formulated a three-part test ....”) (emphasis added). by consideration of the three-part analysis mandated by Therefore, I recommend a finding that, while the burden Hemphill and related cases because that line of cases of production may shift to the plaintiff when a court incorporates concepts—such as estoppel, for example— undertakes a Hemphill analysis, the ultimate burden of that typically require the party asserting them to bear proof with respect to the exhaustion defense remains, at all the ultimate burden of proof. See e.g., Abbas v. Dixon, times, with the defendant. See Soria, 2007 WL 4790807, 480 F.3d 636, 642 (2d Cir.2007) (“The plaintiff bears the at *2 (“[A]s with other affirmative defenses, the defendant burden of showing that the action was brought within has the burden of proof to show that plaintiff failed to a reasonable period of time after the facts giving rise exhaust his administrative remedies.”).
to the equitable tolling or equitable estoppel ....”); In re
Heflin, 464 B.R. 545, 554 (D.Conn.2011) (“The burden of C. Application of Governing Legal Principles providing every element of an estoppel is upon the party seeking to set up the estoppel.”) (citing Comm‘r v. Union 1. Availability of Administrative Remedy Pac. R.R. Co., 86 F.2d 637, 640 (2d Cir.1936)). In this instance, the question of whether the ARP was
available to Bailey is at the heart of the exhaustion
Bailey v. Fortier, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) analysis. The hearing testimony confirmed, and Bailey 219, 226 (S.D.N.Y.2010), aff‘d, 441 F. App‘x 816 (2d admitted, that at all times relevant to this litigation, there Cir.2011)) (other citations omitted).
was an inmate grievance procedure in place at FCI Ray
Brook. This, however, does not necessarily mean that it The question of whether, in this instance, prison officials was “available” to the plaintiff. should be estopped from asserting failure to exhaust as
an affirmative defense as a result of their conduct is Bailey contends that the grievance process was not inextricably intertwined with the question of availability available to him in light of the alleged refusal of prison of the remedy. Assuming, however, that this presents a officials to provide him with the forms necessary to file distinct inquiry, the court must examine whether, through an ARR and pursue the grievance to culmination. Having her conduct, Fortier has provided a basis to estop her from considered the competing testimony, however, I conclude asserting an exhaustion defense.
that Fortier has established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the forms necessary to pursue a grievance in In this instance, Bailey does not allege that Fortier accordance with the ARP in place at FCI Ray Brook were engaged in a campaign to preclude him from filing a available to Bailey through several sources, but were not grievance regarding her actions. Instead, his focus is requested. As such, Fortier has satisfied the first Hemphill upon the alleged refusal of other officials at FCI Ray factor. Brook to provide him with necessary forms and cooperate
in his efforts to present his grievance against Fortier. Accordingly, Bailey has failed to present any evidence that 2. Presentation of Defense/Estoppel would support an estoppel against the defendant from The focus of the second prong of the Hemphill analysis raising the issue of exhaustion. Atkins, 2012 WL 4026840, is upon “whether the defendants may have forfeited the at * 3. Therefore, I conclude that Fortier has proven, by a affirmative defense of non-exhaustion by failing to raise preponderance of the evidence, that she did not, through or preserve it, or whether the defendants’ own actions her own actions, preclude Bailey from taking advantage inhibiting the inmate‘s exhaustion of remedies may estop of the ARP and therefore should not be estopped from one or more of the defendants from raising the plaintiff‘s asserting the defense. failure to exhaust as a defense.” Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 686 (citations omitted). In her answer, Fortier raised
exhaustion as a defense in a timely fashion.
See
Answer
3.
Special Circumstances
(Dkt. No. 22) Second Defense (“Plaintiff clearly failed to
The third, catchall factor that must be considered under
exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by the
the Second Circuit‘s prescribed exhaustion rubric centers
Prison Litigation Reform Act,
qualifying as “special” under this prong of the test is “ ‘Generally, a defendant in an action may not be where a plaintiff‘s reasonable interpretation of applicable estopped from asserting the affirmative defense of failure regulations regarding the grievance process differs from to exhaust administrative remedies based on the actions that of prison officials and leads him or her to conclude (or inactions) of other individuals.’ ” Atkins v. Menard, that the dispute is not grievable. Giano, 380 F.3d at No. 9:11–CV–9366, 2012 WL 4026840, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. 676–77; see also Hargrove, 2007 WL 389003, at *10 Sept.12, 2012) (Suddaby, J.) (citing Murray, 2010 WL (quoting and citing Giano ). Special circumstances may 1235591, at *5 and n. 26 (collecting cases)). Put differently, also exist when a facility‘s “[f]ailure to provide grievance a plaintiff must allege that a defendant named in the deposit boxes, denial of forms and writing materials, and lawsuit acted to interfere with his ability to exhaust in a refusal to accept or forward plaintiff‘s appeals-which order to establish a basis to estop that defendant from effectively rendered the grievance process unavailable to invoking the exhaustion defense. Calloway, 2011 WL him.” Murray, 2010 WL 1235591, at *6 (quoting Sandlin 4345299, at *4 (citing Bennett v. James, 737 F.Supp.2d v. Poole, 488 (W.D.N.Y.2008) (noting that “[s]uch facts
support a finding that defendant‘s are estopped from
Bailey v. Fortier, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
filing a grievance regarding the claims set forth in his
relying on exhaustion defense as ‘special circumstances’
complaint, or otherwise engage in conduct for which she
excusing plaintiff‘s failure to exhaust”)).
should be estopped from asserting failure to exhaust as
an affirmative defense; and (3) Bailey has offered no
During the evidentiary hearing, Bailey testified to
special circumstances warranting that he be excused from
his awareness of the existence of the ARP at FCI Ray
the PLRA‘s exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, it is
Brook.
See, e.g.,
Tr. 102. Bailey‘s testimony regarding
therefore hereby respectfully
his alleged efforts to secure the forms necessary to
pursue the grievance plainly evidences his knowledge of
RECOMMENDED, that plaintiff‘s complaint in this
the requirement that he exhaust available administrative
action be DISMISSED, based upon his failure to comply
remedies, and negates a finding of any reasonable belief
with the exhaustion requirements of
avail himself of the BOP grievance process, which was All Citations available to him, before commencing this action; (2)
Fortier did not, through her actions, preclude Bailey from Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 6935254 Footnotes
1 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619
(1971).
2 The June 20, 2012 Hearing Transcript (Dkt. No. 44) will hereinafter be cited as “Tr. ____”.
3 According to Bailey, there were no corrections officers present in his cell unit at the time of the assault. Complaint (Dkt.
No. 1) ¶ 13. 4 Plaintiff was aware of the twenty-day limitation for filing a BP–9 form to initiate the formal grievance process. Tr. 103. 5 Here, the record demonstrates that in light of his circumstances, including the fourteen-day period of hospitalization
following the incident, Bailey almost certainly would have been granted relief from that requirement had such a request been made. See Tr. 43, 144. I note, parenthetically, that the handbook provided to inmates at FCI Ray Brook does not address the possibility of requesting an extension of the twenty-day time limit for filing a BP–9. See Tr. 34, 43.
6 Jean Marie Diehl took over as plaintiff‘s correction counselor in or about September 2009, shortly before Snyder‘s
retirement from the BOP. Tr. 140, 163. 7 During the hearing Bailey testified that he did not recall Darrah visiting him. See Tr. 114. Once again, I credit the testimony
of Darrah over that of the Bailey with respect to this issue. 8 The hearing was conducted by video conference, with Bailey participating and testifying from the Kentucky federal
correctional facility in which he is currently being held, pursuant toRule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . See Rivera v. Santirocco, 814 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir.1987). At the outset of the hearing I placed upon the record the factors which I considered in declining to exercise my discretion to require that Bailey be produced in person for the evidentiary hearing. See Tr. 3.
Bailey v. Fortier, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) 9 Attorney Michael J. Sciotti, Esq., of the firm of Hancock & Estabrook, LLP, was appointed in January 2012 to represent
the plaintiff in this action, pro bono, at the hearing. The court wishes to express its thanks to Attorney Sciotti and his co- counsel, Robert Thorpe, Esq., for their energetic and diligent efforts on behalf of the plaintiff.
10 In Macias, which, like this action, involved an Eighth Amendment claim under Bivens, as well as claims under the Federal
Court Claims Act,28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. , defendants asserted that plaintiff‘s complaint was subject to dismissal under the PLRA based upon his failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Macias, 495 F.3d at 40. Reiterating the importance of exhaustion in both a substantive and a procedural sense, the Second Circuit concluded that, while a prisoner may have substantively exhausted remedies by making informal complaints regarding the conditions at issue, the PLRA, as illuminated by Woodford, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368, requires proper procedural exhaustion through the available grievance channels. Id. at 41. The court left open, however, the possibility that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court‘s decision in Woodford, a defendant could be precluded from asserting failure to exhaust available administrative remedies in the event of a finding that threats by prison officials may have deterred compliance with the PLRA exhaustion requirements, including under Hemphill. Id. at 44–45. The court in Macias also noted that the plaintiff in that case did not assert that the available internal remedial scheme was so confusing as to excuse his failure to avail himself of that process, thereby obviating the need for the court to determine what effect, if any, Woodford would have upon the Hemphill holding to the effect that a reasonable misinterpretation of the available scheme could justify an inmate‘s failure to follow the procedural rules. See Amador v. Superintendents of Dep‘t of Correctional Serv., No. 03 CIV. 0650 (KTD/CWG), 2007 WL 4326747, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.4, 2007). It therefore appears that the teachings of Hemphill remain intact, at least with regard to the first two points of inquiry. Id. at *7.
11 In practicality, these three prongs of the prescribed test, though perhaps intellectually distinct, plainly admit of significant
overlap. See Hargrove, 2007 WL 389003, at *8 n. 14; see also Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 677 n. 6 (2d Cir.2004). End of Document © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Cole v. Artuz, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999)
1999 WL 983876 ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, S.D. New York.
Craig COLE, Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION v. FRANCIS, Magistrate J.
Christopher P. ARTUZ, Superintendent, Green
Haven Correctional Facility, R. Pflueger, A.
The plaintiff, Craig Cole, an inmate at the Green Haven
Glemmon, Sgt. Stevens, Lt. Haubert, Capt.
Correctional Facility, brings this action pursuant to 42
W.M. Watford, Capt. T. Healey, and John
U.S.C.
William Toran, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the inmate in the custody the New York State Department Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, of Correctional Services (“DOCS”), incarcerated at the New York, for Defendant. Green Haven Correctional Facility. (First Amended
Complaint (“Am.Compl.”) ¶ 3). From June 21, 1993 to July 15, 1993, the plaintiff was in keeplock because of MEMORANDUM & ORDER an altercation with prison guards. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 17– 25). An inmate in keeplock is confined to his cell for PAULEY, J.
twenty-three hours a day with one hour for recreation.
