322 F.3d 776 | 3rd Cir. | 2003
Before: NYGAARD, AMBRO, Circuit Judges(cid:13) and O’NEILL,* District Judge(cid:13) (Opinion filed: February 28, 2003)(cid:13) ________________________________________________________________(cid:13) * The honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, United States District Court Judge(cid:13) for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.(cid:13) Marc P. Niedzielski, Esquire (Argued)(cid:13) Stuart B. Drowos, Esquire(cid:13) Department of Justice(cid:13) 820 North French Street(cid:13) Wilmington, DE 19801(cid:13) Attorneys for Appellants(cid:13) John W. Shaw, Esquire (Argued)(cid:13) Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor(cid:13) P.O. Box 391, 1000 West Street(cid:13) Brandywine Building, 17th Floor(cid:13) Wilmington, DE 19801-0391(cid:13) Attorney for Appellee(cid:13) OPINION OF THE COURT(cid:13) AMBRO, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) This 42 U.S.C. S 1983 case is before us on interlocutory(cid:13) appeal. The defendants, members of the Gander Hill Prison(cid:13) Multi-Disciplinary Team ("MDT") and the Delaware(cid:13) Department of Corrections Central Institutional(cid:13) Classification Committee ("CICC"), challenge the District(cid:13) Court’s denial of their summary judgment motion for(cid:13) absolute or qualified immunity from Delaware prisoner(cid:13) Jerome Hamilton’s lawsuit alleging violations of the Eighth(cid:13) Amendment. The defendants contend that they are entitled(cid:13) to absolute immunity because they acted pursuant to a(cid:13) court order or otherwise in a quasi-judicial capacity.(cid:13) Alternatively, they argue that they should receive qualified(cid:13) immunity because they did not violate Hamilton’s Eighth(cid:13) Amendment rights or because their actions were objectively(cid:13) reasonable. We agree with the District Court that on this(cid:13) record the defendants are not absolutely immune on the(cid:13) ground that they acted pursuant to a court order. We(cid:13) remand, however, for the District Court to analyze under(cid:13) the legal tests noted below whether the defendants are(cid:13) entitled either to absolute immunity for acting in a quasi-(cid:13) judicial capacity or to qualified immunity.(cid:13) 2(cid:13) FACTS1(cid:13) On August 5, 1992, Hamilton’s cellmate in Delaware’s(cid:13) Gander Hill prison attacked and injured him.2 Hamilton(cid:13) alleges that his cellmate was able to commit this assault(cid:13) because the defendant prison officials acted with deliberate(cid:13) indifference to his safety.(cid:13) Hamilton has been the victim of numerous attacks from(cid:13) other inmates throughout his lengthy stint in the Delaware(cid:13) prison system, some of which we described in a prior(cid:13) appeal in this case. See Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742,(cid:13) 744-45 (3d Cir. 1997) (Hamilton I). For Hamilton’s safety,(cid:13) prison officials have transferred him among various prisons(cid:13) both in and outside Delaware and have placed him in(cid:13) protective custody.(cid:13) In 1986 Hamilton cooperated with a drug trafficking(cid:13) investigation at the Gander Hill prison that ended with the(cid:13) arrest of prison officials and inmates. He became known as(cid:13) a "snitch" and, as a result, prison officials repeatedly had to(cid:13) place him in protective custody. In 1990 prison officials(cid:13) transferred Hamilton to a Virginia prison "[b]ecause there(cid:13) appeared to be no safe place for Hamilton in the Delaware(cid:13) prisons." Id. at 745.(cid:13) After the move to Virginia, however, Hamilton initiated(cid:13) two civil lawsuits in Delaware state courts, and he was(cid:13) returned in December 1991 to the Gander Hill prison to(cid:13) enable him to prosecute those actions effectively. He(cid:13) brought one of the lawsuits against state officials. Deputy(cid:13) Attorney General John Polk defended that case. Judge(cid:13) Clarence Taylor of the Delaware Superior Court, who(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. The District Court ruled on the defendants’ motion for summary(cid:13) judgment and so viewed the facts in the light most favorable to(cid:13) Hamilton, the non-moving party. As we explain below, we do not have(cid:13) jurisdiction to review the District Court’s fact-finding in this case. We(cid:13) therefore rely upon its opinion to lay out the facts upon which we rule,(cid:13) as well as our prior opinion in Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1997), to which the District Court referred readers for further factual(cid:13) background.(cid:13) 2. We follow the practice of the parties and the District Court by referring(cid:13) to the prison by its colloquial name, Gander Hill; its official title is the(cid:13) Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility.(cid:13) 3(cid:13) presided over the case, held a hearing on December 13,(cid:13) 1991, and addressed the question where Hamilton could be(cid:13) housed while discovery took place.