3 Blackf. 68 | Ind. | 1832
Samuel Wort and Thomas Hamilton, the parties in this cause, entered into' bonds dated the 17th of November, 1829, submitting a certain matter in difference between them to arbitration; and the arbitrators made an award in favour of Wort.
The arbitration-bond executed by Hamilton, and the award of the arbitrators, were returned to the Circuit Court; and a rule was obtained by Wort, at the September term, 1830, calling upon Hamilton to show cause why the award should not be made the judgment of the Court. Hamilton appeared, and in answer to the rule pleaded, in substance, that the arbitrators in making
Hamilton contends that he had a right to impeach the award, by proving that the arbitrators had not correctly determined the merits of the controversy.
The decision of this case depends upon the construction to be given to our statute relative’to arbitrations. This act.diffefs materially from that of ■William the 3d on the same subject. The English statute, after making the party who refuses to perform an award, liable to process for a contempt-of Court, says — “which process- shall not be stopped or delayed in its execution, by any order, rule, command, or process of any other Court, either of law or equity, unless it shall be made appear on oath to such Court, that the arbitrators or umpire misbehaved themselves, and that such award, arbitration, or umpirage was procured by corruption- or- other undue means.” It also provides, that the Court making the rule for submission, may set aside the award if ithas been “procured by corruption or undue means,” provided the corruption or undue practice be complained of before’ the last day of the next term after the award is made. 2 Tidd’s Practice, p. 733,751. To set aside an award under this act, it has been often decided that the party must show some illegality appearing bn the face of the award, or some irregularity, as want of notice of the. meeting, or collusion or.gross misbehaviour of the arbitrators. But the Court will never, on motion, enter at large into the merits of the cause. 2 Tidd’s Prac. p. 750.
Our statute on the subject of setting aside'awards was, originally, the same in substance with the English law. ' The first act relative to arbitrations in this country was passed in 1799, at the first session of the general assembly of the JYorth-Western Territory. This act, after subjecting the party in default to process for contempt, reads as follows: “which process shall not be stayed or impeded by order of any other Court of law or equity, or by the Court from whence it issued, until the parties shall in all things obey the award or umpirage, unless it shall be made to appear on oath, that the umpire or arbitrators misbehaved, and that such award or umpirage was obtained by fraud, corruption, or other undue means; and no testimony shall be
These new enactments of the legislature, placed the law of arbitration on a very different footing from what it was before. They added an entire new ground of objection to the validity of awards, unknown to the previous law of this country or of England. They expressly permit the party objecting to an award, to introduce evidence to prove that the arbitrators have not*determined the merits of the cause correctly, but have made a mistake in the law or the facts of the case. These new statutory provisions were re-enacted verbatim in the revision of
It is impossible for a party, objecting to an award unexceptionable on its face, to have the benefit of those clauses, of our statute to which we have referred, unless he be permitted to exhibit to the Court the testimony that was adduced before the arbitrators. There is no other way by which the Court can be enabled to determine, whether the arbitrators have mistaken any of the'questions of fact or of law belonging to the cause. By our statute as it now stands, and has stood since 1811, the' merits of an award on a rule to make it a judgment, like the merits of a verdict on a motion for a new trial, must be inquired into by the Court. In the case óf a verdict, the Court having heard the evidence, require no further examination of it. But in the case of an award it is otherwise. The 'Court have had no opportunity to know what was the evidence before the arbitrators. It appears to us, therefore, that the party objecting to an award for mistakes in matter of fact of law, not shown by the award itself, must be permitted to produce before the Court the testimony upon which the award is founded. The award, made by judges of the parties’ own choosing, is entitled to great respect; but it is not, under our statute, conclusive as to the law or the facts. It may be considered as standing on ground similar to that on which a verdict stands. If the party complaining of-an award can prove any misconduct on the part of the' arbitrators, or of the opposite party; or if he can show, by introducing the evidence that was before thé arbitrators, that they have mistaken the merits of the cause, the Court may refuse- to permit the award to become a judgment.
In the case before us, Hamilton was ruléd to show cause why the award against him should not be made a judgment of the Court. He showed cause against the rule, by pleading that the arbitrators had mistaken the law and facts of the case, which he offered to prove. The Court considered such mistakes, assuming them to exist, to constitute no legal objection to the award; and therefore refused to hear the evidence. This decision of the Circuit Court is in opposition to the express provisions of the statute, and cannot be supported.
The rule to show cause, in this case, like a rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted, or a judgment arrested, required no special pleading. We have not, therefore,
The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.