The remaining defendant in this action, Correction
(Affidavit of Anthony Annucci dated Dec. 1, 1994 ¶
Officer Richard Pflueger, having moved for an order,
5). Pursuant to DOCS policy, inmates in keeplock must
pursuant to
by inmates in keeplock to attend religious services. ORDERED that the attached report and (Schneider Aff. ¶ 3). Written approval is provided to the recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge inmate if authorization is granted. (Affidavit of Richard James C. Francis IV, dated August 20, 1999, is adopted in Pflueger dated April 26, 1999 (“Pflueger Aff.”) ¶ 5). The its entirety; and it is further inmate must then present the appropriate form to the
gate officer before being released to attend the services.
ORDERED that defendant Pflueger‘s motion for (Pflueger Aff. ¶ 5).
summary judgment is granted, and the amended
complaint is dismissed; and it is further
Cole v. Artuz, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999)
*2
On June 28, 1993, the plaintiff submitted a request
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
to attend the Muslim services on July 2, 1993. (Request
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
to Attend Scheduled Religious Services by Keep–Locked
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
Inmate dated June 28, 1993 (“Request to Attend
a matter of law.”
255; Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1048– On August 25, 1993, the plaintiff filed suit alleging 49 (2d Cir.1995). But the court must inquire whether that prison officials had violated his procedural due “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party process rights. On December 4, 1995, the defendants for a jury to return a verdict for that party” and grant moved for summary judgment. (Notice of Defendants’ summary judgment where the nonmovant‘s evidence is Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 4, 1995). conclusory, speculative, or not significantly probative. The Honorable Kimba M. Wood, U.S.D.J., granted the Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citation omitted). “The motion and dismissed the complaint on the grounds that litigant opposing summary judgment may not rest upon the plaintiff failed to show that he had been deprived of mere conclusory allegations or denials, but must bring a protected liberty interest, but she granted the plaintiff forward some affirmative indication that his version of leave to amend. (Order dated April 5, 1997). On May 30, relevant events is not fanciful.” Podell v. Citicorp Diners 1997, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging Club, Inc., 112 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir.1997) (citation and five claims against several officials at the Green Haven internal quotation omitted); Matsushita Electric Industrial Correctional Facility. (Am.Compl.) On November 16, Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (a non- 1998, Judge Wood dismissed all but one of these claims moving party “must do more than simply show that there because the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”); or because the statute of limitations had elapsed. (Order Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, dated Nov. 16, 1998). The plaintiff‘s sole remaining claim 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir.1995) (nonmovant “may not rely is that Officer Pflueger violated his First Amendment simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that rights by denying him access to religious services on July the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible”) 2, 1993. The defendant now moves for summary judgment ((citations omitted)). In sum, if the court determines that on this issue, arguing that the plaintiff has presented no “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational evidence that his First Amendment rights were violated. trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no In addition, Officer Pflueger contends that he is entitled ‘genuine issue for trial.” ’ Matsushita Electric Industrial to qualified immunity. (Defendants’ Memorandum of Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First National Bank of Law in Support of Their Second Motion for Summary Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968)); Judgment). Montana v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 869
F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir.1989).
A.
Standard for Summary Judgment
Where a litigant is
pro se,
his pleadings should
Pursuant to
Cole v. Artuz, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999) F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994)). Nevertheless, proceeding 520, 547 (1979).
pro se does not otherwise relieve a litigant from the
usual requirements of summary judgment, and a pro The policy at issue here satisfies the requirement that a se party‘s “bald assertion,” unsupported by evidence, limitation on an inmate‘s access to religious services be is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary reasonable. The practice at Green Haven was to require judgment. See Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d inmates in keeplock to present written approval to the Cir.1991); Gittens v. Garlocks Sealing Technologies, 19 prison gate officer before being released to attend religious F.Supp.2d 104, 110 (W.D.N.Y.1998); Howard Johnson services. This policy both accommodates an inmate‘s right International, Inc. v. HBS Family, Inc., No. 96 Civ. to practice religion and allows prison administrators to prevent individuals posing an active threat to security 7687, 1998 WL 411334, at * 3 (S.D .N.Y. July 22, from being released. The procedure is not overbroad since 1998); Kadosh v. TRW, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 5080, 1994 it does not permanently bar any inmate from attending WL 681763, at * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1994) (“the work religious services. Rather, each request is decided on a product of pro se litigants should be generously and case-by-case basis by a high ranking prison official and liberally construed, but [the pro se’ s] failure to allege denied only for good cause. either specific facts or particular laws that have been violated renders this attempt to oppose defendants’ Furthermore, in order to state a claim under § motion ineffectual”); Stinson v. Sheriff‘s Department, 499 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant F.Supp. 259, 262 (S.D.N.Y.1980) (holding that the liberal acted with deliberate or callous indifference toward the standard accorded to pro se pleadings “is not without plaintiff‘s fundamental rights. See Davidson v. Cannon limits, and all normal rules of pleading are not absolutely 474 U.S. 344, 347–48 (1986) (plaintiff must show suspended”). abusive conduct by government officials rather than mere
negligence). Here, there is no evidence that the defendant was reckless or even negligent in his conduct toward B. Constitutional Claim the plaintiff or that he intended to violate the plaintiff‘s It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional rights. Officer Pflueger‘s responsibility as a prison gate right to participate in congregate religious services even officer was simply to follow a previously instituted policy. when confined in keeplock. Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 993 His authority was limited to granting access to religious F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir.1993); Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d services to those inmates with the required written 567, 570 (2d Cir1989). However, this right is not absolute. permission. Since Mr. Cole acknowledges that he did See Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir.1990) not present the necessary paperwork to Officer Pflueger (right to free exercise balanced against interests of prison on July 2, 1993, the defendant did nothing improper in officials). Prison officials can institute measures that limit denying him access to the religious services. Although it is the practice of religion under a “reasonableness” test that unfortunate that the written approval apparently did not is less restrictive than that which is ordinarily applied reach the plaintiff until after the services were over, his to the alleged infringement of fundamental constitutional constitutional rights were not violated. 1 rights. O‘Lone v. Estate of Shaabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1986). In O‘Lone, the Court held that “when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the Conclusion regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that the
penological interests.”
Id.
at 349 (quoting
Turner v. Safley,
defendant‘s motion for summary judgment be granted and
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). The evaluation of what is an
judgment be entered dismissing the complaint. Pursuant
appropriate and reasonable penological objective is left
to
the chambers of the Honorable William H. Pauley III,
Cole v. Artuz, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1999) Room 234, 40 Foley Square, and to the Chambers of the
undersigned, Room 1960, 500 Pearl Street, New York, All Citations New York 10007. Failure to file timely objections will
preclude appellate review. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 1999 WL 983876
Respectfully submitted,
Footnotes
1 In light of this finding, there is no need to consider the defendant‘s qualified immunity argument.
End of Document © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Martin v. Niagara County Jail, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
2012 WL 3230435 Answers to the amended complaint were filed on November 13, 2006, by defendants Mahar, Drehs,
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
Woock, Niagara County Jail, and Beilein (“the County
United States District Court,
defendants”) (Item 18), and on November 15, 2006
W.D. New York.
by defendants Hohensee, Aikin, and Inter–Community
Memorial Hospital (“the medical defendants”) (Item
Cornelius MARTIN, II, Plaintiff,
22). Plaintiff‘s deposition was taken on September 4,
v.
2008. Following the deposition, the parties stipulated
The NIAGARA COUNTY JAIL, et al,, Defendants.
to the following: 1) plaintiff agreed to withdraw his
claims against the defendants based on excessive dust,
No. 05–CV–868(JTC).
regarding his treatment for sinus problems, and arising
|
from his lack of a mattress and pillow for 12 hours; 2)
Aug. 6, 2012.
plaintiff agreed to withdraw his claims against defendants
Attorneys and Law Firms
Drehs and Woock individually; 3) all issues regarding
plaintiff‘s CPAP machine were resolved; and 4) plaintiff
Cornelius Martin, II, pro se.
acknowledged that his claim that he did not receive an
inmate handbook did not constitute a violation of the
Webster Szanyi, LLP (Charles E. Graney, Esq. and Mark
Eighth Amendment (Item 53).
C. Davis, Esq., of Counsel), Buffalo, NY, for Defendants
Niagara County Jail, Beilein, Mahar, Drehs, and Woock.
Pursuant to a case management order and following
Roach, Brown, McCarthy & Gruber, P.C. (Joel J. Java,
the parties’ exchange of discovery materials, on August
Jr., Esq., of Counsel), Buffalo, NY, for Defendants
27, 2009, the medical defendants moved for summary
Hohensee, Aikin, and Inter–Community Memorial
judgment pursuant to
plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act of INTRODUCTION 1995; 2) Inter–Community Memorial Hospital cannot be *1 Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § held liable on the basis of respondeat superior; 3) there 1983 seeking compensatory and punitive damages for the was no deliberate indifference to plaintiff‘s medical needs; alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs 4) defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and 5) and the deprivation of medical care. Currently pending plaintiff‘s claims against Sheriff Beilein must be dismissed before the court are the defendants’ motions for summary as they are based on a policy that does not exist. judgment (Items 59, 60) and plaintiff‘s cross-motion for
summary judgment on liability (Item 62). Plaintiff filed his cross-motion for summary judgment on
August 31, 2009 (Item 62). He asserted that administrative
remedies were unavailable to him as he never received an
inmate handbook at the Niagara County Jail. Plaintiff
BACKGROUND
also argued that he suffers from a serious medical need and
that the interference by the defendants with his ongoing
Plaintiff commenced this action on December 12, 2005
medical treatment constituted deliberate indifference.
with the filing of a
pro se
complaint pursuant to Title
March 30, 2006 (Item 6). Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief opposition to plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment and compensatory and punitive damages for the alleged (Items 66, 67). Plaintiff filed a response to defendant‘s deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation motions on November 5, 2009 and agreed to withdraw of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United his claim against Inter–Community Memorial Hospital States Constitution.
Martin v. Niagara County Jail, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) (Item 68, p. 3). Thereafter, on January 27, 2010, the the detox protocol have all resolved. Id., p. 47. While medical defendants filed a reply (Item 70), and the County housed at the NCJ, plaintiff was also prescribed Ultram defendants filed a reply on January 29, 2010 (Item 71). for pain, nasal spray for rhinitis, Imodium for diarrhea,
and blood pressure medication for hypertension. Id., pp.