(cid:13) Deputy A.G. Polk suggested to the Court that Hamilton(cid:13) be kept in Delaware for a "month or so." When Judge(cid:13) Taylor expressed concern that the Delaware prison system(cid:13) be able to take the "special precautions" necessary for(cid:13) Hamilton, Polk volunteered to check with the appropriate(cid:13) officials whether this was possible, and the Court granted(cid:13) a recess for him to do so. After the recess, Polk informed(cid:13) the Court that an official from the Delaware Department of(cid:13) Corrections Compact had "reiterated to [him] that Mr.(cid:13) Hamilton is in need of protective custody," but that the(cid:13) Department could "accommodate" Hamilton for two months(cid:13) at either Gander Hill or the Sussex Correctional Institution.(cid:13) Polk then stated that he had requested that the(cid:13) Department keep Hamilton at Gander Hill.3 (cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 3. The exchange went as follows:(cid:13) The Court: . . . [O]n your suggestion that he be kept here in(cid:13) Delaware for the next month or so, I think that ought to be cleared(cid:13) with the prison people because it involves special precautions . . . ,(cid:13) whether they are in a position to maintain those-- that precaution(cid:13) during the period you’re talking about.(cid:13) Deputy A.G.: I would undertake that task of clearing it with the(cid:13) Department, Your Honor.(cid:13) . . .(cid:13) The Court: . . . [I]f it doesn’t pose a problem to the prison(cid:13) administration for him to be detained up here for a month or longer(cid:13) in order for him to have access to the lawbooks and get out his(cid:13) discovery and so on while he’s up here, then that would seem like(cid:13) the best solution to move this case forward from where it is today.(cid:13) . . .(cid:13) [Recess held to allow the Deputy A.G. to check with prison officials(cid:13) regarding housing Hamilton in Delaware.](cid:13) Deputy A.G.: Your Honor, I’ve called the deputy administrator for the(cid:13) Delaware Department of Corrections Compact and they’ve indicated(cid:13) that a one to two-month stay by Mr. Hamilton in Delaware is(cid:13) something they can accommodate.(cid:13) 4(cid:13) The Court next informed Hamilton:(cid:13) Let’s leave it that way, then. So, you’ll -- you are to be(cid:13) detained up here at the State Gander Hill Prison for a(cid:13) length of time up to two months, and it will be(cid:13) dependent [on] what reports I get back from the Deputy(cid:13) Attorney General, from you and what progress is made(cid:13) toward resolving this thing without further trial. .. .(cid:13) Prison will have you up to two months and during that(cid:13) time Mr. Polk will cooperate with you and try to work(cid:13) out something . . . .(cid:13) The docket entry for December 13 states: "Detained at(cid:13) Gander Hill up to 2 months in protective custody."(cid:13) Hamilton was still at the Gander Hill prison on March 5,(cid:13) 1992, almost three months later, when Judge Taylor sent a(cid:13) letter to the Deputy A.G.:(cid:13) At a hearing held on December 13, 1991, you were(cid:13) ordered to supply petitioner Jerome Hamilton with(cid:13) answers to petitioner’s requests for admissions by(cid:13) December 27, 1991 . . . .(cid:13) [T]he Interstate Corrections Compact Administrator(cid:13) has contacted my office to see if the petitioner can be(cid:13) returned to the prison from which he had been(cid:13) transferred for the purpose of resolving this case.(cid:13) You have failed to comply with my order of December(cid:13) 13, 1991. If Gander Hill Prison needs action, then you(cid:13) should take immediate action to comply with the order(cid:13) of December 13, 1991. Until you comply with the(cid:13) Order, there is no alternative but to keep petitioner(cid:13) Hamilton at the Gander Hill facility.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) The Court: They can?(cid:13) Deputy A.G.: They can accommodate. She reiterated to me that Mr.(cid:13) Hamilton is in need of protective custody, and I said can you(cid:13) accommodate him in Delaware. She said he can be accommodated(cid:13) in Gander Hill or SCI [Sussex Correctional Institution]. My request(cid:13) of the Department -- and I don’t think that there would be a(cid:13) problem in adhering to this -- is that he be housed up here in(cid:13) Gander Hill.(cid:13) 5(cid:13) IT IS SO ORDERED.(cid:13) Later that month, Hamilton, still in the Gander Hill(cid:13) prison, filed a grievance against a correctional officer there(cid:13) for calling him in front of other prisoners "a good telling(cid:13) mother f_____g snitcher." Witnesses confirmed this incident.(cid:13) The Resident Grievance Resolution Committee, composed of(cid:13) five prison officials, recommended to the Deputy Warden(cid:13) that "a thorough investigation" take place because(cid:13) comments that a prisoner is a "snitch" have the potential to(cid:13) cause "a major disturbance and require[ ] immediate(cid:13) action." The Deputy Warden concluded on June 15, 1992,(cid:13) that the correctional officer did make the statement.