96 Ga. 301 | Ga. | 1895
We shall deal with only one of the questions made by the motion for a new trial in this case. The evidence against the accused was entirely circumstantial, and the presiding judge failed to state the rule of law applicable in criminal cases to proof of this character. It can hardly be doubted that in every ciúminal case it is the duty of the judge, even without a request, to charge concerning the law of reasonable doubt. There was no complaint that this was not done in the present case; but we think it equally clear that in a case where the State depended for conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone, it was likewise the duty of the judge, Avhether so requested or not, to instruct the jury, in substance, that to authorize a verdict of guilty the evidence must conuect the accused Avitli the perpetration of the alleged offense, and must not only be entirely consistent with his guilt, but inconsistent with every other reasonable hypothesis. The failure to give some such instruction, in'a close and'doubtful case like the present, will entitle the accused to a new trial. The laAV upon this subject is very concisely and aptly stated in the 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, p. 879, from which we make the folloAving quotation: “Where the prosecution relies solely upon circumstantial evidence to secure a conviction, it is incumbent on the trial court to instruct the’jury as to the laAV applicable to such proof. No particular form of language is required; if the ideas conveyed are correct and so expressed as to meet the comprehension of the jury, it is sufficient.” And see the cases there cited. In Barrow v. The State, 80 Ga. 191, this court intimated
Judgment reversed.