The court has determined that oral argument is 44, 54, 106–07.
unnecessary. For the reasons that follow, defendants’
motions for summary judgment are granted, and Prior to his admission to the NJC, plaintiff had not spent plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment is denied. a significant amount of time in custody in a New York
State jail or prison. He spent 14 days at the Erie County Medical Center awaiting extradition to Ohio in 1995, and approximately one hour in Fredonia awaiting bail in 1990 FACTS 1 (Martin Dep., pp. 61–62). He was not familiar with the grievance process and had never filed a grievance. Id., pp. Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Niagara County Jail 62–63. Plaintiff stated that he learned of the grievance (“NCJ”) from May 11, 2005 through July 5, 2005, process in December 2005 or January 2006 by reading and again from October 7, 2005 until February 3, the New York State “Minimum Standards” binder in the 2006. At the time he entered the jail, he had been facility law library. Id., pp. 65, 86. undergoing treatment following multiple spinal surgeries which consisted of physical therapy; two 80 milligram During the intake process, plaintiff signed a form time-released oxycontin pills, one taken at night and acknowledging receipt of a inmate handbook, although one in the morning; and five milligram oxycodone pills he denies receiving the handbook either time he was to be taken in combination with aspirin or tylenol for processed. Plaintiff stated that he simply signed the breakthrough pain (Item 59, Exh. H, “Martin Dep.,” acknowledgment because he was told to do so by the p. 20). Plaintiff stated that while he was not addicted admitting officer (Martin Dep., pp. 80, 84–85). He filed to oxycontin, he was physically “dependent” on the a grievance related to his Eighth Amendment claim on medication. Id., p. 34. January 2, 2006 and pursued the grievance through the appeals process. Id., pp. 71–72. At the time he was booked into the NCJ on May 11, 2005, plaintiff was evaluated by defendant Mahar, a nurse In support of the motion for summary judgment, employed by the NCJ. She noted a diagnosis of diabetes defendants submitted an affidavit of Captain Duane and sleep apnea and a prior history of spinal surgery (Item Vendetta, grievance coordinator for the Niagara County 60, Att. 6, “Mahar Aff.,” Exh. A). Nurse Mahar contacted Sheriff‘s Department (Item 60, att. 7). The grievance defendant Aikin, the nurse practitioner for the NCJ, who policy in effect at the time plaintiff was incarcerated issued a telephone order for plaintiff to be started on the provided that inmates must complete and submit a facility‘s diabetes and detoxification protocols. Id., ¶¶ 14– grievance form within five days of the act or occurrence 15. According to the signed standing medical orders of the giving rise to the grievance. Id., ¶ 9. If the inmate is detox protocol, Nurse Mahar gave plaintiff one tablet of dissatisfied with the decision of the grievance coordinator, darvocet on the evening of May 11, 2005. Id., ¶ 16. he can appeal to the Chief Administrative Officer of the facility. Id., ¶ 10. After receiving a response from the As a result of being on the detox protocol, plaintiff Chief Administrative Officer, the inmate could seek review was housed in an area of the NCJ that he described of the decision with the Citizen‘s Policy and Complaint as “squalor” (Martin Dep., pp. 51, 97). On May 13, Review Council (“CPCRC”) of the New York State 2005, plaintiff asked to be removed from the detox Commission of Correction. Id., ¶ 11. Capt. Vendetta program so that he could be moved to more suitable stated he reviewed the grievance file for the time period housing for federal prisoners. Id., p. 98. As a result of that plaintiff was incarcerated at the NCJ and found being denied oxycontin, plaintiff testified that he suffered no grievances filed by the plaintiff until January 3, 2006 sweats, tremors, extremely high blood pressure, diarrhea, and January 13, 2006. Id., ¶¶ 15–16. Additionally, Capt. and pain in his extremities which lasted about a week to Vendetta stated that it is standard practice for all incoming ten days. Id., p. 41, 42. Other than extremity pain, the inmates to receive an inmate handbook that outlines the withdrawal symptoms plaintiff experienced as a result of
Martin v. Niagara County Jail, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) grievance process. Id., ¶ 24. Even if plaintiff did not receive Aikin that he had taken only dose of oxycontin in the a handbook, the grievance process is outlined in reference last 14 days, and requested to be removed from the detox books available in the NCJ law library. Id., ¶ 25. All protocol. Id., ¶ 21. On May 16, 2005, Mr. Aikin ordered officers in the housing units are familiar with the grievance Zestril for plaintiff‘s hypertension. Id., ¶ 23. On May process and are instructed to provide grievance forms to 19, 2005, Mr. Aikin saw plaintiff again, discontinued the any inmate wishing to report a problem. Id., ¶ 26. Zestril, ordered Imodium for gastrointestinal complaints,
and prescribed Ultracet for pain. Id., ¶ 25. On June 3, 2005, In further support of the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Aikin increased the dosage of Ultracet. Id., ¶ 27. On Dr. James Hohensee stated that at the NCJ, the use of June 14, 2005, Mr. Aikin saw plaintiff, who complained narcotics for pain control is strictly scrutinized (Item 59, of constipation. Mr. Aikin ordered magnesium citrate att. 17, ¶ 14). In a correctional facility, there is a preference and advised plaintiff to increase his fruit and vegetable for non-narcotic pain management, if medically possible, intake. Id., ¶ 28. Upon his return to the NCJ in October but narcotics are prescribed in some cases. Id., ¶ 15. The 2005, plaintiff had lost 75 pounds, no longer needed blood detoxification protocol at the NCJ in 2005 consisted of a pressure medication, and was taking only Ibuprofen for set of standing orders. Id., ¶ 17. The order to place plaintiff pain. Id., ¶¶ 31–33. He was seen by Mr. Aikin on October on the detox protocol was given by Nurse Practitioner 12, 2005 for treatment of a sebaceous cyst and for sinus Christopher Aikin and carried out by Rebecca Mahar, a problems. Id., ¶ 34. He was seen again on November jail nurse. Id., ¶ 18. Thereafter, Dr. Hohensee reviewed 15, 2005 for sinus complaints, at which time Mr. Aikin plaintiff‘s chart and countersigned the detox order. Id., prescribed a different allergy medication. Id., ¶ 35. On ¶ 19. Dr. Hohensee saw plaintiff on June 28, 2005 for a December 16, 2006, plaintiff was seen by Mr. Aikin, scheduled follow-up visit. Plaintiff complained that the complaining of knee pain. Mr. Aikin tested the knee for Ultracet he was prescribed was not helping his pain and ligament tears and ordered x-rays. Id., ¶ 38. The last time that he had swelling in his legs. Id., ¶ 22. Dr. Hohensee Mr. Aikin saw the plaintiff was on January 6, 2006 for a did not believe narcotics were clinically warranted and follow-up visit regarding his knee. The x-ray was negative chose to add 600 mg. of Motrin to be given three times for fracture but indicated osteoarthritis. Id., ¶ 41. During per day. Id., ¶ 23. On December 2, 2005, Dr. Hohensee plaintiff‘s second incarceration, he never presented in sick saw plaintiff for sinus complaints. Id., ¶ 25. Dr. Hohensee call for complaints related to neck or back pain. Id., ¶ 42. saw plaintiff on December 30, 2006 for complaints of knee
pain. He saw no evidence of acute injury and did not Dr. Paul Adler reviewed plaintiff‘s records from the NCJ, feel additional medication was necessary. Id., ¶ 28. Dr. the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the Northeast Ohio Hohensee saw plaintiff for the last time on January 27, Correctional Center, the amended complaint, plaintiff‘s 2006. Plaintiff complained of nosebleeds associated with responses to interrogatories, and his deposition testimony. his use of a CPAP machine. Id., ¶ 27. He stated that “it is well within the standard of care
for nurse practitioners to see and treat patients with In his affidavit, Christopher Aikin stated that he the plaintiff‘s medical issues both in and out of a practices medicine at the NCJ in collaboration with correctional setting.” (Adler Aff., ¶ 13). It is also standard Dr. Hohensee. As a licensed nurse practitioner, he may practice in the hospital or correctional setting for a examine patients, write prescriptions, and order tests nurse to execute a telephone order from a physician (Item 59, att. 18, ¶ 8). On May 11, plaintiff was or nurse practitioner. Id., ¶ 16. Dr. Adler stated that booked at the NCJ and was evaluated by Rebecca Mr. Aikin‘s initial examination of plaintiff on May 12, Mahar, R.N. Id., ¶ 14. At NJC, narcotic medications 2005 was consistent with the standard of care and his are strictly regulated, although there is no blanket order to begin detoxification was “within good medical prohibition against their use when medically necessary. judgment.” Id., ¶ 20. During plaintiff‘s initial incarceration Id., ¶ 17. Mr. Aikin examined plaintiff on May 12, at NCJ, defendants Aikin and Hohensee evaluated and 2005. He confirmed that plaintiff was appropriately on addressed plaintiff‘s various medical issues, changing the detox protocol, requested plaintiff‘s medical records and/or increasing his pain medication as needed. Id., from his neurosurgeon, and determined that narcotic pain ¶ 33. Additionally, during his subsequent incarceration medication was not medically necessary. Id., ¶ 19. On at NCJ, plaintiff‘s complaint regarding knee pain was May 13, 2005, plaintiff denied detox symptoms, told Mr. appropriately evaluated. Id., ¶¶ 43, 47, 49.
Martin v. Niagara County Jail, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) Co., 746 F.Supp.2d 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y.2010), aff‘d, 445 *5 Dr. Adler stated that detoxification in correctional Fed.Appx. 387 (2d Cir.2011). A “genuine issue” exists “if facilities is a “standard intervention,” and the “decision the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return of whether to prescribe narcotic versus non-narcotic a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty pain relief is in the judgment of the prescribing Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d physician.” (Adler Aff., ¶ 52). The plaintiff was seen in 202 (1986). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the sick call 14 times during the less-than six months he outcome of the suit under the governing law .... “ Id. was housed at the NCJ, and was seen and treated for
various reasons, including detoxification, pain, edema, Once the court determines that the moving party has met hypertension, diabetes, sleep apnea, rhinitis, and knee its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to pain. Id., ¶ 56. In Dr. Adler‘s opinion, the medical care “come forward with specific facts showing that there is rendered to plaintiff by defendants Hohensee and Aikin a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. “reflects not deliberate indifference, but clearly health care Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, that is consistent with the applicable standard of care.” 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks and Id., ¶ 57. citation omitted). The nonmoving party may not rest upon
mere conclusory allegations or denials, but must set forth In her affidavit, defendant Mahar stated that she followed “concrete particulars showing that a trial is needed ....“ medical orders provided to her by the Chief Medical R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, Officer or the nurse practitioner. She never deviated from 77 (2d Cir.1984) (internal quotation marks and citation these orders and merely dispensed medication that had omitted) (quoted in Kaminski v. Anderson, 792 F.Supp.2d been prescribed by authorized medical providers (Mahar 657, 662 (W.D.N.Y.2011). In considering whether these Aff., ¶¶ 19–20). respective burdens have been met, the court “is not to
weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the Major John T. Saxton, chief administrative officer of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing NCJ, stated in an affidavit that the NCJ does not have, summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in nor did it have at any time relevant to this litigation, favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments.” a blanket prohibition preventing the Chief Medical Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, Officer, Dr. James Hohensee, or Nurse Practitioner Aikin 122 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citation from prescribing narcotic pain medication in appropriate omitted).
circumstances (Item 60, att. 8, ¶ 6). It is the policy of the
NCJ to provide narcotic pain medication “when and if The court recognizes its duty to “extend extra such medication is medically necessary.” Id., ¶ 7. consideration” to pro se plaintiffs and that “pro se parties
are to be given special latitude on summary judgment
motions.”
