126 Ga. 27 | Ga. | 1906
1. The first and second assignments of error, which relate to the ruling of the court in not excluding certain deeds from evidence, are not discussed in the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error; and under the rulings of this court such assignments of error will be treated as abandoned. Mayson v. State, 124 Ga. 789 (2).
2. Where a promissory note, dated January 21, 1897, f&r $90 as principal, contains the further agreement to pay all interest at the rate of eight per cent, per annum “with all costs of collection including ten per cent, attorney’s fees,” the amount of the attorney’s fees to be paid thereon at any- given time is to be ascertained by adding to the principal debt the accrued interest and calculating ten per cent, on the amount. Morgan v. Kiser, 105 Ga. 104. Thus calculating upon such a note at a time when $36 as interest had accrued, the amount of attorney’s fees due thereon would be $12.60.
3. When such a note is sued on in a justice’s court, the summons requiring “the defendant to answer the plaintiff demand in an action of debt due by note, a copy being attached,” such suit will be construed to be for the recovery of the principal, interest, and attorney’s fees. Peeples v. Strickland, 101 Ga. 829.
(а) In such case the attorney’s fees will be treated as a part of the principal debt.
(б) The principal debt thus sued for, being $102.60, exceeds the amount which the justice’s court has jurisdiction to entertain, and the judgment of the court and execution issued thereon are void.
(c) It follows that the sheriff’s sale under such execution is also void, and that no title passed by virtue thereof.
4. But where a series of several notes such as described are given for a debt which is secured by a deed to land, and, by means above indicated, a void sheriff’s sale of the land is accomplished under the several fi. fas., a bona fide purchaser at the sheriff’s sale, who pays the purchase-price, which is sufficient to pay and does pay the entire debt represented by the several notes and secured by the deed, thereupon becomes subrogated
;5. In an ejectment case upon a security deed, the plaintiff would have no better title than the maker of the deed; and if the suit be against one in ■possession who is not a party to the security deed, the burden will be upon the plaintiff to show title in the maker of the security deed, or ,some other state of facts sufficient to show a legal right to possession superior to the right of the defendant.
(6. In this ease the evidence shows that the defendant claims 4.88 acres of the land in dispute from a source different from the plaintiff’s claim of .title, ;and as to those acres the plaintiff makes no proof of title in the maker of the security deed, nor otherwise shows title in himself, and, having failed to carry the burden of proof, could not recover them.
% As to the remaining 30 acres in dispute, it appears from the evidence that .the-defendant claims under a chain of title which extends back to •a ,deed executed by the maker of the security deed a number of year's ■before the execution of the security deed. This makes the parties claim ■under -a common grantor-, and, as to the 30 acres, avoids the necessity of the plaintiff showing title in the maker of the security deed, and leaves 'the sole question as to which has the better title under him.
¡8. Where the chain of title of the defendant originates in an older deed than that relied upon by the plaintiff from the common grantor, but which 4s -itself a security deed, the defendant, being in possession thereunder, could not be evicted until the debt secured by her deed was paid.
¡9. Whether the deed from the common grantor under which defendant claims was a security deed or an unconditional deed, it was senior- in ■point of execution as well as of record to that under which the plaintiff claimed, and in either event, being held upon a valuable consideration, ' may be -relied on to defeat a recovery by the plaintiff.
10. Where the common grantor is the husband of the defendant, and the title relied .on by the defendant is by virtue of a deed from the grantee in a security deed from the husband, a subsequent deed of bargain and .sale from the husband directly to the wife, not approved by the supe1 -.rior court of the wife’s domicile', will not operate to extinguish by merger the security deed held by the wife, where it appears that the wife did not claim under such deed. Webb v. Harris, 124 Ga. 723.
11. Where a .husband secures a debt to a third person by deed to land, and the wife of the debtor pays the husband’s debt to his creditor and takes from such .creditor a deed to the land, in a suit against the wife to recover the land by one claiming title from the husband by a junior deed the plaintiff .is not entitled to recover until the debt is discharged; and ■where .there .is no evidence attacking the good faith of the wife in the • transaction with her husband’s creditor, or showing the discharge of the ..debt, no issue of fact is presented, and it is proper to direct a verdict for ■the defendant. Such direction is not rendered improper on account of i-the claim by the plaintiff in this case that the money with which the