*1 conse- attendant Labor Law with diverse of the Child tions clearly would discour- legislation The result of such quences. respects Law in some Labor with the Child compliance age This would not as to others. compliance promoting while legiti- effecting means of logical as a reasonable serve Law, i.e., minor protect Labor of the Child purposes mate Legislature’s enactment conclude that the We employees. age all minors under the 320, its inclusion of Section state legitimate purpose, to a rationally related eighteen, Protection Clause and, Equal not offend the accordingly, does III, § Article 32 of the States Constitution of the United Pennsylvania Constitution. Court’s affirm Commonwealth foregoing, on the we

Based order.

714 A.2d 1012 HAMILTON, Jr., Hamilton Marshall Marshall Hamilton, Appellees, Robin

v. FORD SCHOOL UNIONVILLE-CHADDS DISTRICT, Appellant. Pennsylvania.

Supreme Court of 27, Argued April 1998. July

Decided *2 Merrick, John R. Rayne, F. Timothy Gallagher, William J. School. Ford for Unioville-Chadds Square, Kennett Hamilton, al. Coatesville, et for Marshall Jams, M. Alan ZAPPALA, CAPPY, FLAHERTY, C.J., and Before SAYLOR, JJ. NIGRO, CASTILLE, NEWMAN OPINION CAPPY, Justice: the Un- whether allocatur to determine granted court

This (“District”) “Students District’s ionville-Chadds Ford School code”) (“district irreconcil- code Rights Responsibilities” discipline the District’s middle conflicts with ably code”). codes do not (“middle find that the Since we other, expul- conclude the we irreconcilably conflict with each *3 Hamilton, Jr., proper was Marshall appellee, of sion Court. of the Commonwealth reverse decision a student at was year, appellee the 1994-95 During School, is in the Unionville- which Patton Middle Charles S. 23, 1995, Sony a February District. On Ford School Chadds one locker. About from a student’s was stolen Discman of the middle later, principal admitted to the appellee month on behalf party to a third he sold the Discman school that Following that it was stolen. thief, knowledge with days. for 10 from school incident, suspended was appellee this marijuana in with 6, 1995, caught appellee was On June lighter fluid lighter and a cigarettes, cigarettes, regular incident, suspend- was appellee Following this his possession. over into the carry would 10 which day period, for another ed addition, In semester. following fall days six of the first District to the School recommended school administration (“Board”) repeated “due expelled be appellee Board 1 “F” offenses.” level 14, District on June by superintendent of the appellees 1. Memo sent expulsion recom- merely appellees of the informed 1995. The memo notification, not the official board and was to the school mendation 15, August was sent 15, 1995, August On superintendent sent a letter to (also action) appellee’s parents parties to the instant advising them that: the administration had appellee’s recommended expulsion; a hearing date would be set at a mutually conve- time; nient appellees should secure counsel. The letter (listed above) also enumerated the two incidents that provided the bases for the administration’s recommendation. No- 1995, vember the expulsion hearing was held before the Disci- plinary Committee of the Board. The Committee issued appellee recommendation that permanently be expelled. On November 1995 the Board adopted this recommendation. The Court of Common Pleas affirmed.

The Commonwealth Court reversed. The Commonwealth Court held that the middle school code and the district code irreconcilably conflicted with each other and therefore the more specific middle school governed general more Moreover, district code. according to the Commonwealth Court, appellee was improperly expelled because the middle not provide code did any guidelines or list the types of offenses for which expulsion proper. was This court granted allocatur.

Our scope review an agency’s administrative determi- nation is as follows: court shall affirm adjudication

[T]he unless it shall find adjudication violation of the constitutional rights appellant, of the or law, is not accordance with provisions of Subchapter A of Chapter (relating practice and procedure of Commonwealth agencies) have been violated in the proceedings before the agency, *4 that any finding of fact by agency made the necessary and to support adjudication its is not supported by substantial evidence. 754(b), §

2 Pa.C.S.A. in pertinent part. case, In the instant both parties rely on the Rules of Construction, 1501 et seq., for their Statutory § 1 Pa.C.S.A. respective arguments. argues District that the district is in pari materia with the middle school Appel- code.