Bennett v. Goord,
2006 WL 2794421, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Aug.1, 2006),
aff‘d,
2008 WL 5083122 (2d
DISCUSSION
Cir.2008) (quoting
Salahuddin v. Coughlin,
999 F.Supp.
526, 535 (S.D.N.Y.1998));
see also McPherson v. Coombe,
1. Summary Judgment Standard
174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999) (
pro se
party‘s pleadings
of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact be granted dismissing the complaint as plaintiff failed exists. Rockland Exposition, Inc. v. Great American Assur.
Martin v. Niagara County Jail, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) to exhaust his administrative remedies in accordance look at the applicable set of grievance procedures, whether with the grievance procedures in place at the NCJ. city, state or federal” in assessing availability. Mojias v. Additionally, they argue that plaintiff has not shown Johnson, 351 F.3d 606, 610 (2d Cir.2003). deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Plaintiff
contends that administrative remedies were unavailable In New York, formal exhaustion for prisoners to him as he was unaware of the grievance procedures in county jails requires compliance with the three-step at the NCJ and was never given an inmate handbook. grievance and appeal procedure outlined in the New He also argues that the defendants violated the Eighth York State Minimum Standards for Management of Amendment by interfering with his ongoing treatment County Jails. See N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9 (“9 for pain related to his spinal surgeries, by denying him N.Y.C.R.R.”), § 7032.1. In this case, the NCJ employed a narcotic pain medication, and by providing medical three-tiered grievance process with review of an inmate‘s evaluation and treatment by a registered nurse and nurse complaint by the grievance coordinator, the Chief practitioner. Administrative Officer of the facility, and finally the New
York State Commission of Correction. Generally, “[a]
prisoner has not exhausted his administrative remedies
2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
until he goes through all three levels of the grievance
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”),
procedure.”
Hairston v. LaMarche,
2006 WL 2309592, at
mandates exhaustion by prisoners of all administrative
*7 (S.D.N.Y. August 10, 2006) (citing cases).
remedies before bringing an action regarding prison
conditions.
See
Martin v. Niagara County Jail, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) a significant amount of time in custody in New York laws of the United States.” Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, State. While he signed an intake form acknowledging his 547 (2d Cir.1994); see also Kasiem v. Guzman, 2011 WL receipt of an inmate handbook on both of his admissions 4352387, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. September 16, 2011). to the NCJ, plaintiff stated that he signed the form
without reading it and because he was told to do so by “The Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition against cruel and the admitting officer. He was unaware of the grievance unusual punishment has been construed to include the policies and procedures until approximately December denial of adequate medical care for an inmate‘s serious 2005, when he read the grievance policy in the law medical needs.” Woods v. Goord, 2002 WL 31296325, library. Construing the facts in the light most favorable *2 (S.D.N.Y. October 10, 2002); see also Farmer v. to plaintiff, he has raised a material fact as to whether Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d a similarly situated person would have been unaware 811 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 of the grievance process, rendering it unavailable. See S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The care provided Brown v. Fischer, 2010 WL 5797359 (N.D.N.Y. December to prisoners to treat their injuries or illnesses must 8, 2010) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies was meet minimum medical standards of adequacy and be excusable where inmate was unaware of the grievance reasonably intended to satisfy their medical needs. To procedures and there was no evidence he received an show that prison medical treatment was so inadequate as inmate handbook). Accordingly, the defendants’ motions to amount to “cruel or unusual punishment” prohibited for summary judgment based on the plaintiff‘s failure to by the Eighth Amendment, plaintiff must prove that exhaust administrative remedies are denied. defendants’ actions or omissions amounted to “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.”
Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. at 106;
Harrison v. Barkley,
219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d
3. Constitutional Claims
Cir.2000).
Even excusing plaintiff‘s failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies, the complaint must nonetheless
Under
Martin v. Niagara County Jail, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012) (2d Cir.1998), the court set forth a non-exhaustive list of “[m]ere delay in the rendering of medical treatment in factors that are relevant to the inquiry whether a given and of itself does not rise to the level of a constitutional medical condition is serious. These factors include: (1) violation.” Smith v. Montefiore Med. Ctr.-Health Serv. whether a reasonable doctor or patient would perceive the Div., 22 F.Supp.2d 275, 280 (S.D.N.Y.1998). “Nor does medical need in question as “important and worthy of the fact that an inmate might prefer an alternative comment or treatment;” (2) whether the medical condition treatment, or feels that he did not get the level of significantly affects daily activities; and (3) “the existence medical attention he preferred.” Sonds, 151 F.Supp.2d of chronic and substantial pain.” Chance, 143 F.3d at 702. at 311; see also Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 215
(2d Cir.1986). “To demonstrate a constitutional violation, *9 Plaintiff‘s medical conditions included pain as a result a plaintiff must show that he sustained substantial of previous spinal surgeries, edema from a blood pressure harm because of the delay in the rendering of medical medication, and knee pain. He acknowledges that the treatment.” Smith, 22 F.Supp.2d at 280. “As long as the defendants adequately responded to his complaints of medical care is adequate, there is no Eighth Amendment allergic rhinitis and sleep apnea. Edema and knee pain violation.” Sonds, 151 F.Supp.2d at 311; see also Wandell are not sufficiently serious to cause death, degeneration, v. Koenigsmann, 2000 WL 1036030, *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, or extreme pain. Accordingly, the plaintiff‘s only medical 2000) (“So long as the treatment given is adequate, the fact conditions that are arguably “serious” relate to plaintiff‘s that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does not pain resulting from his previous spinal surgeries. give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.”). Even if the court were to assume that plaintiff‘s pain Additionally, plaintiff contends that the medical as a result of multiple spinal surgeries constituted a staff of the NCJ improperly interfered with his treatment serious medical need, there is no evidence of defendants’ by his personal physician by discontinuing his use of deliberate indifference to that medical need. Plaintiff‘s oxycontin and oxycodone and placing him on the detox Eighth Amendment claim is based on his assumption protocol. Plaintiff‘s assertion that he should have been that there is a policy against the prescription of any and given narcotic pain medication is likewise a disagreement all narcotic pain medications in the NCJ. He complains over the course of treatment. “[M]ere disagreement over that defendant Mahar ordered the detox protocol and the proper treatment does not create a constitutional that Major Saxton, the Chief Administrative Officer of claim.” Chance, 143 F.3d at 703. Although plaintiff claims the NCJ, implemented a policy of no narcotic pain that the defendants ignored and overruled the treatment medication. Plaintiff offers no proof to support these plan in place when he entered NCJ, an inmate is not factual assumptions. In contrast, the defendants have entitled to the treatment of his choice. Id. at 702. Plaintiff‘s established that there is no blanket prohibition against demand for narcotic pain medications and defendants’ the prescription of narcotic medications and that Nurse unwillingness to prescribe them does not create an Eighth Mahar initiated the detox protocol upon the order of Amendment claim. See Ifill v. Weinstock, 2012 WL Nurse Practitioner Aikin. 162405, *4 (W.D.N.Y. January 19, 2012); Guarneri v.
Wood, 2011 WL 4592209, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. September Plaintiff also complains that he was not seen by Dr. 2, 2011) (“Defendants regularly offered [plaintiff] non- Hohensee until June 28, 2005, 48 days after his arrival narcotic pain medication ..... [Plaintiff]‘s complaints about at the NCJ. He argues that given his serious medical the type of medication given to him for pain again need, he should have been seen by a physician earlier. amounts to a disagreement over treatment, which is “A difference of opinion between a prisoner and prison insufficient to allege a constitutional violation.”). officials regarding medical treatment does not, as a
matter of law, constitute deliberate indifference.” Sonds In this case, plaintiff was seen by a registered nurse on the v. St. Barnabas Hosp. Corr. Health Serv., 151 F.Supp.2d day of his admission. He was seen by Nurse Practitioner 303, 311 (S.D.N.Y.2001); see also Chance, 143 F.3d Aikin on May 12, 13, 16, and 19, 2005, June 3 and 14, 2005, 698 at 703; McCloud v. Delaney, 677 F.Supp. 230, 232 October 12, 2005, November 15, 2005, December 16, 2005, (S.D.N.Y.1988) (“[T]here is no right to the medical and January 6, 2006. He was seen by Dr. Hohensee on treatment of one‘s choice if the prescribed treatment is June 28, 2005, December 2, and 30, 2005, and January 27, based on applicable medical standards.”). Additionally, 2005. He received medication, medical advice, diagnostic
Martin v. Niagara County Jail, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2012)
is denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter
x-rays, and followup care with a physician. Even granting
judgment in favor of defendants and to close this case.
plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, it cannot
be said that this medical care was inadequate or evinces
The Court hereby certifies, pursuant to
CONCLUSION
All Citations
The defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Items Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 3230435
59, 60) are granted and the complaint is dismissed. Plaintiff‘s cross motion for summary judgment (Item 62)
Footnotes
1 This factual statement is taken from the plaintiff‘s medical and grievance records (Item 59, Exhs. G, J–M), the plaintiff‘s
deposition testimony (Item 59, Exh. H), the affidavits of James Hohensee, M.D., Christopher Aikin, N.P. and Paul Adler, D.O., with exhibits (Item 59, atts. 17–21), and the affidavits of Rebecca Mahar, Duane Vendetta, and John T. Saxton (Item 60, atts. 6–8).
End of Document © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Murray v. Palmer, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2010)
was taken of Plaintiff as well as Defendants’ witnesses
(Darin Williams, Sally Reams, and Jeffery Hale), whom
KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Plaintiff was able to cross-examine through
pro bono
trial
Distinguished by Arnett v. Shojaie, C.D.Cal., November 8, 2011
counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the undersigned
indicated that a written decision would follow. This is that
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
written decision. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff‘s
Second Amended Complaint is dismissed because of his
This decision was reviewed by West editorial
failure to exhaust his available administrative remedies.
staff and not assigned editorial enhancements.
United States District Court,
I. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD
N.D. New York.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”)
requires that prisoners who bring suit in federal court must
James MURRAY, Plaintiff,
first exhaust their available administrative remedies: “No
v.
