274 Mass. 477 | Mass. | 1931
This is a complaint under G. L. c. 59, § 65, by way of appeal from the refusal of the assessors of the defendant to abate taxes assessed as of April 1, 1927, upon the land, buildings and machinery of the complainant. The case, after being referred to a commissioner, was heard upon his report and other evidence by a judge of the Superior Court.
Both parties alleged exceptions and filed separate bills of exceptions. In each is printed the comprehensive and long report of the commissioner. This was a needless expense and a troublesome increase in the bulk of the papers. A single copy of that report would have been better. The parties doubtless could have agreed as to the division of the expense of printing it. If not, the court could have made an order as to such division. Barrell v. Globe Newspaper Co. 268 Mass. 99.
The first contention of the defendant is that the complainant is not a “ person aggrieved ” by the taxes assessed upon it or by the refusal of assessors to abate that tax within the meaning of G. L. c. 59, §§ 59, 64, 65, and hence cannot prevail. The facts pertinent to the determination of that contention are these: The complainant, once a highly prosperous manufacturer of cotton goods, had fallen into financial distress. After numerous, ineffectual attempts at rehabilitation, receivers were appointed, manufacturing was discontinued, and the receivers were authorized to accept an offer of $700,000 for the physical property. See Boucher v. Hamilton Manuf. Co. 259 Mass. 259, where proceedings touching that matter are set forth. Shortly after the decree of the Superior Court authorizing the sale, and pursuant thereto, an agreement was made for the sale, conveyance to be made on or before March 15, 1927. The purchaser, however, declined to go through with the transaction until litigation involving the validity of that decree had been determined by the Supreme Judicial Court;.but on April 14, 1927, the day following the
The words “ person aggrieved ” in these sections of the tax law “ mean one whose pecuniary interests are or mabe adversely affected.” Hough v. North Adams, 196 Mass. 290, 291. Essex Co. v. Lawrence, 214 Mass. 79, 87. We are of opinion that the complainant was a person aggrieved in this sense. It was the owner of record and the owner in fact of the property upon which the assessment was laid. The tax was rightly assessed. One of several causes might have prevented the performance of the agreement for the sale of the property. The decree authorizing the sale might have been reversed by the full court. The purchaser might have been disabled financially from carrying it out. The agreement might have been abrogated by the parties. The property might have been destroyed in substantial part. Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221. The agreement between the seller and the buyer of the property that the latter should assume and pay the taxes was in no way binding upon the collector of taxes. He was not a party to it. Whether he could under any circumstances become a party to such an agreement need not be considered. The primary obligation to pay the taxes rested upon The Hamilton Manufacturing Company. But for the receivership, the collector of taxes might have brought an action at law against that
The proceedings may be prosecuted in the name of the complainant by the purchaser as the person beneficially interested. Hart v. Western Rail Road, 13 Met. 99, 106. Goodrich v. Stevens, 116 Mass. 170. Fay v. Guynon, 131 Mass. 31.
The complainant was the owner of the property upon which the tax was assessed on April 1, and until April 14, 1927. It was, therefore, the taxpayer, the person subject to taxation and the only one to file the true list of its property subject to taxation on the taxing date as founda
The contention of the defendant that it is entitled to prevail because the tax was not paid before the complaint was filed cannot be supported. It is provided by G. L. c. 59, § 68, that, “ If, on hearing, the court finds that the complainant has complied with all the provisions of law and has paid the tax for which he has been assessed, it may grant him a reasonable abatement.” There is nothing in these words fixing any date before which the tax must be paid, except that on the hearing it must be found to be paid. There is nothing in the history or the context of these statutory words to justify the construction that the tax must be paid before the proceeding can be instituted. Payment must be made before the abatement can be granted. That is the only requirement. Commonwealth Investment Co. v. Brookline, 268 Mass. 32. Proceedings for abatement before the county commissioners under G. L. c. 59, § 64, may be instituted before payment of the tax. Milford v. County Commissioners, 213 Mass. 162, 164. An appeal to the Superior Court for abatement under G. L. c. 59, § 65, is “ subject to the same conditions ” as are provided in § 64. Compare G. L. c. 59, § 68A, as amended by St. 1929, c. 212. If the General Court had intended that payment of the tax should be a prerequisite to filing the complaint, clear language to that end would have been used. The proceeding in Bogigian v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 248 Mass. 545, was brought under G. L. c. 62, § 47, whereby prepayment of the tax is required as a condition to filing the complaint. Nothing in that decision was intended
Proceedings for abatement of taxes, although in the nature of an action at law, are prescribed throughout by the statute, and the rules as to procedure in actions at common law are not applicable. No process is required to be served in such complaint. Cheney v. Dover, 205 Mass. 501, 503. Cases like Freeman v. Hedrington, 204 Mass. 238, to the effect that the cause of action must have arisen in completeness before the suing out of the writ, are not controlling.
