363 F. App'x 767
2d Cir.
2010

Kenrick HAMILTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tammy L. HAMILTON-GRINOLS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 08-6111-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Feb. 1, 2010.

362 Fed. Appx. 767

the REAL ID Act, the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction over his § 2241 petition.

The district court properly declined to transfer Meleance‘s petition to this Court. Although the REAL ID Act directs district courts to transfer § 2241 petitions to the appropriate Court of Appeals, that provision applies only to petitions that were pending at the time the REAL ID Act was enacted. See De Ping Wang v. Dep‘t of Homeland Sec., 484 F.3d 615, 616-17 (2d Cir.2007). Meleance filed his § 2241 petition well afterward.

Although 28 U.S.C. § 1631 permits a district court to transfer an appeal mistakenly filed in the wrong court, the district court may do so only if the “appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. A petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision must be filed within 30 days of the agency‘s decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Transfer from the district court is not permitted pursuant to § 1631 if the petition is improperly and untimely filed in the district court, because this Court would lack jurisdiction to consider it had the petition been filed in this Court at that time. See De Ping Wang, 484 F.3d at 618. The BIA denied Meleance‘s motion to reopen on September 12, 2007; that constituted a final order, so he had until October 12, 2007 to file a timely petition for review. See Malvoisin v. INS, 268 F.3d 74, 75 (2d Cir.2001). Meleance did not file his § 2241 petition until October 30, 2007 at the earliest. The district court correctly declined to transfer the untimely petition. See De Ping Wang, 484 F.3d at 618.

To the extent Meleance sought to raise a nationality claim based on his father‘s naturalization, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it because it is untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), 1252(b)(5)(C); Malvoisin, 268 F.3d at 75.

Finally, to the extent Meleance originally sought to raise an as-applied Suspension Clause challenge to the REAL ID Act of 2005, he fails to raise such a claim in his brief and it is therefore waived on appeal. See Norton v. Sam‘s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.“).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED and the pending motion for a stay removal is DENIED as moot.

Kenrick Hamilton, Alexandria, VA, pro se.

No Appearances, for Appellee.

PRESENT: WALKER, CHESTER J. STRAUB, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Kenrick Hamilton, pro se, appeals the district court‘s (Telesca, J.) sua sponte dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We dismiss Hamilton‘s appeal for want of subject matter jurisdiction. “It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction’ and lack the power to disregard such limits as have been imposed by the Constitution or Congress.” Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson, & Cortese-Costa, P.C. v. Dupont, 565 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978)). Hamilton‘s complaint suggests no basis for federal question jurisdiction, as he is not suing under the Constitution or any federal laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Nor has Hamilton pled any basis for a federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction in the matter because, although Hamilton and the defendant are alleged to be diverse in citizenship, Hamilton failed to plead any amount in controversy, let alone an amount in excess of $75,000. See id. at § 1332(a)(1); see also Lupo v. Human Affairs Int‘l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T2he party asserting diversity jurisdiction in federal court has the burden of establishing the existence of the jurisdictional amount in controversy.“). In fact, it appears that Hamilton is not seeking to recover any money damages exclusive of costs and fees; rather, the gravamen of his complaint is that he wishes to have the district court remove his name from joint loans with his ex-wife that have gone into default, so as not to jeopardize his employment with the Department of Homeland Security.

Finally, remand to the district court so that the pro se plaintiff may amend his pleading is not appropriate in the circumstances of this case. Even to the extent that Hamilton‘s complaint could be amended to include the requisite amount in controversy and abandon the claims of child support and visitation rights, under the facts pled, his remaining claim seeking to have this Court remove his name from loans held jointly with his wife would be precluded by the domestic relations doctrine exception to the court‘s jurisdiction. Under this exception, federal courts are divested of jurisdiction in “cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree,” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992), and should further abstain from exercising jurisdiction over cases “on the verge” of being matrimonial in nature, Amer. Airlines v. Block, 905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir.1990) (per curiam). Hamilton‘s request to have a federal court remove his name from jointly-held loans is grounded in his ex-wife‘s purported violation of a New York state court Order for Temporary Support and a New York state court Final Judgement of Divorce, both of which, in addition to assigning responsibility for outstanding loans and debts, distribute marital property and provide for child custody arrangements and child support. The obligation that Hamilton seeks to enforce is thus “matrimonial in nature” and is best left to the “greater interest and expertise of state courts in this field.” Id.; see also McLaughlin v. Cotner, 193 F.3d 410, 411, 413-14 (6th Cir.1999) (refusing jurisdiction under the domestic relations exception in case where wife sought to enforce divorce decree requiring husband to sell jointly-owned real estate).

We conclude that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case, and it is thus

DISMISSED.

* The Honorable Mark R. Kravitz, of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.