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
R. PALMER; S. Griffin; M. Terry;
under
be resolved much more quickly and economically in
proceedings before an agency than in litigation in federal
DECISION and ORDER
court,” and (b) “even where a controversy survives
administrative review, exhaustion of the administrative
Hon. GLENN T. SUDDABY, District Judge.
procedure may produce a useful record for subsequent
The trial in this prisoner civil rights action, filed
judicial consideration.”
Woodford,
548 U .S. at 89. “[T]he
pro se
by James Murray (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to
PLRA‘s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate
suits about prison life, whether they involve general
S. Griffin, M. Terry, F. Englese, Sergeant Edwards,
In accordance with the PLRA, the New York State
K. Bump, and K.H. Smith (“Defendants”)-that Plaintiff
failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies,
Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”) has made
as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, before
available a well-established inmate grievance program.
step procedure for the filing of grievances.
Murray v. Palmer, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2010)
§§ 701.5, 701.6(g), 701.7. 1
First,
an inmate must file a
time limit based on mitigating circumstances. If that
application was denied, the inmate could file a complaint
complaint with the facility‘s IGP clerk within a certain
complaining that the application was wrongfully denied. 3
number of days of the alleged occurrence. 2 If a grievance
Moreover, any failure by the IGRC or the superintendent
complaint form is not readily available, a complaint
to timely respond to a grievance or first-level appeal,
may be submitted on plain paper. A representative
respectively, can-and must-be appealed to the next level,
of the facility‘s inmate grievance resolution committee
including CORC, to complete the grievance process. 4
(“IGRC”) has a certain number of days from receipt of
the grievance to informally resolve the issue. If there is
There appears to be a conflict in case law regarding
no such informal resolution, then the full IGRC conducts
whether the IGRC‘s nonresponse must be appealed to the
a hearing within a certain number of days of receipt
superintendent where the plaintiff‘s grievance was never
of the grievance, and issues a written decision within a
assigned a grievance number. 5 After carefully reviewing
certain number of days of the conclusion of the hearing.
this case law, the Court finds that the weight of authority
Second,
a grievant may appeal the IGRC decision to the
appears to answer this question in the affirmative. 6 The
facility‘s superintendent within a certain number of days of
Court notes that, if the plaintiff adequately describes,
receipt of the IGRC‘s written decision. The superintendent
in his appeal to the superintendent, the substance of his
is to issue a written decision within a certain number
grievance (or if the plaintiff attaches, to his appeal, a copy
of days of receipt of the grievant‘s appeal.
Third,
a
of his grievance), it would appear that there is something
grievant may appeal to the central office review committee
for the superintendent to review.
(“CORC”) within a certain number of days of receipt of
the superintendent‘s written decision. CORC is to render a
It is also important to note that DOCS has a
separate
written decision within a certain number of days of receipt
and distinct
administrative appeal process for inmate
of the appeal.
misbehavior hearings:
*2
Moreover, there is an expedited process for the review
A. For Tier III superintendent hearings, the appeal
of complaints of inmate harassment or other misconduct
is to the Commissioner‘s designee, Donald Selsky,
by corrections officers or prison employees.
supervisor. The inmate then files a grievance under the B. For Tier II disciplinary hearings, the appeal is to the
normal procedures outlined above, but all grievances
alleging employee misconduct are given a grievance
facility superintendent pursuant to
review. Under the regulations, the superintendent or
C. For Tier I violation hearings, the appeal is to the
his designee shall determine immediately whether the
facility superintendent or a designee pursuant to 7
allegations, if true, would state a “bona fide” case of
N.Y.C.R.R. § 252.6.
harassment, and if so, shall initiate an investigation of the
complaint, either “in-house,” by the Inspector General‘s
“An individual decision or disposition of any
Office, or by the New York State Police Bureau of
current or subsequent program or procedure having
Criminal Investigations. An appeal of the adverse decision
a written appeal mechanism which extends review to
of the superintendent may be taken to the CORC as
outside the facility shall be considered nongrievable.”
in the regular grievance procedure. A similar “special”
Murray v. Palmer, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2010) Generally, if a prisoner has failed to follow each of pursued the proper grievance process by filing a grievance the required three steps of the above-described grievance with the IGRC, 12 (d) by initially alleging that he did procedure prior to commencing litigation, he has failed to appeal his claim to CORC (albeit without proof), the exhaust his administrative remedies. Ruggiero v. County inmate has indicated that, during the time in question, of Orange, 467 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir.2006) (citing he understood the correct procedure for exhaustion, 13 Porter, 534 U.S. at 524). However, the Second Circuit and/or (e) before and after the incident in question, the has held that a three-part inquiry is appropriate where inmate pursued similar claims through filing a grievance a defendant contends that a prisoner has failed to with the IGRC. 14 Other district courts have found the exhaust his available administrative remedies, as required second requirement not present where (a) the inmate‘s by the PLRA. Hemphill v. State of New York, 380 mention of his claim during the disciplinary hearing was F.3d 680, 686, 691 (2d Cir.2004), accord, Ruggiero, 467 so insubstantial that prison officials did not subsequently F.3d at 175. First, “the court must ask whether [the] investigate that claim, 15 and/or (b) the inmate did not administrative remedies [not pursued by the prisoner] were in fact ‘available’ to the prisoner.” Hemphill, 380 appeal his disciplinary hearing conviction. 16 F.3d at 686 (citation omitted). Second, if those remedies
were available, “the court should ... inquire as to whether Finally, two points bear mentioning regarding [some or all of] the defendants may have forfeited the exhaustion. First, given that non-exhaustion is an affirmative defense of non-exhaustion by failing to raise affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of or preserve it ... or whether the defendants’ own actions showing that a prisoner has failed to exhaust his available inhibiting the [prisoner‘s] exhaustion of remedies may administrative remedies. See, e.g., Sease v. Phillips, 06- estop one or more of the defendants from raising the CV-3663, 2008 WL 2901966, *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, plaintiff‘s failure to exhaust as a defense.” Id. [citations 2008). However, once a defendant has adduced reliable omitted]. Third, if the remedies were available and some evidence that administrative remedies were available of the defendants did not forfeit, and were not estopped to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff nevertheless failed to from raising, the non-exhaustion defense, “the Court exhaust those administrative remedies, Plaintiff must then should consider whether ‘special circumstances’ have been “counter” Defendants’ assertion by showing exhaustion, plausibly alleged that justify the prisoner‘s failure to unavailability, estoppel, or “special circumstances.” 17 comply with the administrative procedural requirements.” Id. [citations and internal quotations omitted]. Second, the Court recognizes that there is case law from within the Second Circuit supporting the view that the With regard to this third inquiry, the Court notes that, exhaustion issue is one of fact, which should be determined under certain circumstances, an inmate may exhaust his by a jury, rather than by the Court. 18 However, there is administrative remedies by raising his claim during a also case law from within the Second Circuit supporting related disciplinary proceeding. Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d the view that the exhaustion issue is one of law, which 670, 678-79 (2d Cir.2004); Johnson v. Testman, 380 should be determined by the Court, rather than by a F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir.2004). 7 However, in essence, the jury. 19 After carefully reviewing the case law, the Court circumstances in question include instances in which (1) finds that the latter case law-which includes cases from the the inmate reasonably believed that his “only available Second Circuit and this District-outweighs the former case remedy” was to raise his claim as part of a tier disciplinary law. 20 (The Court notes that the latter case law includes hearing, 8 and (2) the inmate articulated and pursued his cases from the Second Circuit and this District.) 21 More claim in the disciplinary proceeding in a manner that afforded prison officials the time and opportunity to importantly, the Court finds that the latter cases are better thoroughly investigate that claim. 9 Some district courts reasoned than are the former cases. In particular, the Court relies on the reasons articulated by the Second have found the first requirement not present where (a) Circuit in 1999: “Where administrative remedies are there was nothing objectively confusing about the DOCS created by statute or regulation affecting the governance regulations governing the grievability of his claim, 10 of prisons, ... the answer depends on the meaning of the (b) the inmate was specifically informed that the claim relevant statute or regulation.” Snider v. Melindez, 199 in question was grievable, 11 (c) the inmate separately F.3d 108, 113-14 (2d Cir.1999). The Court relies also
Murray v. Palmer, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2010) on the several reasons articulated by Judge Richard A. have deemed them available.” Hemphill, 380F.3d at 688 Posner in a recent Seventh Circuit decision: most notably, (quotations and citations omitted); see Hargrove, 2007 the fact that the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies WL 389003, at *8.
inquiry does not address the merits of, or deadlines
governing, the plaintiff‘s claim but an issue of “judicial Here, after carefully considering the evidence submitted traffic control” (i.e., what forum a dispute is to be resolved at the hearing in this action on March 1, 2010, the Court in), which is never an issue for a jury but always an issue finds that administrative remedies were “available” to for a judge. See Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-42 (7th Plaintiff during the time in question. The Court makes this Cir.2008) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. finding for the following four reasons.