(cid:13) Three days later, the MDT -- made up of defendants(cid:13) Faith Leavy, Pamela Faulkner (now Minor), and William(cid:13) Queener -- reviewed Hamilton’s file, summarized his(cid:13) situation in a written report, and unanimously(cid:13) recommended that he be placed in protective custody. After(cid:13) reviewing the MDT report and recommendation, the CICC,(cid:13) which had the authority to place Hamilton in protective(cid:13) custody, decided on June 24, 1992, to take "no action" on(cid:13) the report, which meant that Hamilton remained without(cid:13) additional safety precautions in the Gander Hill general(cid:13) prison population. The members of the CICC are also(cid:13) defendants in this lawsuit.(cid:13) A month after the "no action" decision, inmate Steven(cid:13) Clayton joined the prison population at Gander Hill and(cid:13) sometime before August 5, 1992, became Hamilton’s(cid:13) cellmate. That day, Clayton attacked Hamilton, fracturing(cid:13) his jaw and sending him to the hospital, where he had two(cid:13) metal plates inserted. Clayton pled guilty to the assault and(cid:13) stated that he attacked Hamilton because he was"a(cid:13) snitcher on inmates and officers" at Gander Hill.(cid:13) Coincidentally, on the same day as the assault (August(cid:13) 5), Judge Haile Alford, who had taken over Hamilton’s civil(cid:13) case in the Delaware Superior Court when Judge Taylor(cid:13) retired, wrote a letter to Hamilton, informing him:(cid:13) Judge Taylor ordered you held at Gander Hill until the(cid:13) Deputy Attorney General had attempted to resolve this(cid:13) matter with you without further trial. A review of the(cid:13) file in this case reveals that Deputy Attorney General(cid:13) 6(cid:13) John Polk, after writing to the Court anticipating a(cid:13) settlement of this claim[,] has requested a trial date(cid:13) and that a Scheduling Order in this matter has been(cid:13) entered, setting a trial date of March 31, 1993.(cid:13) The letter from the Court dated March 5, 1992, does(cid:13) not order that you are to be held at Gander Hill until(cid:13) the completion of your case. Because this case is now(cid:13) set down for trial, the conditions that caused you to be(cid:13) incarcerated at Gander Hill have changed, and there is(cid:13) no longer a reason in [this case] for you to remain at(cid:13) that specific facility.(cid:13) PROCEEDINGS(cid:13) Hamilton filed this S 1983 lawsuit on June 20, 1994, in(cid:13) the District Court for the District of Delaware against MDT(cid:13) members Leavy, Faulkner, and Queener, and against(cid:13) Frances Lewis, chair of the CICC, alleging deliberate(cid:13) indifference to Hamilton’s safety in violation of his Eighth(cid:13) Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual(cid:13) punishment. The Court entered summary judgment in favor(cid:13) of the MDT defendants because they "were without(cid:13) authority to effectuate their own recommendation that(cid:13) Hamilton be placed in protective custody, [and therefore](cid:13) they could not be found to have deliberately disregarded(cid:13) serious risks to his safety." Hamilton I, 117 F.3d at 748.(cid:13) The Court also granted summary judgment to defendant(cid:13) Lewis on the ground that no reasonable factfinder could(cid:13) find that she knew that keeping Hamilton in the Gander(cid:13) Hill general prison population without additional safety(cid:13) precautions put Hamilton in substantial risk of suffering(cid:13) serious harm.(cid:13) Hamilton appealed, and in June 1997 our Court(cid:13) reversed. See id. at 744. As to the MDT defendants, we(cid:13) noted Hamilton’s argument that the MDT could have(cid:13) provided him with additional protection by, for instance,(cid:13) putting him in administrative segregation, even if the MDT(cid:13) did not have the authority to place him in protective(cid:13) custody. See id. at 748. We concluded that the "failure of(cid:13) the MDT defendants to take additional steps beyond the(cid:13) recommendation of protective custody could be viewed by a(cid:13) 7(cid:13) factfinder as the sort of deliberate indifference to inmate(cid:13) safety that the Constitution forbids." Id. at 749. As to(cid:13) defendant Lewis, we explained that she "was made aware of(cid:13) a substantial risk to Hamilton’s safety when she reviewed(cid:13) the MDT’s unanimous recommendation to place Hamilton(cid:13) in protective custody" and, accordingly, that"a factfinder(cid:13) could infer that Lewis knew that the threat to Hamilton’s(cid:13) safety was imminent." Id. at 747.(cid:13) Back in the District Court, Hamilton amended his(cid:13) complaint to add additional defendants: George Dixon, Jack(cid:13) Stephenson, Deborah Craig, Joanne Smith, Dennis Loebe,(cid:13) Eldora Tillery, Francis Cockroft, Jerry Borga, and Richard(cid:13) Shockley, all members of CICC when the assault occurred.(cid:13) On July 27, 2001, the District Court denied the defendants’(cid:13) second motion for summary judgment. They timely(cid:13) appealed.(cid:13) JURISDICTION(cid:13) We generally have jurisdiction to review only "final(cid:13) decisions" of district courts. 