In thеse consolidated appeals in two related landlord-and-tenant proceedings, appellant challenges several aspects of the orders under review. We reject all of appellant’s contentions and affirm both orders.
I
On March 3, 1981, appellee filed suit in the Landlord and Tenant Branch for possession of certain real estate (L & T No. 17735-81) based on appellant’s habitual untimely payment of rent. The complaint averred that a notice to quit had been served on appellant. In his answer and counterclaim, appellant denied receiving any notice to quit. He also alleged that appellee had continued to accept rental payments after appellant had first been apprised in February 1980 that he was in violation оf a lease covenant by failing to pay his rent on time. Finally, appellant counterclaimed for a partial rebate of past rent based on аlleged housing code violations.
See Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,
At the close of а jury trial, appellant made a motion for directed verdict, which the court construed as a motion to dismiss the complaint. The motion was granted, and the case was dismissed without prejudice, apparently on the ground that the notice to quit was invalid. Appellant then filed a motion for reconsideration asking thаt the dismissal be with prejudice, and *468 also renewing an earlier request for attorney’s fees. Judge Gardner ruled on that motion on October 29, 1981, in an order which read in part:
1. The dismissal of plaintiffs claim, entered herein on July 8,1981, shall operate as an adjudication upon the merits of the claim asserted in plaintiff’s complаint.
2. Reconsideration of the Court’s denial of defendant’s Motion for counsel fees is denied.
From that order appellant noted the first of these two appeals (No. 81-1600). 1
Meanwhile, on October 22, 1981, appellee filed a second suit for possession (L & T No. 82924-81), alleging “Failure to cure violations of tenancy; Failure to quit and vacate after notice to quit and vacate expired.” Another protective order was entered requiring appellant to pаy $227.50 monthly into the registry of the court.
Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the dismissal in L & T No. 17735-81 was res judicata as to the claims raised in No. 82924 — 81. Appellee then filed a motion tо strike pleadings and enter judgment in its behalf based on appellant’s failure to make the payments required by the second protective order. That motiоn was provisionally denied by Judge Murphy on the condition that appellant make a protective order payment by January 18,1982; if he did not do so, judgment would be entered for appellee. Appellant did not make any payment, and on January 28 Judge Murphy entered two orders, one denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment and the other granting appellee’s motion for judgment.
Five days later, on February 2, appellant filed an “emergency motion to reinstate cаuse of action, transfering [sic] funds of defendant’s into Registry for that purpose,” in which he asked that the money previously paid into the registry in L & T No. 17735-81 be transferred to his account in L & T No. 82924r-81. That motion was deniеd, and appellant noted his second appeal (No. 82-109).
II
Appellant asks us first to declare that acceptance of rental payments prior to the expiration of a notice to quit invalidates the notice. Second, he argues that a dismissal with prejudice for failure to serve a valid notiсe to quit is res judicata in a subsequent suit for possession based on a new notice to quit. Third, he claims that the trial court erred in denying his request for attorney’s fees. Finally, he asserts thаt the trial court abused its discretion in denying his so-called “emergency motion.”
Although the trial court granted appellant’s motion to dismiss in L & T No. 17735-81, the basis for that ruling is not entirely clear. From the record it is impossible to determine whether the trial court’s conclusion that the notice to quit was defective was premised on the acceptance of rental payments prior to expiration of the notice or on some other ground. Whatever the court’s rationale may have been, we need not decide the issue which appellant presents to us concerning the effect of the landlord’s acceptancе of rental payments on the validity of the notice to quit. Because appellant was the prevailing party in No. 17735-81, we decline his invitation to issue what would сlearly be an advisory opinion. 2
*469
The
res judicata
effect, if any, of a default judgment in a prior landlord-and-tenant proceeding on subsequent proceedings is currently undeсided in this jurisdiction, pending the outcome of
Davis v. Bruner,
No. 11924, argued before this court en banc on October 4, 1982. We need not wait for a decision in
Davis,
however, to decide this case, which does not involve a default judgment of uncertain scope but only a defective notice to quit resulting in a dismissal, followed by a valid notice. In
Royall v. Weitzman,
With respect to appellant’s request for attorney’s fees, it is the law in the District of Columbia that “absent a contract, a statutory provision, or a showing of unwarranted, oppressive, or vexatious conduct, attorneys’ fees are not allowed as damages or costs.”
Wisconsin Avenue Associates, Inc. v. 2720 Wisconsin Avenue Cooperative Ass’n,
Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to transfer thе funds in the registry of the court from the earlier case to the later one. In the first place, the motion was untimely, having been filed five days after the judgment in the seсond case was entered. Appellant had been aware of the protective order in the first case for several months and could have sought rеlief much earlier. Furthermore, the trial court could not have released the funds in the registry without holding a hearing under
McNeal v. Habib, supra
note 1. We have recently held in
Goodwin
v.
Barnes,
Affirmed.
Notes
. Apparently no аction was ever taken to disburse the funds in the registry. Appellant filed a motion for release of those funds under
McNeal v. Habib,
. In any event, we have held that acceptance by a landlord of rental payments after the issuance of a notice to quit waives the landlord’s right to demand possession under the notice.
Williams v. Tencher-Walker, Inc.,