1620, 173 L.Ed.2d 995 (2009). The Court notes that the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth First, in his sworn Complaint (which has the force and and Eleventh Circuits appear to agree with the ultimate effect of an affidavit), Plaintiff stated, “Yes,” in response conclusion of the Second and Seventh Circuits that the to the question, “Is there a prisoner grievance procedure exhaustion issue is properly decided by a judge, not a at this facility .” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 4.a.) 23 Second, both jury. 22 Darin Williams (the corrections officer in charge of the
special housing unit during the relevant time period) and Sally Reams (the Inmate grievance program supervisor II. ANALYSIS during the relevant time period) testified credibly, at the As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues that he exhausted his exhaustion hearing, that there was a working grievance administrative remedies regarding the claims at issue in program at Great Meadow Correctional Facility during this action, by filing a grievance regarding those claims, the time in question. (Hearing Tr. at 10, 12, 14-21, and then appealing the non-response to that grievance all 40-54.) Third, Plaintiff testified, at the exhaustion hearing the way to CORC. Because the Court rejects this argument that, during this approximate time period (the August based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the Court to November of 2000), he filed at least three other proceeds to an analysis of the three-step exhaustion grievances Great Meadow Correctional Facility, to which inquiry established by the Second Circuit. he received responses from the inmate grievance clerk, the
Superintendent, and CORC. ( Id. at 154, 157-58, 169-70; see also Hearing Exs. D-4, D-5, P-8, P-13, P-14.) 24 A. Availability of Administrative Remedies Fourth, the Court finds the relevant portions of Plaintiff‘s New York prison inmates are subject to an Inmate hearing testimony regarding the grievance at issue in this Grievance Program established by DOCS and recognized action to be incredible due to various omissions and as an “available” remedy for purposes of the PLRA. inconsistencies in that testimony, and his demeanor during See Mingues v. Nelson, 96-CV-5396, 2004 WL 324898, the hearing. ( Id. at 127-34.) 25 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.20, 2004) (citing Mojias v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 606 (2d Cir.2003), and Snider v. Melindez, 199
F.3d 108, 112-13 [2d Cir.1999] ). There are different B. Estoppel
circumstances under which the grievance procedure is After carefully considering the evidence submitted at the deemed not to have been available to an inmate plaintiff. hearing in this action on March 1, 2010, the Court finds Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 687-88. For example, courts that Defendants did not forfeit the affirmative defense have found unavailability “where plaintiff is unaware of non-exhaustion by failing to raise or preserve it, or of the grievance procedures or did not understand it by taking actions that inhibited Plaintiff‘s exhaustion or where defendants’ behavior prevents plaintiff from of remedies. For example, Defendants’ Answer timely seeking administrative remedies.” Hargrove v. Riley, 04- asserted this affirmative defense. (Dkt. No. 35, ¶ 17.) CV-4587, 2007 WL 389003, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.31, 2007) Moreover, Plaintiff failed to offer any credible evidence (internal citations omitted). When testing the availability at the hearing that Defendant s in any way interfered of administrative remedies in the face of claims that with Plaintiff‘s ability to file grievances during the time undue influence from prison workers has caused a in question. (Hearing Tr. at 127-34, 157-58, 169-70.) plaintiff inmate to forego the formal grievance process, Generally, a defendant in an action may not be estopped courts employ an objective test, examining whether “a from asserting the affirmative defense of failure to similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness [would]
Murray v. Palmer, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2010) this action on August 14, 2003:(1) that exhaustion was exhaust administrative remedies based on the actions (or not possible because of the administrative procedures inactions) of other individuals. 26 that DOCS has implemented regarding inmate grievances;
and/or (2) that an unspecified number of unidentified corrections officers (who are not Defendants in this C. Special Circumstances action) somehow interfered with the delivery of his *6 There are a variety of special circumstances that grievance and appeals. For example, Plaintiff testified may excuse a prisoner‘s failure to exhaust his available at the exhaustion hearing that he handed his grievance administrative remedies, including (but not limited to) the and appeals to various corrections officers making rounds following: where he was being housed, and that, if his grievance and/ or appeals were never received, it must have been because (1) The facility‘s “failure to provide grievance deposit his letters were not properly delivered. (Hearing Tr. at boxes, denial of forms and writing materials, and 126-36.) a refusal to accept or forward plaintiff‘s appeals- which effectively rendered the grievance appeal process With regard to these excuses, the Court finds that, unavailable to him.” Sandlin v. Poole, 575 F.Supp.2d 484, while these excuses could constitute special circumstances 488 (W.D.N.Y.2008) (noting that “[s]uch facts support justifying an inmate‘s failure to exhaust his available a finding that defendants are estopped from relying on administrative remedies in certain situations, 27 these the exhaustion defense, as well as “special circumstances” excuses are not available to Plaintiff in the current action excusing plaintiff‘s failure to exhaust”);
because, as stated in Part II.A. of this Decision and Order, the credible testimony before the Court indicates that (2) Other individuals’ “threats [to the plaintiff] of Plaintiff did not hand his grievance and appeals to various physical retaliation and reasonable misinterpretation of corrections officers with regard to the claims in question. the statutory requirements of the appeals process.” Clarke See, supra, Part II.A. of this Decision and Order. 28 v. Thornton, 515 F.Supp.2d 435, 439 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (noting also that “[a] correctional facility‘s failure to
make forms or administrative opinions “available” to the For all these reasons, the Court finds that prisoner does not relieve the inmate from this burden.”); Plaintiff‘s proffered excuse does not constitute a special and circumstance justifying his failure to exhaust his available
administrative remedies before filing this action.
(3) When plaintiff tries “to exhaust prison grievance
procedures[, and] although each of his efforts, alone, may ACCORDINGLY, it is not have fully complied, together his efforts sufficiently
informed prison officials of his grievance and led to ORDERED that Plaintiff‘s Second Amended Complaint a thorough investigation of the grievance.” Hairston (Dkt. No. 10) is DISMISSED in its entirety without v. LaMarche, 05-CV-6642, 2006 WL 2309592, at *8 prejudice for failure to exhaust his available administrative (S.D.N.Y. Aug.10, 2006). remedies before filing this action, pursuant to the PLRA;
and it is further
After carefully considering the issue, the Court
finds that there exists, in this action, no “special ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter circumstances” justifying Plaintiff‘s failure to comply with judgment for Defendants and close the file in this action. the administrative procedural requirements. Construed
with the utmost of special leniency, Plaintiff‘s hearing All Citations
testimony, and his counsel‘s cross-examination of Defendants’ witnesses, raise the specter of two excuses Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2010 WL 1235591 for not having exhausted his available administrative remedies before he (allegedly) mailed his Complaint in
Footnotes
Murray v. Palmer, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2010) 1 See also White v. The State of New York, 00-CV-3434, 2002 U . S. Dist. LEXIS 18791, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 3, 2002). 2 The Court uses the term “a certain number of days” rather than a particular time period because (1) since the three-step
process was instituted, the time periods imposed by the process have changed, and (2) the time periods governing any particular grievance depend on the regulations and directives pending during the time in question.
3 Groves v. Knight, 05-CV-0183, Decision and Order at 3 (N.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 4, 2009) (Suddaby, J.).
4
York, 198 F.Supp.2d 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y.2002), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 380 F.3d 680 (2d Cir.2004); see, e.g ., DOCS Directive 4040 dated 8/22/03, ¶ VI.G. (“Absent [a time limit extension granted by the grievant], matters not decided within the time limits may be appealed to the next step.); Pacheco v. Drown, 06-CV-0020, 2010 WL 144400, at *19 & n. 21 (N.D.N.Y. Jan.11, 2010) (Suddaby, J.) (“It is important to note that any failure by the IGRC or the superintendent to timely respond to a grievance or first-level appeal, respectively, can be appealed to the next level, including CORC, to complete the grievance process.”), accord, Torres v. Caron, 08-CV-0416, 2009 WL 5216956, at *5 & n. 28 (N.D.N.Y. Dec.30, 2009) (Mordue, C.J.), Benitez v. Hamm, 04-CV-1159, 2009 WL 3486379, at *13 & n. 34 (N.D.N.Y. Oct.21, 2009) (Mordue, C.J.), Ross v. Wood, 05-CV-1112, 2009 WL 3199539, at *11 & n. 34 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.30, 2009) (Scullin, J.), Sheils v. Brannen, 05-CV-0135, 2008 WL 4371776, at *6 & n. 24 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.18, 2008) (Kahn, J.), Murray v. Palmer, 03-CV-1010, 2008 WL 2522324, at *15 & n. 46 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2008) (Hurd, J.), McCloud v. Tureglio, 07-CV-0650, 2008 WL 17772305, at *10 & n. 25 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2008) (Mordue, C.J.), Shaheen v. McIntyre, 05-CV-0173, 2007 WL 3274835, at *14 & n. 114 (N.D.N.Y. Nov.5, 2007) (McAvoy, J.); Nimmons v. Silver, 03-CV-0671, Report-Recommendation, at 15-16 (N.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 29, 2006) (Lowe, M.J.) (recommending that the Court grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, in part because plaintiff adduced no evidence that he appealed the lack of a timely decision by the facility‘s IGRC to the next level, namely to either the facility‘s superintendent or CORC), adopted by Decision and Order (N.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 17, 2006) (Hurd, J.); Gill v. Frawley, 02-CV-1380, 2006 WL 1742738, at *11 & n. 66 (N.D.N.Y. June 22, 2006) (McAvoy, J.) (“[A]n inmate‘s mere attempt to file a grievance (which is subsequently lost or destroyed by a prison official) is not, in and of itself, a reasonable effort to exhaust his administrative remedies since the inmate may still appeal the loss or destruction of that grievance.”); Walters v. Carpenter, 02-CV-0664, 2004 WL 1403301, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2004) (“[M]atters not decided within the prescribed time limits must be appealed to the next level of review.”); Croswell v. McCoy, 01-CV-0547, 2003 WL 962534, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. March 11, 2003) (Sharpe, M.J.) (“If a plaintiff receives no response to a grievance and then fails to appeal it to the next level, he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.”); Reyes v. Punzal, 206 F.Supp.2d 431, 433 (W.D.N.Y.2002) (“Even assuming that plaintiff never received a response to his grievance, he had further administrative avenues of relief open to him.”).
5 Compare Johnson v. Tedford, 04-CV-0632, 616 F.Supp.2d 321, 326 (N.D.N.Y.2007) (Sharpe, J.) (“[W]hen a prisoner
asserts a grievance to which there is no response, and it is not recorded or assigned a grievance number, administrative remedies may be completely exhausted, as there is nothing on record for the next administrative level to review.”) [emphasis in original, and citations omitted] with Waters v. Schneider, 01-CV-5217, 2002 WL 727025, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.23, 2002) (finding that, in order to exhaust his available administrative remedies, plaintiff had to file an appeal with the superintendent from the IGRC‘s non-response to his grievance, of which no record existed).
6 See, e.g., Murray v. Palmer, 03-CV-1010, 2008 WL 2522324, at *16, 18 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2008) (Hurd, J., adopting
Report-Recommendation of Lowe, M.J.) (finding that, in order to exhaust his available administrative remedies with regard to his grievance of August 30, 2000, plaintiff had to file an appeal with the superintendent from the IGRC‘s non-response to that grievance, which included a failure to acknowledge the receipt of the grievance and assign it a number); Midalgo v. Bass, 03-CV-1128, 2006 WL 2795332, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.26, 2006) (Mordue, C.J., adopting Report-Recommendation of Treece, M.J.) (observing that plaintiff was “requir[ed]” to seek an appeal to the superintendent, even though he never received a response to his grievance of April 26, 2003, which was never assigned a grievance number); Collins v. Cunningham, 06-CV-0420, 2009 WL 2163214, at *3, 6 (W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2009) (rejecting plaintiff‘s argument that his administrative remedies were not available to him where his grievance of March 20, 2004, was not assigned a grievance number); Veloz v. New York, 339 F.Supp.2d 505, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (rejecting inmate‘s argument that the prison‘s grievance procedure had been rendered unavailable to him by the practice of prison officials’ losing or destroying his grievances, because, inter alia, “there was no evidence whatsoever that any of [plaintiff‘s] grievances were filed with a grievance clerk,” and he should have “appeal[ed] these claims to the next level once it became clear to him that a response to his initial filing was not forthcoming”); cf. Hernandez v. Coffey, 582 F.3d 303, 305, 309, n. 3 (2d Cir.2009) (“Our ruling in no way suggests that we agree with Hernandez‘s arguments regarding exhaustion or justification for failure to exhaust [which included an argument that the Inmate Grievance Program was not available to him because, when
Murray v. Palmer, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2010) he filed a grievance at the first stage of the Program, he received no response and his grievance was not assigned a grievance number].”).
