OPINION OF THE COURT
In January 1995 plaintiffs — relatives of people killed by handguns — sued 49 handgun manufacturers in Federal court alleging negligent marketing, design defect, ultra-hazardous activity and fraud. A number of defendants jointly moved for summary judgment. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Weinstein, J.), dismissed the product liability and fraud causes of action, but retained plaintiffs’ negligent marketing claim
(see, Hamilton v Accu-Tek,
Plaintiffs asserted that defendants distributed their products negligently so as to create and bolster an illegal, underground market in handguns, one that furnished weapons to minors and criminals involved in the shootings that precipitated this *230 lawsuit. Because only one of the guns was recovered, plaintiffs were permitted over defense objections to proceed on a market share theory of liability against all the manufacturers, asserting that they were severally liable for failing to implement safe marketing and distribution procedures, and that this failure sent a high volume of guns into the underground market.
After a four-week trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding 15 of the 25 defendants failed to use reasonable care in the distribution of their guns. Of those 15, nine were found to have proximately caused the deaths of the decedents of two plaintiffs, but no damages were awarded. The jury awarded damages against three defendants — American Arms, Beretta U.S.A. and Taurus International Manufacturing — upon a finding that they proximately caused the injuries suffered by Fox and his mother (in the amounts of $3.95 million and $50,000, respectively). Liability was apportioned among each of the three defendants according to their share of the national handgun market: for American Arms, 0.23% ($9,000); for Beretta, 6.03% ($241,000); and for Taurus, 6.80% ($272,000).
Defendants unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 50 (b). The District Court articulated several theories for imposing a duty on defendants “to take reasonable steps available at the point of * * * sale to primary distributors to reduce the possibility that these instruments will fall into the hands of those likely to misuse them”
(Hamilton v Accu-Tek,
On appeal, the Second Circuit certified the following questions to us:
“(1) Whether the defendants owed plaintiffs a duty *231 to exercise reasonable care in the marketing and distribution of the handguns they manufacture?
“(2) Whether liability in this case may be apportioned on a market share basis, and if so, how?” (see, Hamilton v Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,222 F3d 36 , 39).
We accepted certification (
Parties’ Arguments
Plaintiffs argue that defendant-manufacturers have a duty to exercise reasonable care in the marketing and distribution of their guns based upon four factors: (1) defendants’ ability to exercise control over the marketing and distribution of their guns, (2) defendants’ general knowledge that large numbers of their guns enter the illegal market and are used in crime, (3) New York’s policy of strict regulation of firearms and (4) the uniquely lethal nature of defendants’ products.
According to plaintiffs, handguns move into the underground market in New York through several well-known and documented means including straw purchases (a friend, relative or accomplice acts as purchaser of the weapon for another), sales at gun shows, misuse of Federal firearms licenses and sales by non-stocking dealers (i.e., those operating informal businesses without a retail storefront). Plaintiffs further assert that gun manufacturers have oversaturated markets in states with weak gun control laws (primarily in the Southeast), knowing those “excess guns” will make their way into the hands of criminals in states with stricter laws such as New York, thus “profiting” from indiscriminate sales in weak gun states. Plaintiffs contend that defendants control their distributors’ conduct with respect to pricing, advertising and display, yet refuse to institute practices such as requiring distribution contracts that limit sales to stocking gun dealers, training salespeople in safe sales practices (including how to recognize straw purchasers), establishing electronic monitoring of their products, limiting the number of distributors, limiting multiple purchases and franchising their retail outlets.
Defendants counter that they do not owe a duty to members of the public to protect them from the criminal acquisition and misuse of their handguns. Defendants assert that such a duty— potentially exposing them to limitless liability — should not be imposed on them for acts and omissions of numerous and *232 remote third parties over which they have no control. Further, they contend that, in light of the comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme governing the distribution and sale of firearms, any fundamental changes in the industry should be left to the appropriate legislative and regulatory bodies.
The Duty Equation
The threshold question in any negligence action is: does defendant owe a legally recognized duty of care to plaintiff? Courts traditionally “fix the duty point by balancing factors, including the reasonable expectations of parties and society generally, the proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like liability, disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, and public policies affecting the expansion or limitation of new channels of liability”
(Palka v Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp.,
Foreseeability, alone, does not define duty — it merely determines the scope of the duty once it is determined to exist
(see, Pulka v Edelman,
The District Court imposed a duty on gun manufacturers “to take reasonable steps available at the point of * * * sale to primary distributors to reduce the possibility that these instruments will fall into the hands of those likely to misuse them”
(Hamilton v Accu-Tek, supra,
A duty may arise, however, where there is a relationship either between defendant and a third-person tortfeasor that encompasses defendant’s actual control of the third person’s actions, or between defendant and plaintiff that requires defendant to protect plaintiff from the conduct of others. Examples of these relationships include master and servant, parent and child, and common carriers and their passengers.