The taxes in question finally were paid in part by the purchaser of the property and in part by those to whom it was sold by the purchaser. This payment was adequate compliance with the provision of said § 68. It was an authorized payment in behalf of the complainant. It was made as a result of a previous agreement between the complainant and the purchaser. It would have been a vain ceremony for those, upon whom ultimately the contractual obligations to pay the taxes rested, to pass the money to the complainant to be handed by it to the collector of taxes. The payment was in execution of a contractual obligation to which the complainant was a party. It was made in substance at its request and for its benefit. The case at bar on this point is distinguishable from decisions like Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Green, 185 Mass. 306.
The complainant returned a list of its property subject to taxation on April 1, 1927, as required by G. L. c. 59, §61. In that list was included a detailed description and enumeration of all its machinery accompanied by a valuation. There was added to the list a statement that the “ entire plant has not been operated since October, 1926, and due consideration should be given the fact that the machinery has not produced any material and has actually been of no value.” The defendant urges that the complainant is thereby estopped now to contend that the machinery was not subject to taxation. It is manifest that the assessors of Lowell were- not misled by the list.
Question is raised as to the taxability of the machinery of the complainant as located and set up in its mill buildings on April 1, 1927. It is contended by the complainant that this machinery did not come within the descriptive terms of the statutes subjecting machinery to local taxation. By G. L. c. 59, § 18, Second, as amended by St. 1924, c. 321, § 2, “ Machinery employed in any branch of manufacture ... or, in the case of domestic business . . . corporations . . . machinery used in the conduct of their business, shall be assessed where . . . situated . . . „” The same statement in substance is found, in enumerating some exceptions to certain exemptions of property from local taxation, in G. L. c. 59, § 5, Sixteenth, as amended by St. 1926, c. 279, § 1, whereby there is exempted from local taxation specified property “. . . other than machinery used in manufacture . . . and other than machinery used in the conduct of the business, owned by domestic business corporations . . . .” The facts bearing upon the legality of the assessment of the machinery are these: The receivers were authorized to continue the operation of the business of the complainant to the extent of completing the manufacture of raw materials and stock in process and on hand and of selling finished goods. To that end they operated the business until October, 1926. A difference of opinion then arose touching the point
The meaning of the governing statutory provision has not been much considered in our decisions. It was discussed in Boston & Maine Railroad v. Billerica, 262 Mass. 439, 444-449, but not with reference to the question here presented. It must be ascertained from its words, interpreted according to the common and approved usage of the language, regard being given to the nature of the property involved, to the practical administration of tax laws and to the operation of the statute as á workable piece of legislation. Duggan v. Bay State Street Railway, 230 Mass. 370, 374. It seems manifest that the General Court could not have intended that a temporary suspension in the actual use of machinery subject to local taxation should operate to exempt it. Otherwise, such taxation could always be avoided by shutting down a manufacturing plant for a brief period covering the tax date. The words of the statute “ employed in . . . manufacture ” and “ used in manufacture ” are of broad signification and import a degree of permanence. Sullivan v. Sheehan, 173 Mass. 361, 364. Roberts v. Lynn Ice Co. 187 Mass. 402, 407. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 138 Mass. 498. Commonwealth v. Osborn Mill, 130 Mass. 33. Commonwealth v. Riley, 210 Mass. 387, 392. Danovitz v. United States, 281 U. S. 389, 396. They have acquired in tax statutes a comprehensive denotation and do not lend themselves to a narrow or technical construction. Barker v. Watertown, 137 Mass. 227. Duxbury v. County Commissioners, 172 Mass. 383. Of course, “ manufacture ” has limits to its meaning, as is shown by the cases reviewed in Boston & Maine Railroad v. Billerica, 262 Mass. 439, at pages 444,
The result of the ruling that the complainant was not entitled to exemption from local taxation on its machinery was correct even though the reason given was unsound. A right decision will be supported although the reason stated for it is wrong. Reilly v. Selectmen of Blackstone, 266 Mass. 503, 512.
All the questions argued have been considered. No reversible error has been discovered.
Complainant’s exceptions overruled.
Defendant’s exceptions overruled.