28 U.S.C. S 1291. A denial of(cid:13) summary judgment, from which the defendants appeal(cid:13) here, usually does not qualify as a final decision for(cid:13) purposes of S 1291 because, far from finally deciding the(cid:13) case, it is a decision to permit the litigation to continue. See(cid:13) Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1245 (3d Cir. 1994). Under(cid:13) the collateral order doctrine, however, we have jurisdiction(cid:13) to review the District Court’s decision if it (1) conclusively(cid:13) determines a disputed question, (2) resolves an important(cid:13) issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and(cid:13) (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final(cid:13) judgment. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-25(cid:13) (1985) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337(cid:13) U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).(cid:13) Pre-trial denials of absolute or qualified immunity are(cid:13) frequently appropriate for appellate review under the(cid:13) collateral order doctrine. An appeal from such a denial may(cid:13) conclusively determine the disputed question of the(cid:13) defendants’ entitlement to immunity, a question that is(cid:13) conceptually separate from the merits of the case. See id. at(cid:13) 527-28. And because immunity is intended to protect the(cid:13) 8(cid:13) defendant "from suit," id. at 526 (emphasis in original) --(cid:13) not simply from an adverse judgment at the conclusion of(cid:13) litigation -- a grant of immunity after a final judgment(cid:13) "would come too late." Johnson v. Jones , 515 U.S. 304, 312(cid:13) (1995).(cid:13) We have jurisdiction to review a pre-trial denial of(cid:13) immunity under the collateral order doctrine only to the(cid:13) extent that it raises questions of law. See Giuffre, 31 F.3d(cid:13) at 1245 ("[A]n order denying qualified or absolute(cid:13) immunity, to the extent that the order turns on an issue of(cid:13) law, is immediately appealable under the collateral order(cid:13) doctrine.") (citation omitted). We may not review the District(cid:13) Court’s "identification of the facts that are subject to(cid:13) genuine dispute," but instead we review the legal issues in(cid:13) light of the facts that the District Court determined had(cid:13) sufficient evidentiary support for summary judgment(cid:13) purposes. See Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia , 288 F.3d 57,(cid:13) 59, 61 (3d Cir. 2002).4 And, of course, we give de novo(cid:13) review to those legal issues. Giuffre, 31 F.3d at 1251.(cid:13) DISCUSSION(cid:13) A. Absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to a(cid:13) court order(cid:13) The defendants assert that they should receive absolute(cid:13) immunity from Hamilton’s claim that they violated the(cid:13) Eighth Amendment because the conduct (or lack thereof)(cid:13) for which they are sued was taken pursuant to a court(cid:13) order. As the defendants see it, the Superior Court’s orders(cid:13) -- Judge Taylor’s December 13 oral decision and docket(cid:13) order and his March 5 letter to the Deputy A.G.--(cid:13) prohibited the defendants from moving Hamilton from the(cid:13) Gander Hill prison. The defendants argue that the Delaware(cid:13) prison system did not at that time provide for protective(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 4. The facts sufficiently proven for summary judgment purposes include(cid:13) those facts not subject to genuine dispute as well as those facts that are(cid:13) subject to such dispute, viewed in the light most favorable to Hamilton,(cid:13) the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,(cid:13) 255 (1986) ("The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all(cid:13) justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.").(cid:13) 9(cid:13) custody at Gander Hill, so they could not have placed(cid:13) Hamilton in protective custody without violating the(cid:13) Superior Court’s order to keep him at Gander Hill.(cid:13) The defendants are correct that action taken pursuant to(cid:13) a facially valid court order receives absolute immunity from(cid:13) S 1983 lawsuits for damages. See Wolfe v. City of Pittsburgh,(cid:13) 140 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1998); Richman v. Sheahan, 270(cid:13) F.3d 430, 437 (7th Cir. 2001).5 The District Court so(cid:13) recognized but nonetheless denied the defendants’ motion(cid:13) for absolute immunity because they had not established(cid:13) that they acted pursuant to a court order. The Court(cid:13) concluded instead that the Superior Court’s orders did not(cid:13) prohibit the defendants from moving Hamilton from the(cid:13) Gander Hill prison to another facility in order to place him(cid:13) in protective custody and that, even if the orders had(cid:13) prohibited such action, they did not also prevent the(cid:13) defendants from otherwise providing Hamilton with effective(cid:13) protection at Gander Hill.(cid:13) Hamilton contends, however, that the question whether(cid:13) the defendants acted pursuant to an order of the Superior(cid:13) Court is one of fact and therefore an issue we cannot(cid:13) address. In the end, whether a defendant is entitled to(cid:13) absolute immunity is a question of law, see Carver v.