The key in each is that the defendant’s relationship with either the tortfeasor or the plaintiff places the defendant in the best position to protect against the risk of harm. In addition, the specter of limitless liability is not present because the class of potential plaintiffs to whom the duty is owed is circumscribed by the relationship. We have, for instance, recognized that landowners have a duty to protect tenants, patrons or invitees from foreseeable harm caused by the criminal conduct of others while they are on the premises
(see, e.g., Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc.,
A similar rationale is relevant here. The pool of possible plaintiffs is very large — potentially, any of the thousands of *234 victims of gun violence. 1 Further, the connection between defendants, the criminal wrongdoers and plaintiffs is remote, running through several links in a chain consisting of at least the manufacturer, the federally licensed distributor or wholesaler, and the first retailer. The chain most often includes numerous subsequent legal purchasers or even a thief. 2 Such broad liability, potentially encompassing all gunshot crime victims, should not be imposed without a more tangible showing that defendants were a direct link in the causal chain that resulted in plaintiffs’ injuries, and that defendants were realistically in a position to prevent the wrongs. Giving plaintiffs’ evidence the benefit of every favorable inference, they have not shown that the gun used to harm plaintiff Fox came from a source amenable to the exercise of any duty of care that plaintiffs would impose upon defendant manufacturers.
Plaintiffs make two alternative arguments in support of a duty determination here. The first arises from a manufacturer’s “special ability to detect and guard against the risks associated with [its] products [and] warrants placing all manufacturers, including these defendants, in a
protective relationship with those foreseeably and potentially put in harm’s way by their products” (Hamilton v Accu-Tek, supra,
*235
As we noted earlier, a duty and the corresponding liability it imposes do
not
rise from mere foreseeability of the harm (see,
Pulka, supra,
The cases involving the distribution or handling of hazardous materials, relied upon by plaintiffs, do not support the imposition of a duty of care in marketing handguns. The manufacturer’s duty in each case was based either on a products liability theory — that is, the product was defective because of the failure to include a safety feature — or on a failure to warn
(see, e.g., Hunnings v Texaco, Inc.,
Plaintiffs also assert that a general duty of care arises out of the gun manufacturers’ ability to reduce the risk of illegal gun trafficking through control of the marketing and distribution of their products. The District Court accepted this proposition and posited a series of structural changes in defendants’
*236
marketing and distribution regimes that might “reduce the risk of criminal misuse by ensuring that the first sale was by a responsible merchant to a responsible buyer”
(Hamilton v Accu-Tek, supra,
Finally, plaintiffs and the District Court identify an alternative basis for imposing a duty of care here under the negligent entrustment doctrine, arising out of the firearms manufacturers’ authority over “downstream distributors and retailers” to whom their products are delivered
(see, Hamilton v Accu-Tek, supra,
The tort of negligent entrustment is based on the degree of knowledge the supplier of a chattel has or should have concerning the entrustee’s propensity to use the chattel in an improper or dangerous fashion. Gun sales have subjected suppliers to liability under this theory
(see, Splawnik, supra; see also, Cullum & Boren-McCain Mall v Peacock,
The negligent entrustment doctrine might well support the extension of a duty to manufacturers to avoid selling to certain distributors in circumstances where the manufacturer knows or has reason to know those distributors are engaging in substantial sales of guns into the gun-trafficking market on a consistent basis. 5 6 Here, however, plaintiffs did not present such evidence. Instead, they claimed that manufacturers should not engage in certain broad categories of sales. Once again, plaintiffs’ duty calculation comes up short. General statements about an industry are not the stuff by which a common-law court fixes the duty point. Without a showing that specific *238 groups of dealers play a disproportionate role in supplying the illegal gun market, the sweep of plaintiffs’ duty theory is far wider than the danger it seeks to avert. 6
At trial, plaintiffs’ experts did surmise that since manufacturers receive crime gun trace requests conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, they could analyze those requests to locate retailers who disproportionately served as crime gun sources, and cut off distributors who do business with them. In essence, plaintiffs argue that defendants had an affirmative duty to investigate and identify corrupt dealers. This is neither feasible nor appropriate for the manufacturers.
Plaintiffs’ experts explained that a crime gun trace is the means by which the BATF reconstructs the distribution history of a gun used in a crime or recovered by the police. 7 While manufacturers may be generally aware of traces for which they are contacted, they are not told the purpose of the trace, nor *239 are they informed of the results. 8 The BATF does not disclose any subsequently acquired retailer or purchaser information to the manufacturer. Moreover, manufacturers are not in a position to acquire such information on their own. Indeed, plaintiffs’ law enforcement experts agreed that manufacturers should not make any attempt to investigate illegal gun trafficking on their own since such attempts could disrupt pending criminal investigations and endanger the lives of undercover officers.