7 The Court recognizes that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d
368 (2006), may have changed the law regarding possible exceptions to the exhaustion requirement (and thus the possibility that exhaustion might occur through the disciplinary process). Specifically, in Woodford, the Supreme Court held that the PLRA required “proper” exhaustion as a prerequisite to filing asection 1983 action in federal court. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. “Proper” exhaustion means that the inmate must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, as a prerequisite to bringing suit in federal court. Id. at 88-103 (emphasis added). It is unclear whether Woodford has overruled any decisions that recognize “exceptions” to the exhaustion requirement. Out of special solicitude to Plaintiff, the Court will assume that Woodford has not overruled the Second Circuit‘s Giano - Testman line of cases.
8 Giano, 380 F.3d at 678 (“[W]hile Giano was required to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit, his
failure to do so was justified by his reasonable belief that DOCS regulations foreclosed such recourse.”); Testman, 380 F.3d at 696-98 (remanding case so that district court could consider, inter alia, whether prisoner was justified in believing that his complaints in the disciplinary appeal procedurally exhausted his administrative remedies because the prison‘s remedial system was confusing).
9 Testman, 380 F.3d at 696-98 (remanding case so that district court could consider, inter alia. whether prisoner‘s
submissions in the disciplinary appeals process exhausted his remedies “in a substantive sense” by “afford[ing] corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally”); Chavis v. Goord, 00-CV-1418, 2007 WL 2903950, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Oct.1, 2007) (Kahn, J.) (“[T]o be considered proper, exhaustion must occur in both a substantive sense, meaning that prison officials are somehow placed on notice of an inmate‘s complaint, and procedurally, in that it must be presented within the framework of some established procedure that would permit both investigation and, if appropriate, remediation.”) [citation omitted]. The Court joins the above-described two requirements in the conjunctive because the Second Circuit has recognized that mere notice to prison officials through informal channels, without more, does not suffice to satisfy the PLRA procedural exhaustion requirement. See Macias v. Zenk, No. 04-6131, 495 F.3d 37, at *43-44 (2d Cir.2007) (recognizing that Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 [2006], overruled Braham v. Casey, 425 F.3d 177 [2d Cir.2005], to the extent that Braham held that “informal complaints” would suffice to exhaust a claim). 10 See, e.g., Reynoso v. Swezey, 423 F.Supp.2d 73, 75 (W.D.N.Y.2006), aff‘d, 238 F. App‘x 660 (2d Cir.2007) (unpublished
order), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1207, 128 S.Ct. 1278, 170 L.Ed.2d 109 (2008); Holland v. James, 05-CV-5346, 2009 WL 691946, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. March 6, 2009); Winston v. Woodward, 05-CV-3385, 2008 WL 2263191, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2008); cf. Muniz v. Goord, 04-CV-0479, 2007 WL 2027912, at *5 & n. 23 (N.D.N.Y. July 11, 2007) (McAvoy, J.) (reciting this point of law in context of failure to appeal grievance determination to CORC).
11 See, e.g., Johnson v. Barney, 04-CV-10204, 2007 WL 2597666, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.30, 2007); Reynoso, 423 F.Supp.2d
at 75-76. 12 See, e.g., Reynoso, 423 F.Supp.2d at 75 (“There is no evidence that plaintiff was confused or misled about the proper
method for raising his claims. In fact, the record shows exactly the opposite: plaintiff did file a grievance about the incident. He simply failed to appeal the denial of that grievance to CORC.”); Tapp v. Kitchen, 02-CV-6658, 2004 WL 2403827, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Oct.26, 2004) (“In the instant case, however, plaintiff does not and cannot claim to have believed that his only available remedy was to raise his complaint as part of his disciplinary hearing, since he also filed a grievance with the Inspector General, and also claims to have filed both an inmate grievance and a separate complaint with the facility superintendent.”); cf. Muniz, 2007 WL 2027912, at *5 & n. 23 (“Plaintiff‘s Complaint alleges facts indicating that he believed it necessary to file a grievance with the Gouverneur C.F. IGRC and to appeal the denial of that grievance to the Gouverneur C.F. Superintendent. Why would he not also believe it necessary to take the next step in the exhaustion process and appeal the Superintendent‘s decision to CORC?”).
13 See, e.g., Petrusch v. Oliloushi, 03-CV-6369, 2005 WL 2420352, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept.30, 2005) (“[A]s to his grievance,
which is the subject of this lawsuit, plaintiff does not appear to be contending that he believed the Superintendent‘s denial constituted exhaustion, since by initially claiming that he did appeal to CORC, albeit without proof, he has demonstrated his knowledge of the correct procedure for exhaustion.”).
14 See, e.g., Benjamin v. Comm‘r N.Y. State DOCS, 02-CV-1703, 2007 WL 2319126, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.10, 2007)
(“Benjamin cannot claim that he believed that appealing his disciplinary proceeding was the only available remedy at his disposal in light of the numerous grievances he has filed during his incarceration at Green Haven [both before and after the incident in question].”), vacated in part on other grounds, No. 07-3845, 293 F. App‘x 69 (2d Cir.2008).
Murray v. Palmer, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2010) 15 See, e.g., Chavis, 2007 WL 2903950, at *9 (“The focus of a disciplinary hearing is upon the conduct of the inmate, and not
that of prison officials.... While the mention of a constitutional claim during plaintiff‘s disciplinary hearing could potentially have satisfied his substantive exhaustion requirement by virtue of his having notified prison officials of the nature of his claims, he did not fulfill his procedural exhaustion requirement [under the circumstances due to his] ... mere utterance of his claims during the course of a disciplinary hearing .... [T]here is nothing in the record to suggest that when the issues of interference with plaintiff‘s religious free exercise rights or alleged retaliation for having voiced his concerns were in any way investigated by prison officials.”) [citations omitted].
16 See, e.g., Colon v. Furlani, 07-CV-6022, 2008 WL 5000521, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov.19, 2008) (“Colon was found guilty of
harassment based on a letter that he wrote to defendant Bordinaro, concerning some of the events giving rise to his failure-to-protect claim, but it does not appear that he appealed that disposition.... While under some circumstances an inmate may be able to satisfy the exhaustion requirement by appealing from a disciplinary hearing decision ..., plaintiff did not do so here, and this claim is therefore barred under the PLRA.”) [citations omitted]; Cassano v. Powers, 02-CV-6639, 2005 WL 1926013, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug.10, 2005) (“[E]ven assuming plaintiff believed that his proper recourse was to raise [his] complaint at his disciplinary hearing, rather than using the Inmate Grievance Program, he did not exhaust that process. That is, plaintiff has not provided any evidence that he appealed his Tier III hearing conviction. Since plaintiff did not pursue even the disciplinary appeal process, he can not have made submissions in the disciplinary process that were sufficient, in a substantive sense, to exhaust his remedies under§ 1997e(a) .”) [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].
17 See Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 686 (describing the three-part inquiry appropriate in cases where a prisoner plaintiff plausibly
seeks to “counter” defendants’ contention that the prisoner failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies under the PLRA); Verley v. Wright, 02-CV-1182, 2007 WL 2822199, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.27, 2007) (“[P]laintiff has failed to demonstrate that the administrative remedies were not, in fact, ‘actually available to him.’ ”); Winston v. Woodward, 05- CV-3385, 2008 WL 2263191, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2008) (finding that the plaintiff “failed to meet his burden under Hemphill of demonstrating ‘special circumstances’ ”); see also Ramirez v. Martinez, 04-CV-1034, 2009 WL 2496647, at *4 (M.D.Pa. Aug.14, 2009) (“In order to effectively oppose defendants’ exhaustion argument, the plaintiff has to make a showing in regard to each of his claims.”); Washington v. Proffit, 04-CV-0671, 2005 WL 1176587, at *1 (W.D.Va. May 17, 2005) (“[I]t is plaintiff‘s duty, at an evidentiary hearing, “to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he had exhausted his administrative remedies or that any defendant had hindered or prevented him from doing so within the period fixed by the Jail‘s procedures for filing a grievance.”).
18 See, e.g., Lunney v. Brureton, 04-CV-2438, 2007 WL 1544629, at *10 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2007) (“There is certainly
case law that supports the view that exhaustion should be determined by the Court rather than by a jury. As the Supreme Court has recently affirmed, however, exhaustion is an ‘affirmative defense,’ much like a statute of limitations defense. Where there are disputed factual questions regarding an affirmative defense such as a statute of limitations defense, the Second Circuit has stated that ‘issues of fact as to the application of that defense must be submitted to a jury.’ Thus, it is not clear that factual disputes regarding the exhaustion defense should ultimately be decided by the Court.”); Finch v. Servello, 06-CV-1448, 2008 WL 4527758, at *8 n. 5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.29, 2008) (McAvoy, J.) (citing Lunney and noting that “it is not clear that factual disputes regarding the exhaustion defense should ultimately be decided by the Court”).
19 See, e.g., Harrison v. Goord, 07-CV-1806, 2009 WL 1605770, at *7 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2009) (recognizing that “[t]here
is authority ... for the position that where questions of fact exist as to whether a plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies, such fact questions are for the Court, rather than a jury, to decide ....”); Amador v. Superintend. of Dept. of Corr. Servs., 03-CV-0650, 2007 WL 4326747, at *5 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.4, 2007) (“It is unclear whether factual disputes regarding the exhaustion defense should ultimately be decided by the court or by a jury.... [T]here is ... case law ... supporting the view that exhaustion should be determined by the court and not a jury.”), appeal pending, No. 08-2079- pr (2d Cir. argued July 15, 2009).
20 See, e.g., Mastroianni v. Reilly, 602 F.Supp.2d 425, 438 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (noting that the magistrate judge held an
evidentiary hearing “on the issue of exhaustion”); Sease v. Phillips, 06-CV-3663, 2008 WL 2901966, *3 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2008) (finding that “the better approach is for the judge, and not the jury, to decide any contested issues of fact relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”); Amador, 2007 WL 4326747, at *5 n. 7 (“[T]here is ... case law, which in my view is more persuasive and on point, supporting the view that exhaustion should be determined by the court and not a jury. I find it proper that this issue be decided by the court.”); Enigwe v. Zenk, 03-CV-0854, 2006 WL 2654985, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.15, 2006) (finding that, at the summary judgment “stage of the proceedings, a genuine question of fact exists with respect to whether [plaintiff] should be excused from exhausting his administrative remedies with regard to claims relating to his confinement at MDC Brooklyn,” and therefore “direct[ing] that a hearing
Murray v. Palmer, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2010) be held” before a judge, to resolve this issue); Dukes v. S.H.U. C.O. John Doe # 1, 03-CV-4639, 2006 WL 1628487, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2006) (ordering an “evidentiary hearing [before a judge] on the issue of whether prison officials failed to assign grievance numbers to [plaintiff]‘s grievances and, if so, whether that rendered further administrative remedies unavailable, estopped the Defendants from asserting non-exhaustion, or justified [plaintiff]‘s failure to appeal to the CORC”); Mingues v. Nelson, 96-CV-5396, 2004 WL 324898, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.20, 2004) (“The Court could have sua sponte dismiss[ed] this action as the record is unmistakeably clear that an appropriate administrative procedure was available to him, that he was required to exhaust his administrative remedies, and that he failed to do so as required by the PLRA.... In this case, plaintiff has been afforded notice and given an opportunity to respond to the exhaustion issue and his failure remains clear.”); Roland v. Murphy, 289 F.Supp.2d 321, 323 (E.D.N.Y.2003) “[W]hether the plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies is a question for the Court to decide as a matter of law.”) [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; Evans v. Jonathan, 253 F.Supp.2d 505, 509 (W.D.N.Y.2003) ( “[W]hether the plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies is a question for the Court to decide as a matter of law.”).