(cid:13) Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Absolute(cid:13) immunity is an issue of law . . . ."); In re Montgomery(cid:13) County, 215 F.3d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Absolute(cid:13) immunity is a purely legal question . . . ."), but we agree(cid:13) with Hamilton that this ultimately legal issue can also(cid:13) involve factual questions.(cid:13) Indeed, in Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1969), we treated the question whether a defendant acted(cid:13) pursuant to a court order -- the question presented here --(cid:13) as one of fact. Id. at 460. The disputed question there(cid:13) concerned whether a court had issued an order to the(cid:13) defendant -- the court’s prothonotary -- not to accept the(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 5. This type of immunity is sometimes referred to as "quasi-judicial"(cid:13) immunity. We reserve this moniker, however, for another form of(cid:13) immunity asserted by the defendants (for acting in a role that is(cid:13) functionally comparable to that of a judge, rather than under the(cid:13) authority of a court order), discussed in Section B below.(cid:13) 10(cid:13) plaintiff ’s papers for filing. Id. at 457-58. Here, in contrast,(cid:13) the key issue is not factually whether the Superior Court(cid:13) entered an order at all, but is instead what the Superior(cid:13) Court’s orders mean. This is a question of law, see Apex(cid:13) Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 818 F.2d 1089, 1097 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 1987) (The "construction of . . . [a] court order" is "a(cid:13) purely legal issue."), which we can review. We turn now to(cid:13) that question.(cid:13) The defendants repeat to this Court their contention,(cid:13) rejected by the District Court, that the Superior Court’s(cid:13) orders forbade them from moving Hamilton from the(cid:13) Gander Hill prison to another facility where he could be(cid:13) placed in protective custody. We agree with the District(cid:13) Court’s conclusion.(cid:13) The Superior Court’s order of December 13, 1991, did not(cid:13) by itself prohibit moving Hamilton. To recap, on December(cid:13) 13 Judge Taylor agreed to the Deputy A.G.’s request that(cid:13) Hamilton be detained in a Delaware prison only after(cid:13) receiving assurances that the Delaware Department of(cid:13) Corrections could take the "special precautions" necessary(cid:13) for Hamilton’s safety. It was at the Deputy A.G.’s request(cid:13) that the Superior Court ordered that Hamilton be kept at(cid:13) Gander Hill rather than at the Sussex Correctional(cid:13) Institution. And the December 13 docket entry states that(cid:13) Hamilton is to be housed at Gander Hill "up to 2 months in(cid:13) protective custody."(cid:13) The December 13, 1991 colloquy with Judge Taylor(cid:13) (which in his March 5, 1992 letter he referred to as an(cid:13) order) did not require Hamilton’s detention for more than a(cid:13) period of two months at Gander Hill, instead of at Sussex(cid:13) or another prison. But especially it cannot be interpreted to(cid:13) have required his detention at Gander Hill if the prison(cid:13) officials there became unable (or unwilling) to keep(cid:13) Hamilton in "protective custody" or to provide some other(cid:13) form of "special precautions" for his safety. Accordingly, the(cid:13) order did not prohibit the MDT or the CICC in the summer(cid:13) of 1992 (the key time period) from placing Hamilton in a(cid:13) facility that could provide him with protective custody.(cid:13) We reach the same conclusion as to the March 5 letter.(cid:13) Again, that letter, addressed to Deputy A.G. Polk,(cid:13) 11(cid:13) concluded: "Until you comply with the Order, there is no(cid:13) alternative but to keep petitioner Hamilton at the Gander(cid:13) Hill facility." This statement did not require that the(cid:13) defendants keep Hamilton at Gander Hill indefinitely, as(cid:13) they seem to argue. Instead, it explicitly states that it will(cid:13) operate only until the time that the Deputy A.G. complied(cid:13) with "the Order." Read in context, the "Order" with which(cid:13) the Deputy A.G. must comply refers to the Superior Court’s(cid:13) December 13 order that the Deputy A.G. participate in(cid:13) discovery, communicate with Hamilton, and inform the(cid:13) Court of the results of this process.(cid:13) Judge Alford’s letter of August 5 is in accord with our(cid:13) understanding of the March 5 letter. She explained that(cid:13) "Judge Taylor ordered [Hamilton] held at Gander Hill until(cid:13) the Deputy Attorney General had attempted to resolve this(cid:13) matter with [Hamilton] without further trial." And further:(cid:13) "The letter from the Court dated March 5, 1992, does not(cid:13) order that [Hamilton was] to be held at Gander Hill until(cid:13) the completion of [the civil] case." Finally, Judge Alford’s(cid:13) letter also tells us that by August 5 the Deputy A.G. had(cid:13) reported to the Superior Court on the progress of the civil(cid:13) suit litigation and that trial had been set, putting an end to(cid:13) the March 5 requirement that Hamilton stay at Gander Hill.