Federal law already has implemented a statutory and regulatory scheme to ensure seller “responsibility” through licensing requirements and buyer “responsibility” through background checks. 9 While common-law principles can supplement a *240 manufacturer’s statutory duties, we should be cautious in imposing novel theories of tort liability while the difficult problem of illegal gun sales in the United States remains the focus of a national policy debate (see, Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers, supra, 65 Mo L Rev, at' 52-54 [analyzing courts’ capacities and limitations in analyzing complex statistical data]).
In sum, analysis of this State’s longstanding precedents demonstrates that defendants — given the evidence presented here — did not owe plaintiffs the duty they claim; we therefore answer the first certified question in the negative.
Market Share Liability
The Second Circuit has asked us also to determine if our market share liability jurisprudence is applicable to this case. Having concluded that these defendant-manufacturers did not owe the claimed duty to these plaintiffs, we arguably need not reach the market share issue. However, because of its particularly significant role in this case, it seems prudent to answer the second question.
Market share liability provides an exception to the general rule that in common-law negligence actions, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of the injury. This Court first examined and adopted the market share theory of liability in
Hymowitz v Eli Lilly & Co.
(
Circumstances here are markedly different. Unlike DES, guns are not identical, fungible products. Significantly, it is often possible to identify the caliber and manufacturer of the *241 handgun that caused injury to a particular plaintiff. 10 Even more importantly — given the negligent marketing theory on which plaintiffs tried this case — plaintiffs have never asserted that the manufacturers’ marketing techniques were uniform. Each manufacturer engaged in different marketing activities that allegedly contributed to the illegal handgun market in different ways and to different extents. Plaintiffs made no attempt to establish the relative fault of each manufacturer, but instead sought to hold them all liable based simply on market share. 11
In Hymowitz, each manufacturer engaged in tortious conduct parallel to that of all other manufacturers, creating the same risk to the public at large by manufacturing the same defective product. Market share was an accurate reflection of the risk they posed. Here, the distribution and sale of every gun is not equally negligent, nor does it involve a defective product. Defendants engaged in widely-varied conduct creating varied risks. Thus, a manufacturer’s share of the national handgun market does not necessarily correspond to the amount of risk created by its alleged tortious conduct. No case has applied the market share theory of liability to such varied conduct and wisely so.
We recognize the difficulty in proving precisely which manufacturer caused any particular plaintiff’s injuries since crime guns are often not recovered. Inability to locate evidence, however, does not alone justify the extraordinary step of applying market share liability
(see, Healey v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
Notably, courts in New York and other jurisdictions have refused to extend the market share theory where products were not fungible and differing degrees of risk were created
(see, e.g., Brenner v American Cyanamid Co.,
This case challenges us to rethink traditional notions of duty, liability and causation. Tort law is ever changing; it is a reflection of the complexity and vitality of daily life. Although plaintiffs have presented us with a novel theory — negligent marketing of a potentially lethal yet legal product, based upon the acts not of one manufacturer, but of an industry — we are unconvinced that, on the record before us, the duty plaintiffs wish to impose is either reasonable or circumscribed. Nor does the market share theory of liability accurately measure defendants’ conduct. Whether, in a different case, a duty may arise remains a question for the future.
Accordingly, both certified questions should be answered in the negative.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Smith, Levine, Ciparick, Rosenblatt and Graffeo concur.
Following certification of questions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and acceptance of the *243 questions by this Court pursuant to section 500.17 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.17), and after hearing argument by counsel for the parties and consideration of the briefs and the record submitted, certified questions answered in the negative.
Notes
. According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s Statistical Abstract for the U.S., there were 7,402 murders by handguns in 1998 (see, U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2000, Table No. 333). This figure does not separately identify legal/illegal handgun deaths. In 1997, there were 39,400 gunshot wounds treated in hospital emergency rooms. For 59% of the victims of nonfatal gunshot wounds, the type of firearm was unknown. Where the firearm was known, 82% were shot by handguns, but additional details about the firearm used are not given (see, Firearms and Crime Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics <http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/webdocs/guns.htm>; see also, Zawitz and Strom, Firearm Injury and Death From Crime, 1993-1997, Bureau of Justice Statistics: Selected Findings, at 4 [Oct. 2000] <http:// www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/webdocs/fidc9397.pdf>).