249 irreconcilably conflict with that the codes contend school lees they do not materia because pan other and not each Moreover, according to persons. to same class of apply the it is more because specific the middle school code appellees, governs and therefore to middle school students applies only code, within the to all students applies the district the Rules of court has never used Although District. this codes, disciplinary this for school interpreting Construction local We construing has for ordinances.2 court used Rules Statutory provide instruc- find that the Rules of Construction case. disposition tion for our of the instant provide pari are in of that statutes The Rules Construction things to persons or they materia “when relate same 1932(a). § 1 persons things.” of Pa.C.S.A. the same class if together, materia shall be construed pari “Statutes 1932(b). Moreover, § 1 as one statute.” Pa.C.S.A. possible, general to and shall be possible given wherever effect conflict between the It is where the specific provisions. prevails specific provision is irreconcilable provisions Thus, § 1 it is clear that Pa.C.S.A. general. over and, together possible to be construed whenever statutes are exists, given to be to an irreconcilable conflict effect is unless provisions. all have broad Pennsylvania, local school boards discre § 24 5- determining policies.3 P.S. disciplinary

tion 91, 510; 481 Pittenger, v. Pa. see also Girard School District (1978)(local to boards have discretion 392 A.2d 261 to be nature administered discipline determine the of local Only it will be imposed). the conditions under which 24 a student. power expel board is vested with Construction, § seq., et principles of 1 Pa.C.S.A. 1901 2. The of Rules Zoning Bd. apply of local laws. Patricca v. the construction of 267, (1991), City Pittsburgh, Adjustment Pa. 590 A.2d Corleto, 417, (1965). citing 418 Pa. 211 A.2d 503 Francis v. may any adopt and school district 3. "The of school directors board may necessary deem regulations rules and it enforce such reasonable deportment pupils regarding of all proper ... the conduct School public in the Public Code attending the schools district....” § 24 P.S. 5-510. *5 250 §

P.S. Pennsylvania Pursuant Code local school “shall publish board of directors define and the types of offenses that lead to from 22 would exclusion school.” Pa. 12.6(a). § encompasses Code “Exclusion” suspension In a and order to student expulsion. expel the board must § a prior hearing conduct formal as set forth in 12.8.4 22 (b)(2). § Pa.Code 12.6 Prior expulsion hearings alia, school district give, must inter the student and his parents appropriate charges notice of the at in are issue 12.8(l)(i). satisfy § order to 22 process. due Pa.Code case, In the instant middle school code expulsion defines as “exclusion from school for an for a period exceeding offense may 10 days and result in a permanent from expulsion school,” in and states that with statutory require- accordance “pupil may expelled by ments a be the School Board as Pennsylvania.” outlined the School Code of The middle school code does not define the for types offenses However, is expulsion proper. the middle school code does types define the of offenses for which is suspension appropri- The offenses, ate. middle six school code defines levels A F, through provides and that a may suspended student be for “F” any Level “F” offenses. Level offenses include “posses- drugs” transfer of and distribution of property. stolen sion/use addition, introduction the “Offenses Disciplinary portion Action” of the middle school code provides merely code is a for guideline disciplinary action and that the list responses inclusive, of offenses not all thus the administration can “exercise judgments discretion making regarding problems behavioral not dealt with in the code.”

The district code as expulsion defines “exclusion from school by the Board of for a period School Directors exceeding 10 days may permanent.” All expulsions require be 12.8(b). formal hearing required by § as 22 Pa.Code district code enumerates the offenses which a may student excluded, sale, be which include possession, “the illegal distri- duly 4. A authorized board committee of the can conduct also expulsion hearing, long expulsion approved by as the a majority § vote entire board. Pa.Code 12.8. school, ...” on bution, drugs property ... or use of of personal property. and theft stated, district the District first contends