(cid:13) Accordingly, neither of the Superior Court orders explains(cid:13) adequately the defendants’ failure to remove Hamilton from(cid:13) Gander Hill. They are therefore not entitled to absolute(cid:13) immunity on this ground.(cid:13) The District Court also held that the Superior Court’s(cid:13) orders "would not have prevented the defendants from(cid:13) providing Hamilton with effective protection at Gander Hill"(cid:13) and thus, on this ground as well, the orders did not provide(cid:13) absolute immunity to the defendants. We again agree with(cid:13) the District Court.(cid:13) The Tenth Circuit has addressed an analogous issue. In(cid:13) Turney v. O’Toole, 898 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1990), also a(cid:13) S 1983 case, a state court ordered the seventeen-year-old(cid:13) plaintiff confined at a state hospital for mental health(cid:13) treatment. Id. at 1471. At the hospital, the plaintiff was(cid:13) placed in the adult maximum security unit. Id. at 1472.(cid:13) "When efforts to find a more suitable placement failed," the(cid:13) 12(cid:13) plaintiff obtained a writ of habeas corpus ordering his(cid:13) release. Id. The plaintiff then sued the superintendent and(cid:13) a psychologist at the hospital, alleging violations of S 1983.(cid:13) The District Court granted absolute immunity to the(cid:13) defendants on the ground that they were acting pursuant(cid:13) to the court order. Id.(cid:13) The Tenth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the(cid:13) defendants "were absolutely immune from liability arising(cid:13) from the fact of [the plaintiff ’s] confinement, but that they(cid:13) were only qualifiedly immune from liability arising from the(cid:13) conditions in which he was held." Id. The Court explained:(cid:13) [T]his absolute immunity [for the plaintiff ’s(cid:13) confinement] extended only to acts prescribed by[the(cid:13) court’s] order, . . . and . . . all the order decreed was(cid:13) [the plaintiff ’s] confinement at [the hospital]. It did not(cid:13) dictate any specific placement or treatment within the(cid:13) facility. Therefore, the defendants are not absolutely(cid:13) immune from liability arising from [the plaintiff ’s](cid:13) placement in the maximum security ward.(cid:13) Id. at 1474 (citations omitted); see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald,(cid:13) 457 U.S. 731, 755 (1982) ("In defining the scope of an(cid:13) official’s absolute privilege, this Court has recognized that(cid:13) the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the(cid:13) immunity’s justifying purposes.").(cid:13) The Superior Court’s orders entered in this case did not(cid:13) direct the defendants -- expressly or otherwise-- to confine(cid:13) Hamilton in conditions that they knew posed a substantial(cid:13) risk of serious harm. The Superior Court’s concern that a(cid:13) Delaware facility take "special precautions" to ensure(cid:13) Hamilton’s safety and the December 13 docket entry noting(cid:13) that Hamilton was to be kept in "protective custody" made(cid:13) clear that he must remain safe.(cid:13) Even if the Superior Court had not stated such explicit(cid:13) concern for Hamilton’s safety (indeed ordered that he be(cid:13) placed in protective custody), nothing else in the Court’s(cid:13) orders provides a basis to interpret them as having(cid:13) prohibited any of the defendants from taking steps to(cid:13) provide Hamilton with effective protection. In accord with(cid:13) the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Turney, we hold that the(cid:13) Superior Court’s December 13 and March 5 orders cannot(cid:13) 13(cid:13) immunize the defendants for their allegedly(cid:13) unconstitutional failure to take action to protect Hamilton.(cid:13) * * *(cid:13) We conclude that the defendants are not entitled to(cid:13) absolute immunity from Hamilton’s Eighth Amendment(cid:13) claim on the basis of the Superior Court’s orders(cid:13) concerning Hamilton’s confinement in Delaware. We(cid:13) therefore affirm the District Court’s decision denying the(cid:13) defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this ground.(cid:13) B. Quasi-judicial absolute immunity(cid:13) The defendants also argue that they are entitled to(cid:13) absolute immunity because they acted in quasi-judicial(cid:13) capacities when, in the case of the CICC defendants, they(cid:13) decided to take "no action" on the MDT’s recommendation(cid:13) that Hamilton be placed in protective custody, and when, in(cid:13) the case of the MDT defendants, they chose to take no(cid:13) steps to secure Hamilton’s safety other than the(cid:13) recommendation they made to the CICC. The District(cid:13) Court, citing Cleavinger v. Saxoner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985),(cid:13) held that the defendants could not receive quasi-judicial(cid:13) absolute immunity because "this type of immunity generally(cid:13) does not extend to prison officials."