. .One of the original plaintiffs was Katina Johnstone. Her husband was killed with a Smith & Wesson revolver. The gun was recovered and traced to its lawful owner, who had reported it missing after a burglary of his home two weeks before the shooting. Johnstone’s case was transferred to Federal court in California
(Hamilton v Accu-Tek,
. For example, limiting the volume of sales in states with weak gun controls to insure against circulation of the oversupply to strong gun control states such as New York; restricting distribution entirely to established retail stores carrying stocks of guns; franchising of retail outlets; and barring distribution to dealers who sell at unregulated gun shows
(see, Hamilton v Accu-Tek,
. See, Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers For Crime-Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 Mo L Rev 1, 41.
. An analysis of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) data for 1998 reveals that a very small number of FFLs do account for a significant portion of guns used in crimes. “Just 1.2 percent of dealers — 1,020 of the approximately 83,200 licensed retail dealers and pawnbrokers — accounted for over 57 percent of the crime guns traced to current dealers in 1998” (see, Commerce in Firearms in the United States, BATF Document, at 2 [Feb. 2000] <http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/webdocs/020400report.pdf>). However, the data does not reveal whether any given FFL’s high incidence of crime gun sales is attributable to irresponsible conduct, or merely reflects a high volume of legal sales or some other activity (such as theft) over which the FFL has no control. BATF has “targeted” those dealers to “determine the reasons for diversion of firearms from this relatively small proportion of dealers” (id.). Because of BATF’s continued pursuit in identifying how handguns enter the illegal market, it may well be that a core group of corrupt FFLs will emerge at some future time. This might alter the duty equation.
. Our decision is in accord with most jurisdictions that have considered this issue
(see, e.g., Armijo v Ex Cam,
843 F2d 406 [10th Cir 1998],
affg
. Tracing involves the process of tracking a recovered crime gun’s history from its source through the chain of distribution to its first retail purchaser. If the BATF is unable to trace the gun from its own records, it contacts the manufacturer and asks for the identity of the federally licensed distributor to whom the gun was sold. The BATF then follows up with the named distributor and the subsequently named retailer to determine the identity of the first purchaser (see, Commerce in Firearms in the United States, BATF Document, at 19-20 [Feb. 2000] <http:www.courts.state.ny.us/ reporter/webdocs/020400report.pdf>; Crime Gun Trace Analysis Reports: The Illegal Youth Firearms Market in 27 Communities, 1998 Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative, BATF Document, at 5 [Feb. 1999] <http:// www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/webdocs/termused.pdf>).
. In fact, the “ATF emphasizes that the appearance of [an FFL] or a first unlicensed purchaser of record in association with a crime gun or in association with multiple crime guns in no way suggests that either the FFL or the first purchaser has committed criminal acts. Rather, such information may provide a starting point for further and more detailed investigation” (Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative, supra, at 17 chttp:// www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/webdocs/updatel.pdf>).
. Gun manufacturers must be licensed by the Federal government in order to produce, deal and ship firearms in interstate commerce (see, 18 USC § 922 [a] [1] [A]; § 923 [a]; 27 CFR 178.41 [a]). Manufacturers may sell only to licensed importers, licensed dealers, or licensed collectors (see, 18 USC § 922 [a] [2]). Manufacturers must keep records of each firearm they make and sell, including the firearm’s type, model, caliber, serial number, as well as information about the purchaser (see, 18 USC § 923 [g] [1] [A]; 27 CFR 178.123 [a], [b]). Any firearm shipped must bear a unique and permanent serial number and the manufacturer’s identity (see, 18 USC § 922 [k]; § 923 [i]; 27 CFR 178.34, 178.92 [a] [1].).
Like manufacturers, firearms dealers must also be licensed by the Federal government
(see,
18 USC § 922 [a] [1] [A]; § 923 [a]; 27 CFR 178.41 [a]). As the “principal agent of federal enforcement”
(Huddleston v United States,
Licensees must keep records of all multiple sales to unlicensed persons (see, 18 USC § 923 [g] [3] [A]). Additionally, all licensees must report any theft or loss of a firearm to appropriate authorities within 48 hours (see, id., § 923 [g] [6]). The BATF oversees compliance with Federal requirements and is charged with enforcing this entire regulatory scheme (see generally, 27 CFR parts 178 and 179). Dealers face criminal penalties and license revocation for intentional unlawful sales (see, 18 USC §§ 924, 923 [e]; 27 CFR 178.73 [a]).
. We note that New York has recently become the second State in the nation to establish a new “fingerprinting” system for identifying guns by the distinctive marks on their shell casings (see, General Business Law § 396-ff).
. Plaintiffs do not contend that negligent marketing of handguns is the sole source of handguns used in crime. They acknowledge that some injuries from handguns will still occur. Indeed, the District Court, using BATF data, assessed the enhanced risk at 33% leaving a significant probability that plaintiffs’ injuries from unidentified weapons came from guns that had not been negligently marketed
(see, Hamilton v Accu-Tek, supra,