As *6 pan Appel code in materia. the middle school are code and are not the school and district codes respond lees that middle not to the same class of they apply in materia because do pan relating the of Construction to Section 1932 of Rules persons. disjunctive. in Section the materia is written pari class of apply can to the same provides that the enactment case, In both instant subject same matter. the persons the disciplinary in to question school codes relate portions the Ac subject same matter. thus involve the procedures, and school are in the code and the middle code cordingly, district as thus can be construed one code. materia and pari por action disciplinary The next issue is whether the in irreconcilably the instant case tions of the codes involved not given other effect can be to conflict with each such that irrecon assert that the codes are provisions. Appellees for the of punishment the same cilable because maximum for sus provides middle school code fenses is different —the for provides expulsion. the code pension, whereas district two difficulty construing portions This court no these finds case, as In the instant complementary. of the school codes offenses, “F” was two and there appellee charged with Level committed offenses. The dispute appellee is no that these any action for provide disciplinary middle school code does not offenders, repeat Level “F” thus the middle school administra discretion, school pursuant tion could exercise its to middle code, problems action for behavioral not recommending by dealt with the middle school code.

Moreover, expel to significant power appellee it is that the vested in the the middle could never be administration administration, school, as that any other individual school pursuant to power solely rests the school board state law. principals can provides that individual school district code only logical thus is that the middle school suspension, effect it at be the middle only provide action that can taken maximum punishment level—limited to the of suspen- addition, sion. middle policy clearly indicates recourse, that expulsion is a means of but all refers matters to Thus, it school board. that appropriate expulsion only guidelines specifically enumerated in a school district- policy, wide as the board of the entire district has power expel a student. Accordingly, the school codes are complementary provides district code what the mid- —the dle school code can not—the expel means student. the District

Lastly, asserts had actual appellees knowledge of the charges- appel furnished the bases for thus, suspension lee’s did pro not violate appellee’s due rights. Appellees respond cess expulsion was im proper, they charges because did not receive notice 12.8(b)(l)(ii) required by Pa.Code district code.5 *7 The Superintendent of the sent District two identical to letters Hamilton, appellees to Marshall Jr. and to one his —one parents, both August dated 1998. provided The letters that the recommendation for to expulsion was related two incidents specifically and enumerated surrounding the facts Thus, underlying incidents.6 appellees’ argument that given notice was not properly violation due process is August without merit. The 15th letter enumerat specifically ed the that charges the Board was considering against appel and complied lee thus with due process requirements pursuant to the Pennsylvania Code and the district code.

Wherefore, this court finds that the school district and middle school codes in pan are materia that proper notice given was appellee required by Pennsylvania Code Appellees also assert vagueness." that school codes are "void for did Commonwealth Court not address this issue because it reversed grounds. way the lower court on different Accordingly, only appellees to raise this claim to court a petition. this was via cross Appellees issue; presented petition have not a regarding cross this thus will opinion. it not be addressed this complied 6. The letter remaining requirements also with the of 22 12.8, § appellees merely challenge Pa.Code provision, pursu- the notice 12.8(b)(i). §to ant proper. was from school thus, expulsion 12.8, appellee’s § Court reversed. the Commonwealth Accordingly, NEWMAN, J., Concurring Opinion. files a Justice, NEWMAN, concurring: to note separately write majority agree I with list of Level among the includes code the middle school that [serious] be considered may offenses, offense “[a]ny “F” Superintendent before the hearing and/or to warrant enough reference explicit code’s The middle Board.” School un- hearings exclusion to conduct power Board’s the School and the school code the middle demonstrates equivocally unified disci- of a elements complementary district possibility Moreover, reference scheme. plinary any contention Board” belies ... School hearing before the “a could have disci- conduct unaware that his was Appellee enumerated specifically those beyond consequences plinary Thus, the Common- agree I middle school code. from expulsion Appellee’s in reversing Court erred wealth school.

714A.2d1016 STAUDENMAYER, Appellant, Theodore

v. *8 STAUDENMAYER, Appellee. Linda Pennsylvania. Supreme Court 2, 1998. Argued Feb. July

Decided