(cid:13) Quasi-judicial absolute immunity attaches when a public(cid:13) official’s role is "functionally comparable" to that of a judge.(cid:13) Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). To determine(cid:13) this, a court must consider whether the official acted(cid:13) independently and what procedural safeguards attended(cid:13) his/her decision-making process. See Cleavinger , 474 U.S.(cid:13) at 202. Cleavinger concerned whether members of a prison(cid:13) disciplinary committee could receive quasi-judicial(cid:13) immunity. Before holding that they could not, the Supreme(cid:13) Court analyzed the independence and safeguards(cid:13) accompanying the committee’s decision-making process. Id.(cid:13) at 202-06. In so doing, the Court did not hold per se that(cid:13) prison officials can never receive quasi-judicial immunity.(cid:13) Though the District Court may be correct that prison(cid:13) officials generally cannot receive quasi-judicial immunity,(cid:13) Cleavinger requires that it analyze whether the particular(cid:13) defendants here are entitled to that immunity. The District(cid:13) 14(cid:13) Court did not do so. Also, we do not know what facts(cid:13) pertaining to the committees’ independence and safeguards(cid:13) were sufficiently proven for summary judgment purposes.(cid:13) We recently announced in Forbes v. Township of Lower(cid:13) Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 2002), a supervisory(cid:13) rule requiring district courts to set out what facts they(cid:13) relied on and the legal reasoning they used to determine(cid:13) whether to grant a summary judgment motion for qualified(cid:13) immunity. We now extend this rule to require district(cid:13) courts to provide the same information when deciding(cid:13) motions for summary judgment based on absolute(cid:13) immunity defenses. Accordingly, we remand to the District(cid:13) Court in order for it to reconsider whether the defendants(cid:13) are entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity. 6(cid:13) C. Qualified immunity(cid:13) Finally, the defendants contend that they are entitled to(cid:13) qualified immunity either because Hamilton has not raised(cid:13) a genuine issue of material fact whether the defendants(cid:13) violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel(cid:13) and unusual punishment or because no clearly established(cid:13) law prohibited the defendants’ conduct at the time they(cid:13) acted. The District Court rejected this claim, and we(cid:13) remand for further consideration of the issues.(cid:13) In determining whether to grant summary judgment on(cid:13) qualified immunity grounds, a court must first consider(cid:13) whether "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party(cid:13) asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s(cid:13) conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz,(cid:13) 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). "[I]f a violation could be made(cid:13) out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the(cid:13) next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly(cid:13) established." Id.(cid:13) The defendants violated Hamilton’s Eighth Amendment(cid:13) rights only if they acted with deliberate indifference to his(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 6. On remand, if the defendants direct the Court to any evidence(cid:13) pertaining to the independence and safeguards of their decision-making(cid:13) processes (they did not do so here), it may be useful to compare this(cid:13) evidence with the independence and safeguards considered insufficient(cid:13) in Cleavinger to warrant quasi-judicial immunity.(cid:13) 15(cid:13) safety; in other words, to be liable, the defendants must(cid:13) have known that Hamilton "face[d] a substantial risk of(cid:13) serious harm" and they must have "disregard[ed] that risk(cid:13) by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer(cid:13) v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). As noted above, in(cid:13) Hamilton I, 117 F.3d at 745-49, we held that Hamilton had(cid:13) raised a genuine issue of material fact whether defendants(cid:13) Leavy, Faulkner, Queener, and Lewis acted with deliberate(cid:13) indifference to Hamilton’s safety in violation of the Eighth(cid:13) Amendment.(cid:13) The District Court’s opinion did not discuss whether a(cid:13) constitutional violation occurred other than to note that we(cid:13) held in Hamilton I that a genuine issue of material fact(cid:13) existed as to the reasonableness of the defendants’(cid:13) conduct. The Court then skipped ahead to address the(cid:13) second prong in the qualified immunity analysis. It seems(cid:13) to us likely that, in so doing, the Court tacitly applied the(cid:13) law of the case doctrine, reasoning that Hamilton I had(cid:13) conclusively resolved for summary judgment purposes the(cid:13) first prong of the qualified immunity analysis.