108 Cal. 273 | Cal. | 1895
Coronado Beach, formerly known as the peninsula of San Diego, was for several years the subject of dispute as to whether it was within or without the territorial limits of the city of San Diego. A decision of the former district court, rendered in the year 1877, held it to be no part of such city; from the judgment in that case—not entered until eleven years later «—an appeal was taken to this court, where the judgment was' reversed, and it was determined that said peninsula is “ within the limits of the city of San Diego, and land situated on said peninsula is subject to assessment and taxation for city purposes.” (San Diego v. Granniss, 77 Cal. 511.) This was in December, 1888. The question arose in other forms (People v. San Diego, 85 Cal. 369; Fisher v. Police Court, 86 Cal. 158); but the case of San Diego v. Granniss, supra, remained authoritative as to the legal questions decided—not to say the points of local geography involved—and established that the peninsula was, and had been since the passage of the act to reincorporate the city of San Diego, April 1, 1876, an integral part of the city.
. The present case grew out of that controversy. In January, 1887, the peninsula being then regarded as without the limits of the city, the board of supervisors of San Diego county took the proper formal steps for the organization of a school district comprising that portion of the peninsula called Coronado Beach, South Island, under the name of “ Coronado school district of San Diego county.” And the case shows that from and after January 10,1887, during a period of some four years, the said so-styled Coronado school district (although Coronado Beach, South Island, was wholly within the boundaries of the city of San Diego, in said county, and was part of the territory of the San Diego school district, constituted by said city), assumed to exercise and did exercise all the powers and franchises and dis
There was a complaint in intervention filed by a new “ Coronado school district,” alleging, among other matters, that on October 16, 1890, the territory included within said former so-called Coronado school district was regularly segregated and excluded from the city of San Diego and from said San Diego school district; that thereafter the territory so excluded was incorporated into and named the City of Coronado, and a new school district was thereby formed, now known and described as “Coronado school district”—the intervenor. We may suppose that the exclusion of such territory was accomplished in virtue of the proceedings required by the judgment in People v. San Diego, 85 Cal. 369. Said intervenor further alleged “ that said intervening school district is the successor of said first-described Coronado school district, and, as such, is the owner of, and is entitled to, the use of said money deposited in the county treasury,” and prayed that the court “ decree that, since said money cannot be applied to the purpose for which it was paid in, that it be applied as nearly as possible to such purposes, to wit, paying for school-buildings for said intervening school district.” The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint of the intervenor on the grounds that it had no interest in the matter in litigation, and for want of facts to constitute a cause of action against any of the other parties, and dismissed its complaint. Plaintiff recovered judgment, directing that the amount claimed by him and costs “ be paid out of the special so-called fund known as the Coronado school bond and interest fund.” Defendants appeal from the judgment and an order denying a new trial, and the intervenor appeals from the judgment dismissing its complaint.
We are to inquire if there was such an attempt to impress the character of a corporation upon the Coronado school district, followed by the assumption and discharge on its part of the duties pertaining to such district, as to bring it within the operation of those principles of public policy by reason of which the law will impute to it for some purposes the status of a lawful corporation, that is, will treat it as a corporation de facto. 1. In the first place, although a part of the district composed of the city of San Diego, yet it w'as legally capable of segregation as an independent district. (Pol. Code, sec. 1576.) 2. The board of supervisors of the county was a body having power under the law to organize new school districts in San Diego county. The respondent says the
We are of opinion that the district had a de facto existence. In the elements above enumerated we see nothing wanting to give the color of legality to its organization, or to render it impolitic to allow the collateral impeachment of such existence. The same rule which recognizes officers de facto applies to corporations de facto (Clement v. Everest, 29 Mich. 20); it is one of policy—to prevent public confusion and private injustice; and it seems to be settled that one assuming to act as a public officer may in some cases be such de facto., although he has not color of election or appointment by the only body which has power to elect or appoint him, and although the appointing or electing body under which he assumes to act had not the legal power. (State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; 9 Am. Rep. 409; 5 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 103.) The order of the board of supervisors purporting to create the district was the formal exercise of legislative power (Hughes v. Ewing, 93 Cal. 417); and thereunder every thing having been done to constitute the district a corporation colorably, if not legally, the law, as we see it, refuses in this incidental way, to declare all its proceedings void. (Attorney General v. Stevens, 1 N. J. Eq. 378; 22 Am. Dec. 526.)
The constitution of Tennessee provided that- no line of any new county created by the legislature should approach nearer than eleven miles of the courthouse of any existing county. An act was passed forming a new county, under which one of the lines was established within the prohibited distance, but this circumstance did not appear on the face of the act; it was therefore on its face not unconstitutional. The new county collected taxes and exercised other jurisdictional rights' up to the line so fixed. Held, that, so long as the older county acquiesced in the boundary which cut off part of
Since the Coronado school district had a de facto existence the plaintiff could not have enjoined the collection of the taxes, nor have resisted an action for the same, on the ground of illegality of its organization (Quint v. Hoffman, 103 Cal. 506; Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 406; Reclamation Dist. v. Turner, 104 Cal. 334; Swamp Land Dist. v. Silver, 98 Cal. 51); and for reasons at ■■ least as strong should not recover the money when paid. | It follows also that the intervenor has no standing to claim the money in dispute. Under section 1887 of the | Political Code the taxes when collected were required j to be “ paid into the county treasury to the credit of ' such district, and be used for the payment of the princi- ^ pal and interest of said bonds, and for no other purpose” ; and, whether the holders of the bonds have any further remedy on the same or not, a subject on which we intimate no opinion, it seems to us clear that on the facts disclosed by the present record they are entitled to the fund in question to the exclusion of both the plaintiff and the intervenor. The judgment dismissing the intervenor’s complaint should be affirmed, and the judg- , meut against the defendants and the order denying j their motion for new trial should be reversed.
Searls, C., and Belcher, C., concurred.
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment dismissing the interveuor’s complaint is affirmed and the judgment against the defendants and the order denying their motion for new trial are reversed.
Garoutte, J., Harrison, J., Van Fleet, J.