21 See, e.g., Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 113-14 (2d Cir.1999) (“Whether an administrative remedy was available to
a prisoner in a particular prison or prison system, and whether such remedy was applicable to the grievance underlying the prisoner‘s suit, are not questions of fact. They either are, or inevitably contain, questions of law. Where administrative remedies are created by statute or regulation affecting the governance of prisons, the existence of the administrative remedy is purely a question of law. The answer depends on the meaning of the relevant statute or regulation.”), accord, Mojias v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 606, 608-11 (2d Cir.2003) (citing relevant language from Snider v. Melindez, and later stating that a district court could sua sponte dismiss a prisoner‘s civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust his available administrative remedies if it gave him notice and an opportunity to be heard); DeBlasio v. Moriarty, 05-CV-1143, Minute Entry (N.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 9, 2008) (McCurn, J.) (indicating that judge held pre-trial evidentiary hearing on whether plaintiff had exhausted administrative remedies before filing action); Pierre v. County of Broome, 05-CV-0332, 2007 WL 625978, at *1 n. 1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb.23, 2007) (McAvoy, J.) (noting that “[t]he court held an evidentiary hearing on October 25, 2006 concerning the issue of whether Plaintiff had exhausted administrative remedies”); Hill v. Chanalor, 419 F.Supp.2d 255, 257-59 (N.D.N.Y. March 8, 2006) (Kahn, J.) ( sua sponte dismissing a prisoner‘s civil rights complaint, pretrial, for failure to exhaust his available administrative remedies after it gave him notice and an opportunity to be heard); Raines v. Pickman, 103 F.Supp.2d 552, 555 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (Mordue, J.) (“[I]n order for the Court to dismiss for failing to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court must be shown that such a remedy exists for an inmate beating in the grievance context. This is an issue of law for the Court to determine.”).
22 See Casanova v. Dubois, 289 F.3d 142, 147 (1st Cir.2002); Hill v. Smith, 186 F. App‘x 271, 273-74 (3d Cir.2006); Mitchell
v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003); Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 682-83 (4th Cir.2005); Dillon v. Rogers, No. 08-30419, 2010 WL 378306, at *7 (5th Cir. Feb.4, 2010); Taylor v. U.S., 161 F. App‘x 483, 486 (6th Cir.2005); Larkins v. Wilkinson, 172 F.3d 48, at *1 (6th Cir.1998); Husley v. Belken, 57 F. App‘x 281, 281 (8th Cir.2003); Ponder v. Wackenhut Corr. Corp., 23 F. App‘x 631, 631-32 (8th Cir.2002); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119-20 (9th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 810 (2003); Freeman v. Watkins, 479 F.3d 1257, 1260 (10th Cir.2007); Alloway v. Ward, 188 F. App‘x 663, 666 (6th Cir.2006); Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1373-76 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 733, 172 L.Ed.2d 734 (2008).
23 The Court notes that, in his Complaint, Plaintiff also swore that his “grievance was denied.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 4.b.ii.) However,
during the exhaustion hearing, Plaintiff testified that he never received a response to his grievance from any member of DOCS.
24 In addition, the documentary evidence adduced at the hearing establishes that, in actuality, Plaintiff filed ten other
grievances during this time period (and several appeals from the denials of those grievances). The first of these grievances (Grievance Number GM-30651-00), filed on August 25, 2000, regarded Plaintiff‘s request for medications. (Hearing Exs. D-4, D-5.) The second of these grievances (Grievance Number GM-30691-00), filed on September 1, 2000, regarded Plaintiff‘s request for copies. (Hearing Ex. D-4.) The third of these grievances (Grievance Number GM-30729-00), filed on September 11, 2000, regarded the use of full restrains against Plaintiff. ( Id.; see also Hearing Ex. P-14.) The fourth of these grievances, filed on October 19, 2000 (Grievance Number GM-30901-00), regarded Plaintiff‘s request for the repair of his cell sink. (Hearing Exs. D-4, D-5.) The fifth of these grievances (Grievance Number GM-30901-00), also filed on October 19, 2000, regarded Plaintiff‘s request for the clean up of his cell. (Hearing Ex. D-4.) The sixth of these grievances (Grievance Number GM-31040-00), filed on November 17, 2000, regarded the review of records. ( Id. ) The seventh of these grievances (Grievance Number GM-31041-00), also filed on November 17, 2000, regarded Plaintiff‘s request for medical attention. ( Id.; see also Hearing Ex. P-13) The eighth of these grievances (Grievance Number GM-31048-00), filed on November 20, 2000, regarded the rotation of books. (Hearing Ex. D-14) The ninth of these grievances (Grievance
Murray v. Palmer, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2010) Number GM-31040-00), filed on November 27, 2000, regarded the review of records (and was consolidated with his earlier grievance on the same subject). ( Id. ) The tenth of these grievances (Grievance Number GM-31070-00), filed on November 27, 2000, regarded Plaintiff‘s eyeglasses. ( Id. )
25 For example, Plaintiff was unable to identify the corrections officers to whom he handed his grievance and appeals for
mailing. ( Id. at 127-34.) Moreover, Plaintiff did not convincingly explain why the grievance and appeals at issue in this action did not make it through the mailing process, while his numerous other grievances and appeals did make it through the mailing process. ( Id. at 154-171.) In addition, Plaintiff acknowledged that it was his belief, during this time period, that an inmate was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies in matters involving the use of excessive force; yet, according to Plaintiff, he decided to exhaust his administrative remedies on his excessive force claim anyway. ( Id. at 148-49.)
26 See Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170, 178 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that defendants were not estopped from
asserting the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion where the conduct plaintiff alleged kept him from filing a grievance- that he was not given the manual on how to grieve-was not attributable to the defendants and plaintiff “point[ed] to no affirmative act by prison officials that would have prevented him from pursuing administrative remedies”); Murray v. Palmer, 03-CV-1010, 2008 WL 2522324, at *19 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2008) (Hurd, J., adopting Report-Recommendation of Lowe, M.J.) (“I have found no evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of triable fact on the issue of whether Defendants, through their own actions, have inhibited Plaintiff exhaustion of remedies so as to estop one or more Defendants from raising Plaintiff‘s failure to exhaust as a defense.”) [emphasis in original]; Shaheen v. McIntyre, 05- CV-0173, 2007 WL 3274835, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. Nov.5, 2007) (McAvoy, J. adopting Report-Recommendation of Lowe, M.J.) (finding defendants not estopped from raising Plaintiff‘s non-exhaustion as a defense based on plaintiff‘s allegation “that [he] was inhibited (through non-responsiveness) by [ ] unnamed officials at Coxsackie C.F.‘s Inmate Grievance Program (or perhaps the Grievance Review Committee), and Coxsackie C.F. Deputy Superintendent of Security Graham” because plaintiff‘s complaint and “opposition papers ... fail to contain any evidence placing blame on Defendants for the (alleged) failure to address his grievances and complaint letters”); Smith v. Woods, 03-CV-0480, 2006 WL 1133247, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. Apr.24, 2006) (Hurd, J. adopting Report-Recommendation of Lowe, M.J.) (finding that defendants are not estopped from relying on the defense of non-exhaustion because “no evidence (or even an argument) exists that any Defendant ... inhibit[ed] Plaintiff‘s exhaustion of remedies; Plaintiff merely argues that a non-party to this action (the IGRC Supervisor) advised him that his allegedly defective bunk bed was not a grievable matter.”); cf. Warren v. Purcell, 03-CV-8736, 2004 WL 1970642, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.3, 2004) (finding that conflicting statements [offered by a non-party]-that the prisoner needed to refile [his grievance] and that the prisoner should await the results of DOCS‘s investigation-estopped the defendants from relying on the defense on non-exhaustion, or “[a]lternatively, ... provided ... a ‘special circumstance’ under which the plaintiff‘s failure to pursue the appellate procedures specified in the IGP was amply justified.”); Brown v. Koenigsmann, 01-CV-10013, 2005 WL 1925649, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.10, 2005) (“Plaintiff does not assert that Dr. Koeingsmann personally was responsible for [the failure of anyone from the Inmate Grievance Program to address plaintiff‘s appeal]. [However,] Ziemba [v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161 (2d Cir.2004) ] does not require a showing that Dr. Koenigsmann is personally responsible for plaintiff‘s failure to complete exhaustion [in order for Dr. Koenigsmann to be estopped from asserting the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies], as long as someone employed by DOCS is. If that reading of Ziemba is incorrect, however, ... then the circumstances here must be regarded as special, and as justifying the incompleteness of exhaustion, since a decision by CORC is hardly something plaintiff could have accomplished on his own.”).
27 See, e.g., Sandlin v. Poole, 575 F.Supp.2d 484, 488 (W.D.N.Y.2008) (noting that “refusal to accept or forward plaintiff‘s
appeals ... effectively render[s] the grievance appeal process unavailable to him”). 28 The Court notes that, even if Plaintiff did (as he testified) hand to a corrections officer for mailing a letter to the
Superintendent on September 13, 2000, appealing from the IGRC‘s failure to decide his grievance of August 22, 2000, within nine working days (i.e., by September 5, 2000), it appears that such an appeal would have been filed two days too late under DOCS Directive 4040, which requires that appeal to be filed within four working days of the IGRC‘s failure to decide his grievance (i.e., by September 11, 2000). ( See Hearing Tr. 127-34; Hearing Ex. P-1, at 5-7 [attaching ¶¶ V.A, V.B. of DOCS Directive 4040, dated 6/8/98].)
End of Document © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Notes
[2] Paragraph numbers are used where documents identified by the CM/ECF docket number contain consecutively numbered paragraphs. 6
[3] The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint in this case was adequately verified under
[4] The Court will provide Plaintiff with copies of all unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit’s decision in Lebron v. Sanders , 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 8