(cid:13) The law of the case doctrine "limits relitigation of an(cid:13) issue once it has been decided" in an earlier stage of the(cid:13) same litigation. In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d(cid:13) 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2002). We apply the doctrine with the(cid:13) intent that it will promote finality, consistency, and judicial(cid:13) economy. In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 158 F.3d 711,(cid:13) 717-18 (3d Cir. 1998). Reconsideration of a previously(cid:13) decided issue may, however, be appropriate in certain(cid:13) circumstances, including when the record contains new(cid:13) evidence. Id. at 718; Bridge v. United States Parole Comm’n,(cid:13) 981 F.2d 97, 103 (3d Cir. 1992). This exception to the law(cid:13) of the case doctrine makes sense because when the record(cid:13) contains new evidence, "the question has not really been(cid:13) decided earlier and is posed for the first time." Bridge, 981(cid:13) F.2d at 103. But this is so only if the new evidence differs(cid:13) materially from the evidence of record when the issue was(cid:13) first decided and if it provides less support for that(cid:13) decision. City of Philadelphia Litig., 158 F.3d at 720.(cid:13) Accordingly, if the evidence at the two stages of litigation is(cid:13) "substantially similar," or if the evidence at the latter stage(cid:13) provides more support for the decision made earlier, the(cid:13) law of the case doctrine will apply. Id.(cid:13) 16(cid:13) Our decision in Hamilton I that the record evidence did(cid:13) not permit the entry of summary judgment in favor of the(cid:13) defendants in the case at that time (Leavy, Faulkner,(cid:13) Queener, and Lewis) does constitute the law of the case as(cid:13) to that evidence and those defendants. Between Hamilton I(cid:13) and the District Court’s rejection of the qualified immunity(cid:13) defense, however, the parties engaged in discovery and(cid:13) supplemented the record. If the record now contains(cid:13) evidence materially deviating from the evidence in the(cid:13) record when we decided Hamilton I, the application of the(cid:13) law of the case doctrine may be inapplicable to the(cid:13) defendants in Hamilton I. Because of the factual nature of(cid:13) this determination, and because we cannot be certain that(cid:13) the District Court applied the law of the case doctrine, we(cid:13) remand for the Court to decide in the first instance whether(cid:13) that doctrine applies.(cid:13) Between Hamilton I and the District Court’s decision,(cid:13) Hamilton also amended the complaint to include additional(cid:13) defendants. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that"[t]he(cid:13) law of the case doctrine should not be read so rigidly that(cid:13) it precludes a party from raising an argument that it had(cid:13) no prior opportunity to raise." United States v. Dexter, 165(cid:13) F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Bagola v. Kindt,(cid:13) 131 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1997)). The defendants added(cid:13) since Hamilton I lacked the opportunity to argue that they(cid:13) had not violated Hamilton’s Eighth Amendment rights. On(cid:13) remand, they will have the opportunity to do so. We(cid:13) recognize, however, that the Hamilton I decision, though(cid:13) "not controlling, . . . is highly persuasive authority for the(cid:13) issues it addressed." Id.(cid:13) Turning to the second prong of the qualified immunity(cid:13) defense, the District Court held that "Hamilton’s right to be(cid:13) protected from known risks was clearly established in(cid:13) August 5, 1992." As we have previously explained, however,(cid:13) "to defeat qualified immunity it is not sufficient that the(cid:13) right at issue be clearly established as a general matter.(cid:13) Rather, the question is whether a reasonable public official(cid:13) would know that his or her specific conduct violated clearly(cid:13) established rights." Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116,(cid:13) 121 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S.(cid:13) 635, 636-37 (1987)) (emphasis in original); Saucier, 533(cid:13) 17(cid:13) U.S. at 202. Because we do not know what "specific(cid:13) conduct" the District Court on remand will consider(cid:13) sufficiently established for summary judgment purposes,(cid:13) we remand without addressing the question whether(cid:13) Hamilton can withstand the defendants’ summary(cid:13) judgment motion to the extent it argues that they did not(cid:13) violate any clearly established law.(cid:13) CONCLUSION(cid:13) The District Court correctly concluded that the(cid:13) defendants have not established that they are entitled to(cid:13) absolute immunity on the ground that the Superior Court’s(cid:13) orders prohibited them from providing Hamilton with(cid:13) effective safety measures. We remand, however, for the(cid:13) Court to reconsider whether they are entitled to quasi-(cid:13) judicial absolute immunity. Finally, the District Court on(cid:13) remand should address also the applicability of the law of(cid:13) the case doctrine and whether the defendants should(cid:13) receive qualified immunity.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 18
